International Harvester Co. v. Williams, 6 Div. 741.

Decision Date12 March 1931
Docket Number6 Div. 741.
Citation222 Ala. 589,133 So. 270
PartiesINTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. ET AL. v. WILLIAMS.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied April 9, 1931.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Gardner Goodwyn, Judge.

Action by Elgin Williams, Jr., a minor, suing by his next friend Elgin Williams, Sr., against the International Harvester Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Charge respecting recovery in case minds of jurors were left in state of confusion held properly refused as argumentative.

The following charges were refused to defendants:

"27. The court charges the jury that the International Harvester Company of America was a mere bailor of the International truck that is alleged to have had said accident, and you are not authorized to find for the plaintiff against International Harvester Company of America unless you are reasonably satisfied that the International Harvester Company of America knowingly permitted said truck to be driven by an incompetent driver.
"28. The court charges the jury that the International Harvester Company of America was the bailor of the truck that is alleged to have had the accident and that the driver of said truck was a bailee, and I further charge you that the International Harvester Company of America is not liable for the negligent acts of said driver unless the International Harvester Company of America knew that the driver of said truck was an incompetent driver and entrusted said truck to said driver."
"E. The court charges you that defendant's driver Hannon was under no duty to assume that Elgin Williams, Jr., would step or run suddenly across the road against the defendants' truck."
"H. The court charges you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff on the occasion complained of, was capable of exercising judgment and discretion, and believing this fact you further believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injury, you must return a verdict for the defendants."
"K. I charge you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that, if after considering all the evidence in this case, your minds are left in a state of confusion and bewilderment and you cannot from the evidence determine to your reasonable satisfaction whether defendants breached any duty owing to the plaintiff, then, gentlemen, you cannot find a verdict for the plaintiff."
"O. The court charges you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that if you believe from the evidence in this case, that plaintiff knew that the automobiles or vehicles would probably be approaching the point where he was crossing the road at the time he was so crossing and in such close proximity to him that he would probably be injured by said automobiles or vehicles unless he exercised reasonable care in looking up and down said road for such approaching vehicles, and if you further believe, from the evidence, that through inattention, inadvertence, carelessness, or forgetfulness, he proceeded across said road without looking up and down said road for such approaching vehicles, and as a proximate consequence thereof, sustained his alleged injuries, then, I charge you, you cannot find a verdict for the plaintiff."
"T. The court charges you that the evidence in this case is undisputed that Elgin Williams, Jr. ran into the side of the truck of the defendants.
"U. The court charges you that the evidence is undisputed in this case that the defendants' truck did not strike the plaintiff, Elgin Williams, Jr."
"A-7. You are not authorized to award plaintiff anything in this case for the purpose of punishing the defendants."
"A-18. The court charges the jury that if after considering all of the evidence in this case you find that you are reasonably satisfied thereby that such evidence leaves the issue equally balanced as to whether Elgin Williams, Jr. ran against the truck or the truck ran against him then you should resolve the issue in favor of the defendants and render your verdict for defendants."
"A-20. You are not authorized to find from the evidence in this case that Elgin Williams, Jr. has suffered permanent injury.
"A-21. The court charges you that you cannot award the plaintiff, Elgin Williams, Jr. any damages on account of permanent injuries."

Coleman, Coleman, Spain & Stewart, of Birmingham, and Huey, Welch & Stone, of Bessemer, for appellants.

Perry, Mims & Green, of Bessemer, for appellee.

BROWN J.

Elgin Williams, Jr., a boy, age seven years, on the last anniversary of his birth, September 15, 1929, after alighting from a school bus in which he had been riding on his way home from school on November 4, 1929, while crossing a public highway near his home, came in collision with a passing truck, and as a consequence both bones in his left leg were broken a few inches below his knee.

The boy and his father each brought suit against the defendant; the boy claiming damages for the personal injury, the father claiming damages for loss of services of his minor son and expenses incident to the treatment of his injury. Both suits, by agreement of the parties, were tried at the same time before the same jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants have appealed. The questions presented by the assignments of error insisted upon are the same in both cases, and have been considered together.

