INTERNATIONAL LADIES', ETC. v. DeeVILLE, ETC.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-705.
• Citation: 486 F. Supp. 1253
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 111 v. DeeVILLE BLOUSE CO., INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

486 F. Supp. 1253

INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 111 v. DeeVILLE BLOUSE CO., INC.

Civ. A. No. 79-705.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

March 17, 1980.

Charles W. Johnston, Jr., Harrisburg, Pa., for plaintiff.

Roland Morris, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TROUTMAN, District Judge.

Threatening to strike, plaintiff union sent defendant a letter in May 1975 and demanded access to company payroll books and other records according to provisions of a collective bargaining agreement into which the parties had entered.¹ When defendant refused to permit plaintiff to inspect all records which it desired, plaintiff submitted the dispute to an arbitrator,² who determined that defendant had violated the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. Having filed this action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce the arbitrator's decision, plaintiff now moves for summary judgment, which will be granted.

The scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is "narrow in the extreme", Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workers of North America, Local 195 v. Cross Butchers Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 (3d Cir. 1975),³ for federal labor policy favors arbitration as the means selected by the parties for the final adjustment of their differences. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 2 v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1977).⁴ Refusal to review the merits of an arbitration award is

the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards. * * *

The question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation is different from his.

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360-1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (emphasis added). Review of arbitration awards is circumscribed further by the following test:

An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When an arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.

Id. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361 (emphasis added). A labor arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" when

the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.

Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).

In the case at bar the arbitrator interpreted Article XXII of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. This article, captioned "Access to Shop—Examination of Books—Payroll Records", included these provisions:

1. Representatives and employees of the Union, including engineers and accountants, shall have access to the shop of the Employer during working hours to take up complaints or to determine compliance with the terms of this agreement.

2. The Employer shall, upon request, submit to such representatives and employees of the Union the payroll books and records and all other pertinent books and records for examination for the purpose of determining compliance with the terms of this agreement, and the data including time study records employed in setting wages and piece rates.

3. The failure of the Employer to permit access to the shop or to submit such books, records or data shall be presumptive evidence of the violation complained of and shall justify sustaining the Union's complaint. Moreover, in the event of such failure by the Employer, the Union at its option may consider that the Employer has forfeited its rights under the agreement.

4. The Employer shall send to the Union office monthly a copy of its payroll for the last work week of the preceding month, which shall include for each employee his name, date of employment, craft, operation and section, straight-time hours and wages and overtime hours and wages.

Plaintiff contends that Section 2 of Article XXII creates an absolute right of access to defendant's books and records "for the purpose of determining compliance with the terms of the agreement" between the parties. Defendant maintains that Section 2, read as a part of the entire agreement, limits plaintiff's right of access to only certain specific books and records and only under certain circumstances. Specifically, defendant asserts that plaintiff can obtain only payroll books and records. The language "and all other pertinent books and records", argues defendant, merely describes records which pertain to payroll. Furthermore, the right of access must be pertinent to "the violation complained of". Under defendant's theory, plaintiff would have to be certain, in advance of the requested access, of its basis for claiming a violation of the agreement by defendant.

Careful examination of the language of Article XXII refutes defendant's contentions. In Section 1 plaintiff receives a right of access to the shop not only to take up actual disputes but also to see if defendant has been complying with the terms of their agreement. Access is not conditioned on the existence of a complaint, for the section provides that union representatives may enter the shop "to take up complaints" or "to determine compliance".

Similarly, in Section 2 defendant agrees, upon request of plaintiff, to submit to union representatives or employees its "payroll books and records and all other pertinent books and records for examination for the purposes of determining compliance with the terms of the agreement". This last phrase, "for the purpose . . .", is identical to the language of Section 1, where the parties acknowledge a distinction between access to the shop for complaints and compliance. The arbitrator reasonably assumed that the parties were cognizant of this distinction in drafting Section 2. By expressly including compliance, instead of limiting the language to complaints, the parties clearly expressed the intent that submission of the books was not conditioned upon the existence of a complaint. Section 2 affords plaintiff, acting in good faith, of course, access to defendant's payroll books and records and all other pertinent books and records without any limiting preconditions.

Section 3 creates certain presumptions and rights in the event of a violation of the previous two sections. Defendant points to the terms of this section as authority for the proposition that the parties contemplated production of other pertinent books and records only if plaintiff alleges a particular violation of the agreement. In particular, defendant points to the language of Section 3, which states that "the failure of the Employer to submit such books, records or data shall be presumptive evidence of the violation complained of and shall justify sustaining the Union's complaint." Defendant stresses the language "of the violation complained of" and argues that this phrase shows the parties' intention to condition access to books and records upon a specific violation of which plaintiff would complain. However, neither Section 2 nor 3 supports this view. The presumption articulated in Section 3 not only applies to submission of books, records and data but also to access to defendant's shop. Once again, the pertinent language is couched in the disjunctive. The presumption created by Section 3 clearly applies to both access to the shop, a right created by Section 1, and submission of books and records, a right created by Section 2. Therefore, if a complaint is pending and the union, to investigate the complaint, attempts to gain, and defendant denies, access to the shop or to books and records, Section 3 creates a presumption that defendant committed the alleged violation. Keeping in mind, as defendant argues, that access to books and records depends upon the existence of a complaint, it would necessarily follow that access to defendant's shop also depends upon such a complaint. Regrettably for defendant, this interpretation squarely contradicts the express language of the collective bargaining agreement.

The arbitrator also rejected defendant's interpretation of Article XXII. He concluded that

the entire wording of these provisions, as agreed to and signed by defendant, makes it a kind of "discovery provision under which defendant has agreed, in advance, to make available its "payroll books and records and all other pertinent books and records for examination for the purpose of determining compliance with the terms of this Agreement . . ." This is a provision which has been used as a "discovery" procedure throughout all of the Agreements with which the Arbitrator has been acquainted in the several branches of the Women's Apparel Industry in Eastern Pennsylvania and Southern New Jersey, whether they be jobbers, jobbers-contractors, contractors, or subcontractors.

Past Union access to the books and pertinent records of other Women's Apparel companies with which the present Arbitrator has been involved for some 20 years have uncovered instances in which employers have been subcontracting work to

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