Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alpheus Stickney

• Decision Date: 29 November 1909
• Docket Number: No. 251,251
• Citation: 30 S.Ct. 66,54 L.Ed. 112,215 U.S. 98
• Parties: INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appt., v. ALPHEUS B. STICKNEY and Charles H. E. Smith Receivers of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

215 U.S. 98

30 S.Ct. 66

54 L.Ed. 112

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appt.,

v ALPHEUS B. STICKNEY and Charles H. E. Smith Receivers of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company et al.

No. 251.

Argued October 12, 1909.

Decided November 29, 1909.

On December 10, 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission entered an order requiring certain railroads running into Chicago to cease and desist from making a terminal charge of $2 per car for the transportation of live stock beyond the tracks of said railroads in Chicago, and for delivery thereof at the Union Stock Yards, and requiring them to establish and put in force for said services a charge of $1 per car. Compliance with the order was postponed by the Commission until May 15, 1908. On May 7, 1908, the appellees filed this bill in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, to restrain the enforcement of said order, averring that the actual cost to them for such terminal services exceeded in each instance the sum of $2 per car, and that the companies were making delivery at a charge less than such actual cost; that therefore the reduction of the charge by the commission to $1 per car was unreasonable, opprssive, and unlawful. A hearing was had before three judges of the eighth circuit, and a restraining order entered as prayed for by the railroad companies, from which order an appeal was taken to this court.

Assistant to the Attorney General Ellis and Mr. S. H. Cowan for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 99-102 intentionally omitted] Messrs. William D.Mchugh and Walker D. Hines for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 102-104 intentionally omitted] Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The controversy as to this terminal charge has been of long duration. A history of it antecedent to the present litigation is to be found in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 186 U. S. 320, 46 L. ed. 1182, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 824.

It is well to understand the precise question which is presented in this case. That question is the validity of the terminal charge of $2 per car. The report of the Commission opens with this statement: 'The subject of this complaint is the socalled terminal charge of $2 per car imposed by the defendants for the delivery of car loads of live stock at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago,' and its order was in terms that the railroad companies be—'required to cease and desist on or before the 1st day of February, 1908, from exacting for the delivery of live stock at the Union Stock Yards, in Chicago, Illinois, with respect to shipments of live stock transported by them from points outside of that state, their present terminal charge of $2 per car.

'It is further ordered that said defendants be, and they are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on or before the 1st day of February, 1908, and apply thereafter during a period of not less than two years, for the delivery of live stock at the Union Stock Yards, in said Chicago, with respect to shipments of live stock transported by them from points outside the state of Illinois, a terminal charge which shall not exceed $1 per car, if any terminal charge is maintained by them.'

The 2d section of the act known as the 'Hepburn act' (an act to amend the interstate commerce act, passed on June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 892) requires carriers to file with the commission, and print and keep open to inspection schedules showing, among other things, 'separately all terminal charges . . . and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates.' By § 4, the Commission is authorized and required, upon a complaint, to inquire and determine what would be a just and reasonable rate or rates, charge or charges. This, of course, includes all charges, and the carrier is entitled to have a finding that any particular charge is unreasonable and unjust before it is required to change such charge. For services that it may render or procure to be rendered off its own line, or outside the mere matter of transportation over its line, it may charge and receive compensation. Southern R. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. 214 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 1004, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. If the terminal charge be, in and of itself, just and reasonable, it cannot be condemned or the carrier required to change it on the ground that it, taken with prior charges of transportation over the lines of the carrier or of conecting carriers, makes the total charge to the shipper unreasonable. That which must be corrected and condemned is not the just and reasonable terminal charge, but those prior charges which must of themselves be unreasonable in order to make the aggregate of the charge from the point of shipment to that of delivery unreasonable and unjust. In order to avail itself of the benetfi of this rule, the carrier must separately state its terminal or other special charge complained of; for, if many matters are lumped in a single charge, it is impossible for either shipper or Commission to determine how much of the lump charge is for the terminal or special services. The carrier is under no obligations to charge for terminal services. Business interests may justify it in waiving any such charge, and it will be considered to have waived it unless it makes plain to both shipper and Commission that it is insisting upon it. In the case in 186 U. S. supra, we sustained the decree of the lower court, restraining the reduction of the terminal charge...