International Paper Co. v. Farm Credit Corp., Civ. No. 88-0704 (JP).
| Decision Date | 22 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 88-0704 (JP). |
| Citation | 760 F. Supp. 18 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. FARM CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Edgardo Colón Arrarás, Goldman, Antonetti, Ferralloli, Axtmayer and Hertell, Santurce, Puerto Rico, for plaintiff.
Jaime Brugueras, Ramírez & Ramírez, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for defendant.
This case arises from a series of deliveries plaintiff made to April Agro Industries, Inc. ("April Agro"), in March and April of 1986, based on a $300,000.00 line of credit plaintiff granted to April Agro during that same period of time. Plaintiff International Paper claimed damages in the amount of $296,491.89 against defendant Corporación de Crédito Agrícola ("CCA"). The case went to trial on March 12, 1991. On March 14, 1991, this Court orally granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We further elaborate on the Court's oral ruling.
The standard for granting a motion for directed verdict is based upon the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The Court must evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury. See 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2524 (1971). In order to grant the motion, the Court must conclude that the evidence must permit thoughtful factfinders to reach but one reasoned conclusion. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1987). In making this determination, the Court cannot weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, all evidence and the inferences reasonably flowing therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. However, a "mere scintilla" of evidence is not enough to forestall a directed verdict. Fashion House, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1989); Desfosses v. Wallace Energy, Inc., 836 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.1987). The First Circuit's "scintilla of evidence" standard was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In addition, Anderson held that a judge must consider substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case in determining whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury.
In this case, the plaintiff claims that it was misled into believing that the defendant would pay for the shipments of cartons it delivered to April Agro during the months of March and April of 1986. Plaintiff argues that the actions and conduct of CCA induced it to grant a $300,000.00 line of credit to April Agro and deliver this merchandise, especially pointing out the fact that plaintiff was paid $40,150.30 on April 3, 1986, and $49,106.72 on April 15, 1986. According to the relevant law, the plaintiff must show that a binding offer in the form of a promise was made, and that the promise was definite and certain so that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that this promise would have induced reliance. Santoni v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 677 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1982). In other words, a directed verdict can only be granted if the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that there was a binding offer in the form of a promise, and the actions of the defendant reasonably led to reliance on that promise. After carefully considering the plaintiff's evidence presented to the jury in light of the applicable law, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to warrant submission of this case to the jury.
According to the First Circuit's interpretation of Puerto Rico's adoption of the doctrine of promissory estoppel through judicial decisions, the first essential element of promissory estoppel is a binding offer in the form of a promise. This promise must be definite and certain so that the promisor should reasonably foresee that it will induce reliance by the promisee or a third party. Santoni, 677 F.2d at 179 (1st Cir.1982). Viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that there was sufficient evidence to show that there was 1) a binding offer that was definite and certain; and 2) plaintiff's reasonable reliance that CCA would pay for any merchandise it sold to April Agro.
The plaintiff's main witness, Barto Bover Irizarry, who, as a sales representative for GT Enterprises, was plaintiff's representative in Puerto Rico, testified that many preliminary meetings were held in the fall of 1985 in order to arrange a deal whereby International Paper would sell cartons to April Agro for the 1986 harvest season, from around February to April of 1986. After many of these meetings, Mr. Bover met with Francisco de Jesús Gotay, President of CCA. Mr. Bover received a letter from Mr. de Jesús, dated December 2, 1985, stating that disbursements for April Agro were part of the Loan Agreement between April Agro and CCA, and that such purchases would be "taken care of following the established norms." See Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. A further letter was sent to the plaintiff, International Paper, from the President of April Agro, Dr. Sella, stating the specific conditions which constituted "established norms" under the Loan Agreement between April Agro, Banco de Ponce and CCA. See Joint Exhibit I. These established norms were described as follows:
This letter clearly put the plaintiff on notice that a rigorous procedure was set up under April Agro's loan agreement with Banco de Ponce, guaranteed by CCA.
Thus, this letter cannot constitute the definiteness and certainty which could be construed as an offer from CCA to pay for items April Agro purchased from the plaintiff. Furthermore, during trial, the plaintiff presented no evidence, which, in addition to this letter, could constitute a binding offer by CCA to pay International Paper for items it delivered to April Agro. Although International Paper and Mr. Bover were on notice that these requirements needed to be met in order for the CCA to cover purchases under the Loan Agreement between April Agro and Banco de Ponce, the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that it ensured that the conditions stated in the January 21, 1985 letter — specifically, the documentation on approved check requisition, approved bill, approved purchase order and approved receiving documents ("conduce") — were presented to CCA so that it could reasonably rely on CCA's granting credit to April Agro for its deliveries. Mr. Bover testified that he...
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Cruz Berrios v. Accreditation Council for Graduate
...and certain, so that ACGME should have reasonably foreseen that this promise would have induced reliance. International Paper Co. v. Farm Credit Corp., 760 F.Supp. 18 (D.P.R.1991). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court finds that ACGME did not make a bind......