INTERNATIONAL UNION OF E., R. & MW, AFL-CIO v. NLRB

Decision Date03 April 1970
Docket NumberNo. 22797,22911.,22797
Citation426 F.2d 1243
PartiesINTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mr. Melvin Warshaw, with whom Mr. Irving Abramson and Miss Ruth Weyand, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 22,797.

Mr. Eugene B. Granof, Atty., National Labor Relations Board, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, and Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 22,911 and respondent in No. 22,797. Mr. Harold B. Zanoff, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, also entered an appearance for petitioner in No. 22,911 and respondent in No. 22,797.

Mr. Roy E. Browne, Akron, Ohio, for respondent in No. 22,911.

Before LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

This case arises on the Union's petition to review, and on a Board application to enforce an order of the National Labor Relations Board. In its decision and order, reported at 174 NLRB No. 103, the Board found that Tiidee Products, Inc. (the Company) violated subsections (1), (3) and (5) of § 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.1 The Board entered an order forbidding interference with employees' section 7 rights, and requiring that employees unlawfully laid off or discharged be reinstated and made whole for loss of earnings. As to the 8(a) (5) violation, the Board ordered the Company to bargain collectively with the Union and to furnish information pertaining to wage and fringe benefits. The order also required the posting of an appropriate notice.

The Company concedes the 8(a) (5) violation and some of the 8(a) (1) violations charged, but resists the findings and remedies dealing with the other alleged violations. The Union agrees with the Board's findings but complains that the remedies prescribed are inadequate. We grant the Board's application to enforce the order already entered. On the Union's petition seeking further relief we remand for further proceedings.

A. The Violations of §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3)

1. The Company manufactures metal and plastic parts for mobile homes and trailers. In July of 1967 the Union began to organize the Company's employees. From the very beginning of the drive the Company's president displayed clear antiunion animus, as Company's counsel conceded at oral argument. At the urging of the president certain of the older and more trusted employees began to question their fellow employees about union activity. One employee, possibly on her own initiative, "polled" the employees concerning sentiment toward the Union without any safeguards or assurances that they would not suffer reprisals for their answers. The president of the company made, and certain employees passed on to others, threats to close the plant. The trial examiner and the Board found that the employees who engaged in these activities were supervisory personnel within the meaning of the statute, and thus that the Company itself had violated section 8(a) (1) of the Act by coercive actions taken against its employees.

The only ground on which the Company seeks to avoid accountability for 8(a) (1) violations is that certain employees "were not supervisors and that their conduct cannot, therefore, be attributed to the Company." The evidence amply supports the Board's conclusion that employees Burgher, Gearing, and Hershey met the statutory standards of having the authority "in the interest of the Company" to "assign," "transfer," and "responsibly * * * direct" employees."2 It is the Board's function to determine those who as a practical matter fall within the statutory definition3 of "supervisor." N.L.R.B. v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563, 1st Cir. (1961). Its finding is not undercut by the testimony relied on by the Company that they are not called supervisors, certainly not the testimony of the Company's president, and for that matter not the testimony of the employees involved since this merely falls into the groove of the titles used by the president. What is decisive is what the employees do rather than what they are called, and the evidence of what they do (see note 2) fully supports the Board's judgment that as a practical matter they are supervisors.

2. The election sought by the Union was held on September 14, 1967, and the Union won 19 to 6. On September 15, the Company began a series of temporary and permanent layoffs. As to certain employees production quotas were increased. The Board found that the layoffs, discharges and changes in production quotas were discriminatorily motivated. We conclude that these findings are supported by substantial evidence.4

The layoffs began immediately after the election, which had results the Company considered adverse. The Company defends its actions on the ground that there was no work for the employees involved. No substantiated business reasons were offered for the alleged lack of work or sudden change in amount of work available. There was substantial evidence that in particular cases the no-work claim was pure fabrication.

The Board's findings and orders with respect to post-election layoffs, discharges, and changes in production quotas are affirmed.

B. The Remedy Appropriate for the Patent Violation of Section 8(a) (5); Failure of the Board to Provide Satisfactory Justification for Limiting Relief to Order To Cease from Further Violations

1. The September 14 election resulted from an election petition that the Union had filed with the Board the previous August 1. On September 1, the parties entered into the usual agreement providing that disputes would be settled by the regional director of the Board, and that his decisions would be final. Shortly after the Union's 19-to-6 victory, the Company contested the results of the election, on the basis of Union distribution of a certain leaflet on election morning and also on the basis of a claim that three of those who voted were not entitled to vote. The leaflet was mildly worded.5 The regional director determined that it did not affect the validity of the election. He further determined that whatever the merits of the claim that three voting employees should not have voted, the Union's 19-to-6 majority mooted the issue.6 Accordingly, he certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the Company's employees.

On November 10, the Union's attorney wrote to the Company's president asking that the Company meet with the Union to begin collective bargaining. He requested various kinds of information about the employees (names, wages, etc.), including any information that the Union "would need to bargain intelligently." Another letter was sent the same day to Harvey Rector, the Company's labor consultant, asking the Company to meet with the Union on November 15, or the earliest convenient date, to begin negotiations. No replies were received to either letter. On November 20, the Union's president wrote to Rector renewing his previous request for negotiations and information. Two days later Rector replied that the Company considered the Union's certification invalid because the Regional Director had "acted arbitrarily and capriciously" and denied the Company due process. Rector stated that he would not meet with the Union until all litigation was disposed of. Two later letters from the Union to the Company requesting bargaining and information were ignored.

2. The Company's refusal to bargain was a clear and flagrant violation of the law. Its objections to the election were patently frivolous, and violated the express terms of the Agreement for Consent Election, entered into with the Union only thirteen days before the election, to abide by the decision of the regional director. The Company gave not a hint of support or explanation for its claim that the regional director acted "arbitrarily and capriciously."

The Union contends that the Board's use of its traditional "remedy" — a cease-and-desist order — for a case of such intransigence bountifully and improperly rewards the Company for its transgression, and cannot be maintained as a faithful performance of the Board's task "of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act." N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346, 73 S.Ct. 287, 289, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953).

We conclude that the Union makes a substantial contention, and that the Board has not, on the record before us, provided a satisfactory justification for its order.

Section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), requires the Board "to take such affirmative action * * * as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter."

The broad scope of the Board's function has been noted by the Supreme Court. An illuminating precedent is Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L. R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1964), where the Supreme Court approved a Board order which awarded back pay on the basis of a contract no longer in effect. The Board determined, and the Court agreed, that the employer's unilateral action in subcontracting the work, which destroyed the jobs of his employees, violated his duty to bargain with the union. Though the contract was no longer in effect, the Board reinstated its terms. The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that this action "to insure meaningful bargaining" is well designed to promote the policies of the Act. As to the burden on the employer, the Court said, simply: "Nor is there evidence which would justify disturbing the Board's conclusion that the order would not...

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