International Union, United Auto., Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers of America, C.I.O. v. Russell, 8 Div. 751

• Decision Date: 22 March 1956
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 751
• Parties: , 62 A.L.R.2d 669 INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, C.I.O., et al. v. Paul S. RUSSELL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 175

88 So.2d 175

264 Ala. 456, 62 A.L.R.2d 669

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, C.I.O., et al. v. Paul S. RUSSELL.

8 Div. 751.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 22, 1956.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1956.

Count One of the complaint, as amended, is as follows:

'Count One. The plaintiff claims of the defendants the sum of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars as damages for that on and prior to July 18, 1951, the plaintiff was an employee of Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division) engaged in his said employment at the plant of his said employer in Decatur, Alabama, and customarily went to and from said plant in pursuance of his employment on and over a public street in Decatur, Morgan County, Alabama, known as Railroad Avenue, which said street was the only means of ingress to and egress from said plant. At the times hereinabove and hereinafter mentioned the defendant, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, C. I. O., was the bargaining agent for certain of the employees of plaintiff's said employer, and called a strike against said employer on, to-wit, July 17, 1951, to commence on July 18, 1951. The defendants, in order to make said strike effective, and in order to prevent plaintiff and various other employees of plaintiff's employer, who desired to continue working for their said employer notwithstanding said strike, from entering their employer's place of business, established and maintained from, to-wit, July 18, 1951 to September 24, 1951, a picket line along and in said public street at a point thereon in close proximity to said plant, consisting of great numbers of persons, some of whom were standing along said street and some of whom were walking at various and sundry intervals during said period in a close and compact circle across the entire traveled portion of said street, and said pickets, on or about July 18, 1951, by force of numbers, threats of bodily harm to plaintiff and damage to his property, and by force and violence consisting of taking hold of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding and thereby stopping it, and consisting of some of said pickets standing or walking in front of said automobile, blocked said public street and made passage to said plant over the same impossible for plaintiff and for others similarly situated, and defendants thereby wilfully and maliciously prevented plaintiff from going to and from said plant and from engaging in his said employment, and caused plaintiff to lose much time from his work, to-wit, from July 18, 1951 to August 22, 1951, and to lose earnings from his employment at said plant which he would have received had he not been prevented as aforesaid from going to and from said plant, and caused plaintiff to suffer much mental anguish, all to plaintiff's damage as aforesaid, and plaintiff, in addition to his claim for compensatory damages, claims of the defendants such punitive and exemplary damages as are commensurate with their malicious and reprehensible conduct as aforesaid and as may seem appropriate to the jury trying this cause to punish defendants for such wrongful conduct and to deter defendants and others from committing similar wrongs in the future.'

These charges were given at plaintiff's request:

'3. If after considering all of the evidence in this case you are reasonably satisfied therefrom that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you may include in your verdict such amount as would reasonably compensate him for any mental pain and anguish the evidence reasonably satisfies you he suffered as a proximate consequence of the wrongful conduct of the defendants, and the determination of this amount is left to your sound judgment and discretion in the light of the evidence in this case.'

'9. The Court charges the jury that picketing is lawful when it is for the purpose of observation, or for the purpose of peaceful persuasion, or for the purpose of apprising others of a dispute between employer and employees, but that picketing is unlawful if carried on with intimidation, threats, coercion, force or violence. Picketing is unlawful if such a large number of pickets is utilized as to obstruct a public street and block the entrance to a plant from said street, or if the pickets use threats or abusive language towards others to such an extent as to instill fear of harm or injury in the mind of a reasonable man. The Court further charges the jury that if the defendants in this case stationed or caused pickets to be stationed on a public street, as alleged in the complaint, for the purpose of preventing plaintiff and others from entering into their place of employment by means of intimidation, threats, coercion, force or violence, and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the number of pickets and their conduct as alleged in the complaint was such as to prevent the plaintiff by such unlawful means from entering his place of employment, and as a proximate consequence thereof the plaintiff was denied access to his place of employment for a long period of time, you should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff.'

The following requested charge was refused to defendant:

'33. I charge you that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that, prior to the establishment of the picket line, defendants had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that no work would be available for plaintiff at the Decatur plant of Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division), on July 18, 1951, and until the strike was settled, you should not return a verdict for the plaintiff on Count Two of the Complaint.'

Adair & Goldthwaite, Atlanta, Ga., Harold A. Cranefield, Detroit, Mich., and Sherman B. Powell, Decatur, for appellants.

Horace C. Wilkinson, Birmingham, and Julian Harris and Norman W. Harris, Decatur, for appellee.

Cooper, Mitch & Black, Birmingham, for Congress of Industrial Organizations, American Federation of Labor, etc., amici curiae.

LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.

This is the second appeal in this cause. Paul S. Russell brought suit against International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, C.I.O., an unincorporated organization, and other unions, later stricken by amendment, and Michael Volk, and other individuals, who were also stricken by amendment. Michael Volk is a resident of the State of Alabama and a member of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, C.I.O., an unincorporated organization. The defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, to which the plaintiff demurred. The court overruled the demurrer to the plea and because of this adverse ruling, the plaintiff took a nonsuit and appealed on the record, as authorized by Sec. 819, Tit. 7, Code 1940. On that appeal, this court held that the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama, did have jurisdiction of the cause of action stated in the complaint and reversed and remanded the cause to the Circuit Court of Morgan County. Russell v. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, C.I.O., 258 Ala. 615, 64 So.2d 384.

After the cause was remanded to the circuit court, that court set aside its judgment of nonsuit and reinstated the cause on the trial docket. Thereafter, some amendments were made to the complaint, and the complaint as last amended contained two counts which were substantially the same as the counts before this court on former appeal. The plea to the jurisdiction of the court was refiled and demurrers thereto were sustained by the trial court. Demurrers to each count of the complaint being overruled, defendants entered a plea of the general issue in short by consent with leave, etc. The case was then tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000, and the defendants bring this appeal.

The question of jurisdiction is again raised and argued. Since our decision on former appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia rendered its decision in the case of United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694, 699. The Virginia Court there said:

'It is settled by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., Congress has occupied and closed to the States the field of 'regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages' in industries engaged in interstate commerce. International Union, etc. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457, 70 S.Ct. 781, 783, 94 L.Ed. 978; Amalgamated Ass'n, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390, 71 S.Ct. 359, 363, 95 L.Ed. 364.

'But this is not to say that by the passage of the Act the courts of the several States have been deprived of their traditional power and jurisdiction to deal with unlawful conduct committed within their respective territorial limits during the course of a labor dispute which may affect interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an 'intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.' Allen-Bradley Local, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825, 86 L.Ed. 1154, and cases there cited. As was said in Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3, '* * * the exercise by the state of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.''

'In Erwin Mills, Inc., v. Textile Workers Union of America, 234 N.C. 321, 67...