International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Board, AFL-CI
Decision Date | 05 June 1961 |
Docket Number | AFL-CI,No. 284,P,284 |
Citation | 81 S.Ct. 1603,6 L.Ed.2d 762,366 U.S. 731 |
Parties | INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION,etitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Charles J. Morris, Dallas, Tex., and Morris P. Glushien, New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. Dominick L. Manoli, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
We are asked to decide in this case whether it was an unfair labor practice for both an employer and a union to enter into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of certain of his employees, although in fact only a minority of those employees had authorized the union to represent their interests.The Board found1 that by extending such recognition, even though done in the good-faith belief that the union had the consent of a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, the employer interfered with the organizational rights of his employees in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act and that such recognition also constituted unlawful support to a labor organization in vio- lation of § 8(a)(2).2 In addition, the Board found that the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A)3 by its acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority at a time when in fact it did not have the support of a majority of the employees, and this in spite of its bona fide belief that it did.Accordingly, the Board ordered the unfair labor practices discontinued and directed the hl ding of a representation election.The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, granted enforcement, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 280 F.2d 616.We granted certiorari.364 U.S. 811, 81 S.Ct. 68, 5 L.Ed.2d 44.We agree with the Board and the Court of Appeals that such extension and acceptance of recognition constitute unfair labor practices, and that the remedy provided was appropriate.
In October 1956the petitioner union initiated an organizational campaign at Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's knitwear manufacturing plant in San Antonio, Texas.No other labor organization was similarly engaged at that time.During the course of that campaign, on July 29, 1957, certain of the company's Topping Department employees went on strike in protest against a wage reduction.That dispute was in no way related to the union campaign, however, and the organizational efforts were continued during the strike.Some of the striking employees had signed authorization cards solicited by the union during its drive, and, while the strike was in progress, the union entered upon a course of negotiations with the employer.As a result of those negotiations, held in New York City where the home offices of both were located, on August 30, 1957, the employer and union signed a 'memorandum of understanding.'In that memorandum the company recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of 'all production and shipping employees.'The union representative asserted that the union's comparison of the employee authorization cards in its possession with the number of eligible employees representatives of the company furnished it indicated that the union had in fact secured such cards from a majority of employees in the unit.Neither employer nor union made any effort at that time to check the cards in the union's possession against the employee roll, or otherwise, to ascertain with any degree of certainty that the union's assertion, later found by the Board to be erroneous,4 was founded on fact rather than upon good-faith assumption.The agreement, containing no union security provisions, called for the ending of the strike and for certain improved wages and conditions of employment.It also provided that a 'formal agreement containing these terms' would 'be promptly drafted * * * and signed by both parties within the next two weeks.'
Thereafter, on October 10, 1957, a formal collective bargaining agreement, embodying the terms of the August 30 memorandum, was signed by the parties.The bargaining unit description set out in the formal contract although more specific, conformed to that contained in the prior memorandum.It is not disputed that as of execution of the forma contract the union in fact represented a clear majority of employees in the appropriate unit.5In upholding the complaints filed against the employer and union by the General Counsel, the Board decided6 that the employer's good-faith belief that the union in fact represented a majority of employees in the unit on the critical date of the memorandum of understanding was not a defense, 'particularly where, as here, the Company made no effort to check the authorization cards against its payroll records.'122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292.Noting that the union was 'actively seeking recognition at the time such recognition was granted,' and that 'the Union was (not) the passive recipient of an unsolicited gift bestowed by the Company,' the Board found that the union's execution of the August 30 agreement was a 'direct deprivation' of the nonconsenting majority employees' organizational and bargaining rights.At pp. 1292, 1293, note 9.Accordingly, the Board ordered the employer to withhold all recognition from the union and to cease giving effect to agreements entered into with the union;7 the union was ordered to cease acting as bargaining representative of any of the employees until such time as a Boardconducted election demonstrated its majority status, and to refrain from seeking to enforce the agreements previously entered.
The Court of Appeals found it difficult to 'conceive of a clearer restraint on the employees' right of self-organization than for their employer to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with a minority of the employees.'280 F.2d at page 619.The court distinguished our decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 710, on the ground that there was involved here neither recognitional nor organizational picketing.The court held that the bona fides of the parties was irrelevant except to the extent that it 'was arrived at through an adequate effort to determine the true facts of the situation.'280 F.2d at page 622.
At the outset, we reject as without relevance to our decision the fact that, as of the execution date of the formal agreement on October 10, petitioner represented a majority of the employees.As the Court of Appeals indicated, the recognition of the minority union on August 30, 1957, was 'a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative.'280 F.2d at page 621.It is, therefore, of no consequence that petitioner may have acquired by October 10 the necessary majority if, during the interim, it was acting unlawfully.Indeed, such acquisition of majority status itself might indicate that the recognition secured by the August 30 agreement afforded petitioner a deceptive cloak of authority with which to persuasively elicit additional employee support.
Nor does this case directly involve a strike.The strike which occurred was in protest against a wage reduction and had nothing to do with petitioner's quest for recognition.Likewise, no question of picketing is presented.Lastly, the violation which the Board found was the grant by the employer of exclusive representation status to a minority union, as distinguished from an employer's bargaining with a minority union for its members only.Therefore, the exclusive representation provision is the vice in the agreement, and discussion of 'collective bargaining,' as distinguished from 'exclusive recognition,' is pointless.8Moreover, the insistence that we hold the agreement valid and enforceable as to those employees who consented to it must be rejected.On the facts shown, the agreement must fail in its entirety.It was obtained under the erroneous claim of majority representation.Perhaps the employer would not have entered into it if he had known the facts.Quite apart from other conceivable situations, the unlawful genesis of this agreement precludes its partial validity.
In their selection of a bargaining representative, § 9(a) of the Wagner Act guarantees employees freedom of choice and majority rule.J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 339, 64 S.Ct. 576, 581, 88 L.Ed. 762.In short, as we said in Brooks v. National Labor Relations Board, 348 U.S. 96, 103, 75 S.Ct. 176, 181, 99 L.Ed. 125, the Act placed 'a nonconsenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the workers.'Here, however, the reverse has been shown to be the case.Bernhard-Altmann granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the nonconsenting majority.There could be no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the Act, assuring employees the right 'to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing' or 'to refrain from' such activity.9It follows, without need of further demonstration, that the employer activity found present here violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act which prohibits employer interference with, and restraint of, employee exercise of § 7 rights.Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 'contribute * * * support' to a labor organization.The law has long been settled that a grant of exclusive recognition to a minority union constitutes unlawful support in violation of that section, because the union so favored is given 'a marked advantage over any other in securing the adherence of employees,' National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267, 58 S.Ct. 571, 574, 82 L.Ed. 831.In the Taft-Hartley Law, Congress added § 8(b)(1)(A) to the Wagner Act, prohibiting, as the Court...
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