International Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox

• Decision Date: 10 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 11984.,11984.
• Citation: 212 S.W.2d 1000
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 564, et al. v. COX.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 1000

212 S.W.2d 1000

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 564, et al. v. COX.

No. 11984.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

June 10, 1948.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1948.

Appeal from District Court, Brazoria County; M. S. Munson, Judge.

Suit by R. G. Cox, doing business as Velasco Laundry & Cleaners, against the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 564, and others, to enjoin defendants from picketing plaintiff's business establishment and congregating in the vicinity thereof and recover damages therefor. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Mullinax, Wells & Ball, of Dallas, and Robert M. Lyles, of Angleton, for appellants.

Irving G. Mulitz and Frank F. Spata, both of Houston, for appellee.

GRAVES, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the 23rd District Court of Brazoria County, sitting without a jury, in favor of the appellee, who was the plaintiff below, and against the appellants as defendants there, which, in material substance, was this:

"It is * * * Decreed that International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 564, of Freeport, Brazoria County, Texas; George Williams, individually, and in his capacity as Business Representative of Local No. 564; Pricilla M. McCaffety; Ethel Sifford; Anna May Williams; Lucille Duggar, and Nannie Day, all residents of Brazoria County, Texas, together with all representatives, agents, and officers of said International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 564, and each of their agents and servants, be, and here now are enjoined * * * from picketing or causing to be picketed the premises and business establishment of plaintiff, R. G. Cox, known as Velasco Laundry & Cleaners, and from congregating or assembling in the vicinity thereof, upon plaintiff executing a bond in the sum of * * * $2,000.00 in favor of the defendants, conditioned as the law requires.

"And, it is further * * * Decreed that plaintiff, R. G. Cox, doing business as Velasco Laundry & Cleaners, do have and recover of and from the defendants, jointly and severally, * * * the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars. * * *"

In this Court the appellants are the Labor Union and the six individuals so severally named in the quoted decree, while the appellee is the owner and operator of the laundry affected.

No findings-of-fact or conclusions-of-law, as such, were either requested or filed below, hence the cause is before this Court upon the transcript, the statement-of-facts, and the briefs of the parties.

The judgment thus rendered was a final one, granting a permanent injunction, with the stated allowance for damages, and was handed down on December 19, of 1947, thereby arresting or stopping a "picketing" of the appellee's laundry at Velasco the court found the appellants were then conducting.

In the appeal here, the appellants have declared-upon these five points-of-error:

"1. A labor dispute exists between appellants and appellee.

"2. Picketing of appellee's premises is privileged under the free speech guarantees of the constitutions of Texas and the United States.

"3. Article 5154f, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas [Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. Art. 5154f], is unconstitutional insofar as it is basis for the injunction herein.

"4. The district court had no jurisdiction to apply the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., since injunctive relief thereunder can be obtained only through the National Labor Relations Board.

"5. The district court erred in assessing damages."

At the very outset, it is determined that — in the binding condition upon it of the record brought here by the appellants — none of these contentions can be sustained; this, for the overall reason that they have therein completely failed to substantiate for any such prayed-for adjudications in their favor, the essential factual basis for any one of such claimed-rights.

As recited, the trial was before the court without a jury, which was neither requested to, nor did it file findings of either fact or law. Wherefore, the presumption here is that the judgment below was grounded-upon all the findings that are necessary to support it as rendered, that could be inferred from the evidence in the record. Gribble v. Call, Tex.Civ. App., 123 S.W.2d 711; Southern Union Life & Casualty Company v. McKinney, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 1103; Zenith Corporation v. Cook Operating Company, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 548.

The appellee's bill for the injunction so awarded him had alleged that the appellant-Union, its named business representative, and the other individual appellants enumerated, had conspired to destroy his business, had placed a picket-line at his laundry-plant at Velasco to accomplish that purpose, when there was, in fact, (1) no bona fide labor-dispute then in existence between himself and any of the appellants, (2) that none of the individual appellants were then his employees, and finally, (3) that neither such Local No. 564, nor any of its agents, officers, or employees, nor any of the other appellants, had at that time been the bargaining-agent for all of appellee's employees; he added (4) that no employee of his was at that time on strike against him or his plant; wherefore, he averred, such picketing by all the appellants against his laundry-plant was in direct violation of the law, both of the State of Texas, and of the United States.

This Court has carefully examined the statement-of-facts so brought here, with the result that it finds there was testimony — despite some to the contrary — before the trial court sufficient to have justified its finding in favor of the appellee, not only of all the facts so plead by him in support of the injunction the court awarded in response thereto, but also of others now added; so that, a recapitulation of all the controlling ones may be thus made:

(1) That there was no labor-dispute then pending between any one of the appellants and the appellee; (2) That none of the individual appellants was at that time an employee of the appellee; (3) That neither the appellant-Local, nor any of its agents, officers, or employees, had been chosen as the bargaining-agent for all of the employees of the appellee; (4) That, to the contrary of appellants' presentments, it had (a) agreed with the appellee that it would apply to the National Labor Relations Board for permission to hold an election to determine whether or not appellee's employees should join the appellant-Union; but (b) soon thereafter, without notice to the appellee, and after the Labor Relations Board had, instead of granting such petition, declined so to do, with the advice to the appellant-Union that it questioned its own jurisdiction in the matter, the Union then withdrew its application for such election, and upon the next day instituted, joined by the other appellants, the stated-picketing of appellee's laundry; (5) That, along-with, and in instituting such picketing, the appellant-Union —...