International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,283 v. Scofield International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 133, Uaw v. Fafnir Bearing Co

• Decision Date: 07 December 1965
• Docket Number: 53,AFL-CI,Nos. 18,P,LOCAL,s. 18
• Citation: 382 U.S. 205,15 L.Ed.2d 272,86 S.Ct. 373
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,283, Petitioner, v. Russell SCOFIELD et al. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 133, UAW,etitioner, v. The FAFNIR BEARING CO. et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

382 U.S. 205

86 S.Ct. 373

15 L.Ed.2d 272

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 283, Petitioner,

v Russell SCOFIELD et al.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL

133, UAW, AFL-CIO, Petitioner,

v. The FAFNIR BEARING CO. et al.

Nos. 18, 53.

Argued Oct. 20, 1965.

Decided Dec. 7, 1965.

[Syllabus from pages 205-206 intentionally omitted] Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Sol. Gen. Thurgood Marshall for respondents.

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The two cases before us present converse sides of a single question—whether parties who are wholly successful in unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals review proceedings.

In No. 18 (Scofield), the Union Local was charged by four individual employees with violations of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964 ed.), for fining certain Union members for exceeding incentive pay ceilings set by the Union. The General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint. After a full hearing, the Board dismissed the complaint, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097. The individual employees then sought review in the Seventh Circuit. The General Counsel filed an answer supporting the decision. At this point, the Union filed a timely motion of intervention, alleging that it would be directly affected should the appellate court set aside the Board's decision and direct the entry of a remedial order against it. Neither the individual employees nor the Board opposed intervention. A division of the Seventh Circuit denied the motion to intervene, but authorized the Union to file a brief as amicus curiae without leave to participate in oral argument. The Union sought review here, and we granted certiorari to review the denial of intervention because of the importance of the issue and the conflict among the courts of appeals, 379 U.S. 959, 85 S.Ct. 666, 13 L.Ed.2d 554. Further proceedings were stayed pending the completion of our review.

In No. 53 (Fafnir), the Local filed unfair labor practice charges against the Fafnir Bearing Company. The charging party alleged that the company had violated its statutory bargaining obligation by refusing to permit the contracting Union to conduct its own time studies of job operations in the plant. The Union allegedly needed to conduct these studies to ascertain whether it should proceed to arbitration. The General Counsel issued a complaint, a hearing was held, and the Board entered a cease-and-desist order against the company, 146 N.L.R.B. 1582. The company petitioned for review in the Second Circuit, and the Board filed a cross-petition for enforcement. The Union—the successful party before the Board—moved to intervene, alleging numerous grounds in support. Both the company and the Board opposed intervention. The Second Circuit denied the motion, although cognizant of the difficulties of the problem, and authorized the Union to file an amicus brief. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 2 Cir., 339 F.2d 801. We granted certiorari, 380 U.S. 950, 85 S.Ct. 1087, 13 L.Ed.2d 968, and consolidated Fafnir with Scofield in order to consider both facets of the intervention problem.

We hold that both the successful charged party (in Scofield) and the successful charging party (in Fafnir) have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals proceeding which reviews or enforces Labor Board orders. We think that Congress intended to confer intervention rights upon the successful party to the Labor Board proceedings in the court in which the unsuccessful party challenges the Board's decision.

A threshold question concerns our jurisdiction to grant certiorari. Under § 1254(1) of the Judicial Code,¹ only a 'party' to a case in the Court of Appeals may seek review here. In both these cases, the Union seeking certiorari was denied intervention and relegated to the status of an amicus curiae. Because an amicus is not a 'party' to the case, it would not have been entitled to file a petition to review a judgment on the merits by the Court of Appeals, Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board, 222 U.S. 578, 581, 32 S.Ct. 833, 56 L.Ed. 323; Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S. 14, 20—22, 24 L.Ed. 49. In view of our decision herein, we think that § 1254(1) permits us to review the orders denying intervention. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646.

I.

Congress has made a careful adjustment of the individual and administrative interests throughout the course of litigation over a labor dispute. The Labor Act does not, however, provide explicitly for intervention at the appellate court level. Section 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964 ed.), serves as our guide, even though it is silent on the intervention problem. It states, in pertinent part:

'Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.'

Similarly, no specific standards govern the propriety of intervention in Labor Board review proceedings. The Rules of the Courts of Appeals typically provide: 'A person desiring to intervene in a case where the appli- cable statute does not provide for intervention shall file with the court and serve upon all parties a motion for leave to intervene.'²

Lacking a clear directive on the subject, we look to the statutory design of the Act. Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 11, 62 S.Ct. 875, 880, 86 L.Ed. 1229. Of course, in considering the propriety of intervention in the courts of appeals, our discussion is limited to Labor Board review proceedings. Federal agencies are not fungibles for intervention purposes—Congress has treated the matter with attention to the particular statutory scheme and agency.

In some instances, the words of the statute themselves elicit an answer. When the Board enters a final order against the charged party, it is clear that the phrase '(a)ny person aggrieved' in § 10(f) enables him to seek immediate review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. Alternatively, if the Board determines that a complaint should be dismissed, the charging party has a statutory right to review as a 'person aggrieved.' A hybrid situation occurs when the Board dismisses certain portions of the complaint and issues an order on others. As to that portion which results in a remedial order against him, the charged party is aggrieved; likewise, the charging party is aggrieved with respect to the portion of the decision dismissing the complaint. Each one is a 'party' in a consolidated appeal, and has invariably been granted leave to intervene with regard to the portion of the order on which the Board found in his favor.³

Scofield serves as an example of another variant in review proceedings. The unsuccessful charging party to the Board proceedings petitioned for review, and the successful charged party wished to intervene. The vast majority of the courts have recognized his right to do so.⁴ Recognition of intervention rights in this instance is in complete accord with the statements in Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 364, 369, 373, 59 S.Ct. 301, 305, 307, 83 L.Ed. 221, that:

'While Section 10(f) assures to any aggrieved person opportunity to contest the Board's order, it does not require an unnecessary duplication of proceedings. The aim of the Act is to attain simplicity and directness both in the administrative procedure and on judicial review. * * *

'* * * The jurisdiction to review the orders of the Labor Relations Board is vested in a court with equity powers, and while the court must act within the bounds of the statute and without intruding upon the administrative province, it may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable principles governing judicial action. The purpose of the judicial review is consonant with that of the administrative proceeding itself,—to secure a just result with a minimum of technical requirements. * * *'

To allow intervention to the charged party in the first appellate review proceeding is to avoid 'unnecessary duplication of proceedings,' and to adhere to the goal of obtaining 'a just result with a minimum of technical requirements.' Analysis of the Act's machinery in practice so indicates. A decision of the reviewing court to set aside a Board order dismissing a complaint has the effect of returning the case to the Board for further proceedings. This normally results in the Board's entering an order against the charged party. From this remedial order, as noted, the charged party is aggrieved and may seek review. Judicial time and energy is then expended in pursuit of issues already resolved in the first appeal.⁵ Moreover, the second appeal could lead to undesirable 'circuit shopping' and useless proliferation of judicial effort. Under § 10(f), an aggrieved person has the option of obtaining review either in the circuit in which he maintains his residence or place of business or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the second appellate proceeding, he could obtain a hearing in the circuit which did not originally decide the validity of the Board's dismissal of the complaint. Permitting intervention in the first review thus centralizes the controversy and limits it to a single decision, accelerating final resolution. This is in accord...