INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTO., AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS v. Lyng
| Decision Date | 22 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 84-3303. |
| Citation | 651 F. Supp. 855 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard A. LYNG, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jordan Rossen, Gen. Counsel, Richard W. McHugh, Asst. Gen. Counsel, UAW Legal Dept., Detroit, Mich., Michael Holland, Gen. Counsel, Judith A. Scott, UMWA, Legal Dept., Wendy L. Kahn, Dwerdling, Schlossberg, Leibig & Kahn, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs; Harold A. Katz and Ann C. Hodges, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Lewis K. Wise and Thomas Miller, Attys., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant; Roger Wiener, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS
On January 10, 1985, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Plaintiffs requested certification of a class consisting "of all UAW and Mine Worker strikers and their households who are or were otherwise eligible for Food Stamps but for the anti-striker provision of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)." Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 6 (filed January 10, 1985). Defendant consented to class certification but of a somewhat narrower class. The November 14, 1986 memorandum and order, 648 F.Supp. 1234, declared the striker provision unconstitutional, but did not rule upon plaintiffs' motion.
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend, Class Certification, and Intervention at 11 (filed November 26, 1986).
Defendant still consents to class certification but poses three objections to the class as defined by plaintiffs.
First, defendant objects to the inclusion of non-UAW and non-UMWA strikers within the class, as envisioned in the first paragraph of plaintiffs' proposed class definition. Defendant also opposes plaintiffs' concurrent motion to intervene three individual named plaintiffs to represent these strikers and their households.
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 355, 50 L.Ed.2d 309 (1976) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs note that the proposed intervenors were affiants in the summary judgment stage of this litigation. Obviously, therefore, they were aware of the litigation. As no justification has been proferred for their failure to request intervention sooner, plaintiffs' motion for intervention and expansion of the class to include non-UAW and non-UMWA strikers should be, and will be, denied.
Defendant also argues that the class should be limited to persons "who were discouraged from filing an application by their local food stamp agency because they were on strike," rather than for reasons unrelated to the striker provision. In response, plaintiffs concede that there should be some relation between a person's status as a striker and the reason he was discouraged from applying for food stamps, but disagree that his status as a striker need be the only or the predominate reason for the discouragement. Instead, plaintiffs propose modifying the class to include persons "who were prevented or discouraged from filing an application ... due, in part, to their status as strikers or members of a striker's household...." The importance of this distinction is uncertain. The proof problems of establishing "discouragement" are already sufficient to preclude precision in the definition of the class. Nevertheless, a striker and his household should not be excluded from the plaintiff class merely because they were discouraged from applying for food stamps because of some factor in addition to the striker provision. Consequently, an accompanying order will certify a class to include persons "who were prevented or discouraged from filing an application ... due, in part, to their status as strikers or members of a striker's household...."
Finally, defendant argues that the class should include only those persons whose applications were denied or discouraged by operation of § 2015(d)(3) within one year prior to the filing of this suit. In support, defendant relies upon 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b), which states in pertinent part:
In any judicial action arising under this chapter, any food stamp allotments found to have been wrongfully withheld shall be restored only for periods of not more than one year prior to the date of the commencement of such action....
By its terms, this section applies only to cases arising under the Food Stamp Act. As this case arises under the Constitution, section 2023(b)'s limitation on recovery does not apply.
An order entered November 14, 1986, declared that defendant may not lawfully withhold food stamps from any individual plaintiff's household solely because the household includes a striker for the reason that 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3), the striker amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029, as administered, violates rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The order withheld injunctive relief until the judgment becomes final. On November 26, 1986, plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the November 14, 1986 order and sought an injunction preventing defendant from enforcing the food stamp striker disqualification. Defendant opposes the motion and in the alternative moves for a stay of any injunction pending appeal to the Supreme Court. On December 14, 1986, defendant noted such an appeal. Meanwhile, there are indications that the Supreme Court will not be able to hear this case until October 1987, or later.
The parties have further briefed and argued the issue of relief. Plaintiffs have filed a careful, albeit necessarily tentative, estimate of the number of plaintiffs' households likely to be eligible for food stamps during the pendency of the appeal. They estimate that the total cost of food stamps which would be issued pending appeal will range between $25,350 and $38,025 per month. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Proposed Order on Interim Relief at 6 (filed December 16, 1986) (copy attached as Appendix A).
The defendant correctly points out the gravity of a judicial declaration that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution. However, he cites no authority for deferral of enforcement of such a declaration until its validity is finally determined by the Supreme Court. Although the November 14 declaration necessarily distinguished between the two relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, neither of which resolves the precise issue posed here, compare Lyng v. Castillo, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) with United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973), the parties have not demonstrated any reason to retract or to modify the declaration. At the trial level, plaintiffs are more than likely to prevail on the merits; they have prevailed. Without purporting to predict the Supreme Court's decision on the merits, the Court is persuaded that, in all of the circumstances here, correct discharge of its constitutional responsibilities requires prospective...
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