Interstate Iron & Steel Co. v. Szot

• Decision Date: 30 March 1917
• Docket Number: No. 9660.,9660.
• Citation: 115 N.E. 599,64 Ind.App. 173
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: INTERSTATE IRON & STEEL CO. v. SZOT et al.

64 Ind.App. 173

115 N.E. 599

INTERSTATE IRON & STEEL CO.

v.SZOT et al.

No. 9660.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

March 30, 1917.

Appeal from State Industrial Board.

Proceedings for workmen's compensation by Katarzana Szot and others against the Interstate Iron & Steel Company. From an award, the employer appeals. Affirmed.

Fred Barnett, of Hammond, for appellant.

CALDWELL, J.

Lawrence Szot, while in appellant's employ, suffered certain physical injuries September 17, 1915, from which in a few days he died, leaving as dependents appellee, his widow, and certain children. The circumstances under which such injuries were inflicted were such as to entitle decedent's dependents to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, p. 392). A hearing before the Industrial Board resulted in an award based on an average weekly wage of $18.

[1][2] The only question involved in this appeal is whether the board found such average weekly wage higher than the facts warranted. In appeals from proceedings had before an Industrial Board the jurisdiction of this court is confined to a review of questions which may involve an error of law. Section 61 of the act supra. The board's finding of fact in any case comes to us on appeal as fully accredited as the verdict of a jury or the finding of a court in an appeal in an ordinary civil action. This court is authorized to set aside such a finding only when entirely unsupported by the evidence in some respect essential to sustain the award. Pigeon v. Employs', etc., Co., 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737;In re McPhee's Case, 222 Mass. 1, 109 N. E. 633;In re Savage, 222 Mass. 205, 110 N. E. 283. It follows that a finding deduced from conflicting evidence, if there is evidence to support it in its material features, cannot be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. Erie R. Co., 86 N. J. Law, 550, 91 Atl. 1035.

The nature of the question of average weekly wage is inherently such as ordinarily would be one of fact. It becomes or involves a question of law when, the facts being ascertained, recourse must be had to principles of law or to the interpretation of a statute to determine it. Subdivision (c) of section 76 of the act defines the term “average weekly wages” and outlines the method by which such average shall be determined in any case, the part applicable here being as follows:

“‘Average weekly wages' shall mean the earnings of the injured employé in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury during a period of fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the date of injury, divided by fifty-two; but if the injured employé lose...