Internet Prods. v. LLJ Enters.
| Decision Date | 24 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 18-15421 (RBK/AMD) |
| Parties | INTERNET PRODUCTS LLC, Plaintiff, v. LLJ ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 88.) For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
The parties in this case are in the same industry, and more strikingly, the same family. Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Internet Products, LLC (hereinafter "IPL") is composed of husband and wife duo Rick Janus and Patricia Janus, who are also third-party Counterclaim Defendants in this action. (Amended Complaint ("Compl.")1 ¶¶9-10.) Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff LLJ Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter "LLJ") is composed of individual Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs Jeffrey Janus, Linda Janus, and Lauren Cornelius. (Compl. ¶24.) Jeffrey, Linda, and Rick Janus are siblings, and Lauren Cornelius is Rick's former stepdaughter. (Compl. ¶¶11-14.)
IPL and LLJ are both in the business of selling table pad protectors and piano covers; each company accuses the other of interfering with their performance in the industry. IPL initially filed its Complaint in October 2018, alleging copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501, trademark infringement, false designation of origin and false descriptions, unfair competition, cyberpiracy under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a) and 1125(a) and (d), and unfair competition under New Jersey common and statutory law. (Doc. 1.) IPL alleged that LLJ unlawfully copied its website design and created extremely similar domain names, thus confusing customers into purchasing from LLJ rather than IPL. Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, including five separate counterclaims against IPL, Rick Janus, and Patricia Janus: tortious interference with business, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition and deceptive trade practices, defamation, and trade libel. (Doc. 16.)
Following Defendants' Answer, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff sought to add six additional claims, to join two additional defendants, and to remove two claims from the Complaint. Magistrate Judge Donio denied the request, except did allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint removing the claims for trademark infringement and cyberpiracy. (Doc. 53.) Plaintiff then filed its Amended Complaint (Doc. 76), which is substantively identical to the initial Complaint. Defendants subsequently filed the present Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 88.)
When deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court limits its review to the face of the complaint. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Phillips v. Cty. ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). In other words, a complaint is sufficient if it contains enough factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "The inquiry is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail in a trial on the merits, but whether [he or she] should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of [his or her] claims." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). However, legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To determine whether a complaint is plausible on its face, courts conduct a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A claim cannot survive where a court can infer only that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' motion should be denied because it is untimely. (Opp. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that the Amended Complaint does not create a newopportunity to move to dismiss pre-existing claims. (Id. at 3-4.) In response, Defendants request that the Court treat the Motion as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings if the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is untimely. (Reply at 1-3.)
The general requirement under Rule 12(b)(6) is that a defendant must file any motion asserting a 12(b) defense before filing an answer. However, as other courts have noted, "this general principle is complicated if the original complaint is amended." Brooks v. Caswell, No. 3:14-cv-01232, 2016 WL 866303, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2016). The issue then becomes whether amending a complaint revives a defendant's opportunity to file a motion to dismiss after he or she has already filed an answer to the original complaint. It does not appear that the Third Circuit has precisely answered this question. Courts elsewhere have held that "although an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original pleading, it does not automatically revive defenses and objections a defendant has waived in response to the original complaint." See e.g., id. (citing Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1988)). Instead, a defendant may attack only new allegations or claims not contained in the original complaint. See id. (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiff's original Complaint alleged claims for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, false designation of origin and false descriptions, unfair competition, cyberpiracy, and unfair competition. Defendants already filed an Answer to the Complaint (Doc. 9) and subsequently filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff then sought leave to amend its Complaint. (Doc. 31.) Magistrate Judge Donio granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Leave to Amend. (Doc. 53.) Judge Donio allowed Plaintiff to remove two claims from the Complaint, but otherwise did not allow Plaintiff to add new allegations, claims, or parties. (Seeid.) Complying with Magistrate Judge Donio's Order, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Defendants have not yet answered the Amended Complaint, but instead filed the present Motion to Dismiss.
Based on this procedural background, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Amended Complaint does not—and should not—automatically revive any defenses and objections that Defendants waived in response to the original Complaint. Defendants had the opportunity to file a motion to dismiss the original complaint on the exact same grounds now asserted. However, Defendants chose not to do so and instead chose to only Answer and Counterclaim. The Amended Complaint contains minor changes, removing only two claims that were originally asserted, yet Defendants' present Motion relies on grounds that they could have asserted previously. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint does not revive Defendants' opportunity to assert these arguments.
However, courts in this Circuit have held that "a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) made after an answer has been filed may be treated, in the court's discretion, as a rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Tr. Of Univ. of Penn. v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., No. 87-1111, 1997 WL 598001, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1997) (citing Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 34, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). "The difference between a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is a matter of timing." Dovale v. Marketsource, Inc., No. 05-2872, 2006 WL 2385099, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2006). A Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss is available after a responsive pleading has been filed. Id. Moreover, "regardless of which rule is appropriate, the same standard applies." Id.
Accordingly, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion and will convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Thus, for the purposes of thisMotion, the Court will treat the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c).2
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501. To state a claim for copyright infringement in the Third Circuit, a plaintiff must plead only two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying of original elements of the plaintiff's work. Levey v. Brownstone Inv. Group, LLC, 590 F. App'x 132 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Kennedy v. Creditgo, LLC, No. 15-1790, 2015 WL 7760181, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2015). For the first element, a certificate of registration with the copyright office constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate," including those...
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