International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission

• Decision Date: 09 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 8857,8857
• Citation: 1970 NMSC 32,81 N.M. 280,466 P.2d 557
• Parties: , 83 P.U.R.3d 405 INTERNATIONAL MINERALS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee, Southwestern Public Service Company, Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 557

466 P.2d 557

81 N.M. 280, 83 P.U.R.3d 405

INTERNATIONAL MINERALS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee Southwestern Public Service Company, Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 8857.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 9, 1970.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Albuquerque, for petitioner-appellant

James A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., John D. Donnell, James L. Parmelee, Jr., Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent-appellee.

Hinkle, Bondurant & Christy, Paul W. Eaton, Roswell, for intervenor-appellee.

OPINION

WATSON, Justice.

International Minerals and Chemical Corporation purchases electricity for the operation of its potash mine near Carlsbad, New Mexico, from Southwestern Public Service Company, a public utility which is subject to regulation by the New Mexico Public Service Commission. Pursuant to § 68--8--1, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., International filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that the rates charged it and other potash companies near Carlsbad by Southwestern are unfair, unreasonable, and unjust in that such rates create an unreasonable difference as to rate of service between different classes of service.

Section 68--6--6, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., among other things provides:

'* * * No public utility shall establish and maintain any unreasonable differences as to rates of service either as between localities or as between classes of service.'

After a hearing in which Southwestern participated, the Commission, by order, denied the complaint; and International sought review by the District Court of Eddy County. After a hearing on the record of the proceedings before the Commission, as provided by § 68--9--3, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. (1969 Supp.), the court found that the order of the Commission 'is lawful and reasonable and is supported by substantial evidence.' It then affirmed the Commission's action. International then appealed to this court.

Appellant's first point is that the Commission's order should be vacated because it does not comply with § 68--8--14, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., and thus the district court erred in affirming the Commission's order. Appellant calls our attention to our holding in Hardin v. State Tax Commission, 78 N.M. 477, 432 P.2d 833 (1967), where we said: 'This court, in reviewing the district court's judgment, must, in the first instance, make the same review of the administrative agency's action as did the district court.'

Section 68--8--14, supra, provides:

'After the conclusion of any hearing the commission shall make and file its findings and order. The findings of fact shall consist only of such ultimate facts as are necessary to determine the controverted questions presented by the proceeding. Such findings shall be separately stated and numbered, and each thereof shall state briefly and plainly an ultimate fact necessary to determine a controverted question; and there shall be such a finding of fact as to each of the controverted questions presented by the proceeding. The order of the commission shall be based upon said findings of fact * * *.' (Emphasis Added.)

Here the Commission after finding it had jurisdiction and that notice had been given found:

'That Complainant falls within the classification of retail customer of Respondent while REA cooperatives and wholesale customers fall within the classification of wholesale customers of Respondent and that Respondents (sic) rates on file with and previously approved by this Commission allow a lower charge to its wholesale and REA cooperative customers than to its retail customers.

'That by some standards, Complainant is a more desirable customer than some wholesale and REA cooperative customers but not by all standards.

'That a substantial difference exists between transmission investments by REA cooperative customers and that of the Complainant.

'That many other factual differences exist between the respective services offered by Respondent to Complainant and to Respondent's wholesale and REA cooperative customers.

'That Complainant's financial position would be enhanced by the enjoyment of rates commensurate with wholesale and REA cooperative rates but that this fact is not solely determinative of the issues raised by this Complaint.

'That rates charged to different classes of service need not be equally profitable to the utility and the rate of return need not be the same.

'That Complainant has failed to sustain the burden of proving unlawful or unreasonable discrimination exists between the rates charged to its classification of service and to other classifications of service of the Respondent or as to rates charged to various members of its own classification.'

The controverted question here presented was whether the admitted difference in electrical rates charged International and the potash companies as compared to wholesale and REA cooperative consumers is unreasonably different within the meaning of that portion of § 68--6--6, supra, quoted above. Appellant International asks how the trial court could properly say that the Commission's order was reasonable since it could not determine from the Commission's findings what standards it used in making its decision. Appellant states for its second point that if some of the Commission's findings are deemed relevant then we must assume that the Commission erroneously interpreted the law.

Certainly we cannot read the Commission's findings and ascertain its specific reasons for denying International's complaint, but § 68--8--14, supra, requires that the Commission find only the ultimate fact and does not require it to give reasons for its decision. The ultimate fact is the logical result of the proofs reached by reasoning from the evident facts. It is a conclusion of fact. Christmas v. Cowden, 44 N.M. 517, 105 P.2d 484 (1940); Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962). In Brundage v. K. L. House Construction Co., 74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731 (1964), we approved ultimate findings of fact which were practically the applicable words of the workmen's compensation statute. The requirement of only a finding of the ultimate fact is not the most desirable method of assuring clear thinking by the administrative agency or effective judicial review of the agency's decision. 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law, 465--467 (1965). This may be so, but the Commission must be guided by the statute which created it.

Had the Commission found that no unreasonable discrimination existed between the rates charged to International's classification of service and to respondent's classifications of service, we believe under our prior holdings this would have been a finding of the ultimate fact in this case. Except for the opening phrase, 'That Complainant has failed to sustain the burden of proving unlawful or unreasonable discrimination * * *,' and the closing phrase, 'or as to rates charged to various members of its own classification,' in its last finding above, this is what the Commission did find. We do not think that the addition of these two phrases, or the fact that the findings were unnumbered, would justify a reversal on the grounds that the requirements of § 68--8--14, supra, were not followed. S.I.C. Finance-Loans of Menaul, Inc. v. Upton, 75 N.M. 780, 411 P.2d 755 (1966). Compare Ross v. State...