International Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Manatee County Port Authority

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SCHEB
• Citation: International Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Manatee County Port Authority, 472 So.2d 1321, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1771 (Fla. App. 1985)
• Decision Date: 17 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-2621,84-2621
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1771 INTERNATIONAL BULK SHIPPING, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. MANATEE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, Appellee.

Page 1321

472 So.2d 1321

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1771

INTERNATIONAL BULK SHIPPING, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. MANATEE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, Appellee.

No. 84-2621.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

July 17, 1985.

David F. Pope of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.

E.N. Fay, Jr., Bradenton, for appellee.

SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant, International Bulk Shipping, Inc. (agent), challenges the trial court's entry of a summary final judgment in favor of appellee, Manatee County Port Authority. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Manatee County Port Authority is a public entity which operates Port Manatee, a commercial port for ocean-going vessels. The port is governed by rates, rules and regulations known as Port Manatee Tariff No. 1. The agent is licensed by the port authority to act as a charterer and owner's agent for vessels calling at Port Manatee and has acted in that capacity for several years. In November 1982 the charterer of the motor vessel "Menhir" appointed the agent to make arrangements for the vessel while it docked at Port Manatee to load phosphate. The owner, pursuant to an agreement with the charterer, furnished the agent with sufficient funds to pay for the ordinary port expenses. Because of the length of the M/V Menhir and certain restrictions on loading machinery at the Manatee Terminals, it was necessary to turn the vessel around to complete loading. This shifting process involved the assistance of tugs, pilots, and line handlers and gave rise to an unanticipated shifting charge of $380. Soon after the vessel left port, the port authority billed the agent $5,174.31 for total services including the unanticipated charge. The agent denied liability for the $380, and, as a result, the full amount of the invoice remained unpaid.

The port authority filed suit against the agent for recovery of the invoice amount. Each side moved for summary judgment. The trial judge concluded that there was an issue of material fact as to the liability of an agent for a disclosed principal under the provisions of Port Manatee Tariff No. 1. Thus, he denied both motions. Thereafter, the port authority renewed its motion for summary judgment. This time, along with its motion, it submitted a deposition from Antonio M. Lubrano, the agent's vice president, concerning his company's role as agent. After considering the renewed motion and deposition, the trial judge concluded that there was no longer a genuine issue as to any material fact. On the basis of the pleadings, deposition, and affidavits, the court rendered summary final judgment for the port authority for $5,174.31 in damages, plus $1,174.55 in interest and $203.75 in court costs. This appeal by International Bulk Shipping ensued.

We have examined each point presented by the agent and conclude that there is just one meritorious issue: can International Bulk Shipping, acting as agent for a disclosed principal, be held liable for unanticipated shifting charges under the port authority's tariff provision imposing liability on agents for "wharfage and similar bills"?

As the agent points out, absent an express agreement to the contrary, a maritime agent, acting for a disclosed principal, is not personally liable for the debts of the principal. See Blount v. Tomlinson, 57 Fla. 35, 48 So. 751 (1909). See also Atlantic Gulf Stevedores v. Revelle Shipping Agency, 750 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1985); Lake City Stevedores, Inc. v. East West Shipping Agencies, Inc., 474 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir.1973). To apply this general proposition to the facts of this case, we must examine two questions. First, was the identity of the principal (vessel or vessel owner) known by the port authority? Second, did the provisions of the tariff constitute an express agreement that the agent would be responsible for goods and services furnished to its principal?

We find that the first prong of the test is met, since the port authority's invoice for the charges at issue lists the name of the vessel receiving the services. Golden Marine Co. v. World Tide Shipping Corp., 1975 AMC 160 (N.Y. City Ct.1974) (disclosure held sufficient where plaintiff invoiced the vessel and owner in care of the agent); T.T.T. Travel Service, Inc., v. Rogers Terminals and Shipping Corp., 1983 AMC 2597 (E.D.La.1983) (disclosure of vessel's name alone held sufficient for parties experienced in maritime transactions).

The second prong presents more difficulty. The port authority urges that we affirm the summary judgment on the ground that Port Manatee Tariff No. 1 imposes liability on the agent for services such as those involved here. We disagree. Rather, we think there remains a viable issue as to whether that liability includes payment of...