International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths Forgers and Helpers v. Hardeman

• Decision Date: 24 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 123,AFL-CI,P,123
• Citation: 401 U.S. 233,28 L.Ed.2d 10,91 S.Ct. 609
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS,etitioner, v. George W. HARDEMAN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

401 U.S. 233

91 S.Ct. 609

28 L.Ed.2d 10

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS, AFL-CIO, Petitioner,

v George W. HARDEMAN.

No. 123.

Argued Dec. 16, 1970.

Decided Feb. 24, 1971.

Syllabus

Respondent, who was a member of petitioner union, assaulted the business manager of his local for allegedly failing to refer him for a job, and was tried for this conduct by the union on charges of (1) creating dissension, and working against the interest and harmony of the local, which carried a penalty of expulsion, and (2) of threatening and using force to restrain an officer from discharging the duties of his union office, punishable 'as warranted by the offense.' He was found 'guilty as charged' and expelled for an indefinite period. He later brought suit for damages alleging that petitioner violated § 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act by denying him a full and fair hearing in the disciplinary proceedings. The District Judge found that there was no transcript evidence to support the charge of creating dissension, and since the union tribunal had returned only a general verdict, held that respondent was deprived of the statutory 'full and fair hearing.' The Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted to consider whether the subject matter was pre-empted because exclusively within the competence of the National Labor Relations Board, or, if not, whether the courts below had applied the proper standard of review. Held:

1. This action was within the competence of the District Court, as the issues here are whether respondent was denied rights guaranteed him by § 101(a)(5), and, if so, his consequent entitlement, pursuant to the federal statute, to damages for that denial, questions that are irrelevant to the legality of conduct under the National Labor Relations Act. Pp. 237—241.

2. Section 101(a)(5) does not empower courts to determine what conduct may warrant disciplinary action by a union against its members. Pp. 242—245.

3. The statutory 'full and fair hearing' requires that the charging party provide some evidence at the hearing to support the charges, and here there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that respondent attacked the business manager as charged. Pp. 245—247.

420 F.2d 485, reversed.

Louis Sherman, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Robert E. McDonald, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (hereafter LMRDA) provides that a union member who charges that his union violated his rights under Title I of the Act may bring a civil action against the union in a district court of the United States for appropriate relief.¹ Respondent was expelled from membership in petitioner union and brought this action under § 102 in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. He alleged that in expelling him the petitioner violated § 101(a)(5) of the Act, 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) which provides: 'No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.' A jury awarded respondent damages of $152,150. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 420 F.2d 485 (1969).² We granted certiorari limited to the questions whether the subject matter of the suit was pre-empted because exclusively within the competence of the National Labor Relations Board and, if not pre-empted, whether the courts below had applied the proper standard of review to the union proceedings, 398 U.S. 926, 90 S.Ct. 1816, 26 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970). We reverse.

The case arises out of events in the early part of October 1960. Respondent, George Hardeman, is a boilermaker. He was then a member of petitioner's Local Lodge 112. On October 3, he went to the union hiring hall to see Herman Wise, business manager of the Local Lodge and the official responsible for referring workmen for jobs. Hardeman had talked to a friend of his, an employer who had promised to ask for him by name for a job in the vicinity. He sought assurance from Wise that he would be referred for the job. When Wise refused to make a definite commitment, Hardeman threatened violence if no work was forthcoming in the next few days.

On October 4, Hardeman returned to the hiring hall and waited for a referral. None has forthcoming. The next day, in his words, he 'went to the hall * * * and waited from the time the hall opened until we had the trouble. I tried to make up my mind what to do, whether to sue the Local or Wise or beat hell out of Wise, and then I made up my mind.' When Wise came out of his office to go to a local jobsite, as required by his duties as business manager. Hardeman handed him a copy of a telegram asking for Hardeman by name. As Wise was reading the telegram, Hardeman began punching him in the face.

Hardeman was tried for this conduct on charges of creating dissension and working against the interest and harmony of the Local Lodge,³ and of threatening and using force to restrain an officer of the Local Lodge from properly discharging the duties of his office.⁴ The trial committee found him 'guilty as charged,' and the Local Lodge sustained the finding and voted his expulsion for an indefinite period. Internal union review of this action, instituted by Hardeman, modified neither the verdict nor the penalty. Five years later, Hardeman brought this suit alleging that petitioner violated § 101(a)(5) by denying him a full and fair hearing in the union disciplinary proceedings.

I

We consider first the union's claim that the subject matter of this lawsuit is, in the first instance, within the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board. The union argues that the gravamen of Hardeman's complaint—which did not seek reinstatement, but only damages for wrongful expulsion, consisting of loss of income, loss of pension and insurance rights, mental anguish and punitive damages—is discrimination against him in job referrals; that any such conduct on the part of the union is at the very least arguably an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1) (A), 158(b)(2); and that in such circumstances, 'the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of * * * interference with national policy is to be averted.' San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); see Local 100 of United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963).

We think the union's argument is misdirected. Hardeman's complaint alleged that his expulsion was unlawful under § 101(a)(5), and sought compensation for the consequences of the claimed wrongful expulsion. The critical issue presented by Hardeman's complaint was whether the union disciplinary proceedings had denied him a full and fair hearing within the meaning of § 101- (a)(5)(C).⁵ Unless he could establish this claim, Hardeman would be out of court. We hold that this claim was not within the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.

"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction * * * applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.' United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63—64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126. The doctrine is based on the principle 'that in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over.' Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 72 S.Ct. 492, 494, 96 L.Ed. 576, and 'requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme,' United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1736, 10 L.Ed.2d 915.' Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684—685, 85 S.Ct. 1596, 1599, 14 L.Ed.2d 640 (1965) (opinion of White, J., announcing judgment).

Those factors suggesting that resort must be had to the administrative process are absent from the present case. The fairness of an internal union disciplinary proceeding is hardly a question beyond 'the conventional ex- perience of judges,' nor can it be said to raise issues 'within the special competence' of the NLRB. See N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181, 193—194, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2007, 2013—2014, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). As we noted in that case, the 86th Congress which enacted § 101(a)(5) was 'plainly of the view' that the protections embodied therein were new material in the body of federal labor law. 388 U.S. at 194, 87 S.Ct. at 2014. And that same Congress explicitly referred claims under § 101(a)(5), not to the NLRB, but to the federal district courts. This is made explicit in the opening sentence of § 102: 'Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.' Of course, ...