The evidence is without dispute that Elgin Williams, Jr., was one of several school children who had been transported to the place of the injury in a school bus, and from three to five minutes before the injury the bus, which had been proceeding north along the highway, parked at one of the regular stopping places to allow some of the children to disembark, and that from seven to ten children, ranging in age from seven to seventeen, alighted from the bus and were separating to go to their respective homes.

Elgin's home was on Oak street, which intersected the highway on the west immediately opposite from the point where the bus stopped. Oak street did not cross the highway, but led off therefrom in a southwesterly direction. Elgin was the first to alight from the bus, and immediately passed around the rear thereof and, in his effort to cross the highway on his way home, came in collision with the passing truck immediately opposite the driver's seat. When he was last observed by the plaintiff's witnesses, he had passed behind the bus and was running across the highway between its center and the east margin, going west. The plaintiff's witnesses did not see the collision and the bus proceeded north without the driver or occupants thereof learning of the collision. The time of the collision was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of November 4, 1929.

The evidence offered by the plaintiff further goes to show that the truck was proceeding south to the right of the center of the highway, at a rate of speed from twenty-five to thirty miles per hour, and that no signals of its approach were given as it approached and passed the place of the collision; that it ran beyond the point of the collision about seventy-five feet before coming to a stop.

The evidence offered by the defendants goes to show that the driver of the truck with his companion were on their way from Birmingham to Carrolton in Pickens county; that they were strangers and unfamiliar with the highway over which they were traveling; that the driver observed the bus when within one hundred yards of it; that it appeared to be an interurban passenger bus; that there was nothing in its appearance to indicate that it was a school bus; that as the truck approached the bus, he observed only one boy who was standing near the front end of the bus; that he glimpsed the boy, Elgin, just as he ran or walked against the passing truck.

The defendants' evidence further goes to show that the horn on the truck was sounded when the truck was within twenty to twenty-five feet of the bus; that as the truck approached the bus its speed was reduced from twenty miles per hour, which was its maximum speed, and when the collision occurred it was moving about five miles per hour, and was stopped within a few feet.

The judgment here is that the evidence and its conflicting tendencies presented a question for jury decision, as to whether the conduct of the driver of the truck in approaching and passing the school bus, while engaged in discharging its passengers, was in consonance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man. If, as some of the evidence tended to show, the operator of the truck approached said bus without signals and at such rate of speed as that he was not able to observe the situation and avert the collision, this would warrant a finding that he was guilty of negligence. Reaves v. Maybank, 193 Ala. 614, 60 So. 137. On the other hand, if he discovered that a number of children were alighting from the bus and separating, going in different directions, and this was for the jury, and failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent person to avoid injury, this would constitute negligence. Reaves v. Maybank, supra.

The appellants however insist, notwithstanding the evidence may warrant a finding of negligence on the part of the operator of the truck, that they were entitled to the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Maddox
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 20 January 1938
    ... ... 594 LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MADDOX ET AL. 6 Div. 92.Supreme Court of AlabamaJanuary 20, 1938 ... 510, 143 So. 893; ... International Harvester Co. v. Williams, 222 Ala ... 589, 133 ... ...
  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 14 May 1942
    ... ... 1 WILSON v. STATE. 1 Div. 157. Supreme Court of Alabama May 14, 1942 ... "6 ... I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that ... Ala. 327, 330, 71 So. 404; International Harvester Co. v ... Williams, 222 Ala. 589, ... ...
  • General Motors Corp. v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 15 November 1985
    ...aggrieved party seeks compensation. Smith v. Alabama Water Service Co., 225 Ala. 510, 143 So. 893 (1932); International Harvester Co. v. Williams, 222 Ala. 589, 133 So. 270 (1931). Second, the mere presence of a causal connection, that is to say, a cause and effect relationship between a pa......
  • Cox v. Roberts
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 17 October 1946
    ...27 So.2d 617 248 Ala. 372 COX v. ROBERTS. 6 Div. 390.Supreme Court of AlabamaOctober 17, 1946 ... 336, 122 ... So. 351; International Harvester Co. et al. v ... Williams, 222 Ala ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT