International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 286, AFL-CIO (Local 286) v. Sand Point Country Club (Sand Point), AFL-CIO

Citation519 P.2d 985,83 Wn.2d 498
Decision Date07 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. 42691,AFL-CIO,42691
Parties, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2405, 73 Lab.Cas. P 53,297 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL NO. 286,(LOCAL 286), et al., Appellants, v. SAND POINT COUNTRY CLUB (SAND POINT) et al., Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Donaldson, Hafer, Cassidy & Price, John E. Rinehart, Jr., Seattle, for appellants.

Montgomery, Purdue, Blankinship & Austin, John D. Blankinship, Lenihan, Ivers, Jensen & McAteer, William F. Lenihan, Seattle, David E. Gannett, Torbenson, Thatcher & McGrath, Thomas F. McGrath, Jr., Seattle, for respondents.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

Alleging that a majority of the golf course maintenance men employed by the respondents had authorized them to represent the employees in collective bargaining with their employers, and further alleging that the respondents had failed and refused to bargain with them, the appellants brought this action seeking an injunction requiring the respondents to engage in such bargaining. The respondents' motion for summary judgment was granted.

A single contention is made on appeal--that RCW 49.32.020 imposes upon employers an affirmative duty to bargain with representatives of their employees. It is not suggested that such a duty exists under any constitutional mandate or by virtue of any principle of common law. It appears to be undisputed that the National Labor Relations Board has declined jurisdiction over enterprises such as the golf clubs which the respondents operate.

RCW 49.32, commonly referred to as Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act, makes 'yellow-dog' contracts unenforceable (RCW 49.32.030). It also places limitations upon the injunctive powers of the courts in dealing with labor disputes. 1 RCW 49.32.011, .30, .060, .072 and .074. It also provides for accelerated appellate review in injunction actions arising out of labor disputes (RCW 49.32.080) and procedural safeguards for persons charged with contempt of court in cases arising under the chapter (RCW 49.32.090--49.32.100).

The term 'collective bargaining' is used only once in the act. It appears in the policy declaration, or 'preamble,' in the following context:

In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Washington, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the state of Washington is hereby declared as follows:

Whereas, Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, It is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Washington are hereby enacted.

(Italics ours.) RCW 49.32.020.

The appellants do not complain of interference with the right to organize, or to designate representatives of the employees' own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment. Rather, they claim that the respondents are in violation of a duty to engage in collective bargaining, which duty, they say, is imposed upon them in the policy declaration in the statute. In short, they claim a statutory right, not merely to be designated the representatives of the employees for purpose of negotiation, but to have the aid of the courts to compel the employer to negotiate. Fatal to their contention is their inability to point to language in the act which creates such a right.

The rights which are recognized in the policy statement are rights of organization, of concerted activity 'for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections.' But the appellants would read this language as imposing a positive duty upon employers to negotiate with the employees' representative, once that representative has been chosen. Recognizing that the duty is not expressly imposed, they insist nevertheless that it is implied. If there is not such a duty, they say, the right to organize and to select a representative is useless.

Such a theory discounts the entire history and experience of the labor movement. It was because the laboring man had learned that there is strength in unity that he fought so hard for the right to organize, to picket, and to strike. The legislature, in enacting this measure, apparently considered that the economic pressure which organized labor could exert upon employers was all that was necessary to bring the employer to the bargaining table.

The act recognizes the validity of those tools of economic pressure, the strike and the peaceful picket line. This court also has recognized the legitimacy of those methods of achieving collective bargaining. Associated Gen'l Contractors, Inc., Seattle-Northwest Chapter v. Trout, 59 Wash.2d 90, 366 P.2d 16 (1961); Northgate Mtrs., Inc. v. Automobile Drivers Local 882, 48 Wash.2d 356, 293 P.2d 762 (1956). And see cases cited in note 1 Supra. The appellants do not claim that these methods are foreclosed to the respondents' employees, nor do they claim that they would be ineffective.

In a 6--3 decision, this court held in Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965), 2 that when the declaration of policy was read in context with RCW 49.32.030 (making 'yellow-dog' contracts unenforceable) and with the entire act, it manifested a legislative intent that employers should not be permitted to interfere with the exercise of the rights recognized in RCW 49.32.020 by discharging employees who engaged in union activities. It is upon this case that the appellants place their sole reliance.

As was made clear in Krystad v. Lau, Supra, we had there to determine whether the courts were powerless to provide a remedy where rights expressly recognized and protected by the legislature were threatened with curtailment or extinction. It was apparent that if employers were free to discharge employees for their union activities, the right to engage in such activities would be rendered meaningless. The operative provision of the act, making unenforceable contracts between employers and employees which were designed to discourage union membership, we found, manifested a legislative intent that employers should not discharge employees for such membership.

In the case before us, it is not contended that the respondents have interfered in any manner with the union activities of their employees or that they have threatened to discharge any employees who may join the appellant organization or any other labor union.

Reading RCW 49.32 in its entirety, we are convinced that its purpose was to facilitate the achievement by employees of an effective bargaining position and that it was not its purpose to provide for compulsory collective bargaining.

Where the legislature has seen fit to impose upon employers an affirmative duty to bargain with their employees, it has done so by express statutory provision. While other states have enacted comprehensive labor-management relations acts (See Krystad v. Lau, Supra, n. 1 at 831, 400 P.2d 72), the legislature of this state has seen fit to regulate such relations only in the case of public employees and health service employees. In 1967, after this court had handed down its decision in Port of Seattle v. ILWU, 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958), holding that public employees may not strike if the public health and safety are involved, the legislature enacted RCW 41.56, governing public employees' collective bargaining, and imposing upon the employer, in RCW 41.56.100, a duty of engaging in such bargaining. At the same time it expressly refrained from granting the right to strike. RCW 41.56.120. See Roza Irrigation Dist. v. State, 80 Wash.2d 633, 497 P.2d 166 (1972).

In 1972, the legislature passed an act which governs labor relations of health care employees and makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain in good faith 'with the duly designated representatives of an appropriate bargaining unit of employees' (RCW 49.66.040). This act places heavy restrictions upon the right to strike and to picket (RCW 49.66.060).

Thus it appears that where the legislature has seen fit to impose upon an employer a duty to bargain with the designated representative of his employees, it has at the same time either restricted the right to strike and to picket or has recognized that the right to strike is not available to employees covered by the act. In other words, the imposition of the duty upon the employer has been compensatory. The policy statements of both acts (RCW 41.56.010 and 49.66.010) manifest a legislative awareness that the provisions of the act which are designed to facilitate or implement collective bargaining, are innovative. Neither act purports to amend RCW 49.32.020, as it would have been appropriate to do if the legislature had regarded that act as one providing for compulsory collective bargaining.

In urging the court not to read a new provision into the policy statement contained in RCW 49.32.020, the respondents have drawn to its attention the immense complexity of problems of labormanagement relations and the inadequacy of court structure and...

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