International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Georgia Ports Authority, AFL-CIO

• Citation: 124 S.E.2d 733,217 Ga. 712
• Decision Date: 08 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 21552,AFL-CIO,21552
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION,, et al. v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 733

124 S.E.2d 733

217 Ga. 712

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, et al. v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY.

No. 21552.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 8, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court

1. (a) The State Ports Authority is a creature of the State (Ga.L.1945, p. 464); and in the operation of the Savannah Port Terminals acts as an instrumentality of the State for governmental purposes, and is not an 'employer' subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. (29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2, 3)).

(b) It appearing from the petition that the purpose of the strike by the employees of the Port Authority and the subsequent picketing of the Savannah Terminals by such employees and others was to force the authority to enter into a labor bargaining agreement with the defendant labor organizations and that such action was against the public policy of the State and unlawful, the court did not err in overruling the general demurrer and the motion to dismiss.

2. The order permanently enjoining the defendants from picketing the premises of the Port Authority was demanded by the law and evidence.

Hartridge & Hartridge, Julian Hartridge, Sr., Savannah, Sewall Myer, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Adams, Adams & Brennan, Anton F. Solms, Jr., Savannah, Fisher & Phillips, Erle Phillips, John Bacheller, Jr., Atlanta, for defendant in error.

ALMAND, Justice.

The bill of exceptions seeks to review orders: (1) overruling a general demurrer and a motion to dismiss a petition praying for injunctive relief and (2) enjoining permanently the defendants from picketing the premises of the plaintiff. The questions of law presented by the pleadings and evidence are (a) is the Georgia Ports Authority an employer under the provision of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2, 3)) and subject to its jurisdiction? and (b) if it is not so subject, was it error to enjoin the defendants from engaging in peaceful picketing?

1. The general demurrer and motion to dismiss. In its petition the Georgia Ports Authority, alleging itself to be an instrumentality and a political subdivision of the State of Georgia in the operation of the Savannah State Docks and warehouses, named as defendants the national and local organizations of the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and two of their officers, individually and as representatives of the class composed of members of both groups. In the operation of state docks and warehouses at its Garden City Terminals and Ocean Terminals it employs a hundred or more persons. In October, 1960, the Ports Authority received a letter dated October 25, 1960, from the defendant, Massey, an officer of the international association, enclosing a contract on behalf of the defendant local association. The proposed agreement provided a schedule of wages, for straight time and overtime, a basic working day of eight hours, holidays, and contributions by the Ports Authority to a welfare, pension, and vacation fund for the benefit of its employees. The members of the local association were to be given employment if they were available and could satisfactorily qualify as to physical fitness and experience. Should the union file a complaint with the Ports Authority regarding the discharge of a member of the union, the matter was to be referred to a grievance committee composed of two men chosen by the union and two chosen by the Ports Authority. If these four could not agree they would appoint a fifth member, and a decision by a majority of this committee would be binding on the Ports Authority. Matters of seniority were to be settled by negotiation, and all disputes and controversies arising if not settled by the parties to the agreement were to be submitted to a board of arbitration. Massey, in transmitting the proposed agreement, said: 'We are proposing that you accept same, notifying the undersigned as soon as possible preferably in fifteen (15) days of your decision.'

The Ports Authority did not respond to the letter or execute the contract. It was alleged that, on December 8, 1960, the defendants caused pickets to be placed in front of both entrances to the Garden City Terminals of the Ports Authority carrying signs reading 'State Docks Unfair to ILA, AFL-CIO. Non-Union State Docks Unfair to ILA, AFL-CIO.' The warehouse employees of the Ports Authority and the longshoremen, members of the local union, refused to cross the picket lines. The reason for the picketing was to force the Ports Authority to sign the proposed contract, which proposal as to employment would be in violation of the laws of Georgia. (Code Ann., §§ 54-902, 54-801, 54-804; Ga.L.1947, pp. 616-621) It was further alleged that the defendants were seeking through picketing to compel the Ports Authority to recognize the defendant union organization as the exclusive bargaining agent of its warehouse employees and to execute the proposed labor contract which the Ports Authority is not required to do as a political subdivision of the State and, as such, is immune from any picketing by the defendants.

It was further alleged that the Ports Authority in the operation of its facilities handles and dispatches cargo vital to national defense; that the general economy of Georgia is dependent upon receiving and shipping of many items of products; and that the closing of the port facilities will cause irreparable injury.

The petition prayed for a temporary and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from picketing the Ports Authority's facilities.

(a) One of the grounds of the general demurrer and the motion to dismiss is that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, a dispute between an employer, engaged in interstate commerce, and its employees as to wages and working conditions, but that the exclusive jurisdiction of such controversies was vested in the National Labor Relations Board under the Labor Management Act. (29 U.S.C.A. § 151). See § 152(2, 3) of that Act which provides that the term 'employer' 'shall not include * * * any State or political subdivision thereof,' and the term 'employee' 'shall not include any individual employed * * * by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.'

The petitioner in this case was created by the legislative Act of 1945 (Ga.L.1945, p. 464; as amended Ga.L.1949, p. 778, Ga.L.1955, p. 120, Ga.L.1958, p. 714, Ga.L.1960, p. 150), and all of its authority, powers, and duties are provided for by that Act. That Act created '* * * a body corporate and politic to be known as The State Ports Authority, which shall be deemed to be an instrumentality of the State of Georgia and a public corporation * * *. Said Authority shall have perpetual existence.' The authority consists of five members appointed by the Governor. It was authorized to own, operate, and maintain wharves, docks, ships, piers, warehouses, and other structures and '* * * any and all facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce * * *.' It was granted authority to acquire property for public use by purchase, lease, or condemnation, and to use and administer such sums of money appropriated by the General Assembly for the purposes of the authority. Section 15 of the Act of 1945, Code Ann., § 98-217, provides: 'It is hereby found, determined and declared that the creation of the Authority and the carrying out of its corporate purpose is in all respects for the benefit of the people of this State and is a public purpose and that the Authority will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by this Act,' and that the property and revenue bonds of the authority should be exempt from all taxation within the state. The Act as amended provides that the Ports Authority can sell, lease, or mortgage any of its properties only after being approved by the Governor, State Auditor, and Attorney General, and cannot purchase any real property without the consent and approval of the State Property Acquisition Commission.

Article VII, § II, Par. 1(6) of the Constitution of 1945 (Code Ann., § 2-5501 § 6) authorizes the General Assembly to levy taxes to be used to construct and maintain state docks. In Sigman v. Brunswick Port Authority, 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467, we had before us the validity of certain provisions of the Act of 1945 (Ga.L.1945, p. 1023) creating the Brunswick Port Authority. In all essential respects, pertinent to the issue here, that Act is similar to the State Ports Authority Act of the same year. It was there held that the Ports Authority holds title to the property it possesses only for the benefit of the State and the public; that the authority is an instrumentality of the State or a subordinate public authority or corporation of the State; that public property embraces property held by a subordinate public corporation holding the same exclusively for the benefit of the State; that 'Property used for...