Interway, Inc. v. Alagna

• Decision Date: 10 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-789,79-789
• Citation: 407 N.E.2d 615,85 Ill.App.3d 1094,41 Ill.Dec. 117
• Parties: , 41 Ill.Dec. 117 INTERWAY, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew J. ALAGNA, Sr., an Individual, and Trailer Leasing Corp., Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 615

407 N.E.2d 615

85 Ill.App.3d 1094, 41 Ill.Dec. 117

INTERWAY, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew J. ALAGNA, Sr., an Individual, and Trailer Leasing Corp., Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-789.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

June 10, 1980.

Pedersen & Houpt, Chicago (Richard V. Houpt and Marc D. Janser, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Stirling Mortimer, Ltd. and John C. Polales, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

PERLIN, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff filed a contract action against defendants seeking damages, specific performance and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act. The trial court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal, or alternatively, to allow the filing of an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff appeals. Our consideration of this case is limited to determining whether the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss was proper. However, in making that determination we must consider, in general terms, whether a Letter of Intent is enforceable in Illinois and more specifically, whether the letter of intent executed by the parties in the instant case, containing language that their agreement was "subject to" the execution of a formal contract, was unenforceable as a matter of law.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm the action of the circuit court of Cook County.

The facts, as pleaded, are not disputed. Defendant, Matthew J. Alagna, Sr., is the President and principal shareholder of Trailer Leasing Corporation, Inc., (TLC) a Delaware Corporation engaged in the business of leasing trailers. Prior to March 1978, Alagna engaged the services of the brokerage firm of Clements, Garvey and Dole "to seek out prospective purchasers and otherwise assist in the negotiation and consummation of" a sale of the assets of TLC. Pursuant thereto, Clements, Garvey and Dole informed plaintiff, Interway, Inc., that the stock of TLC owned by Alagna was "available for purchase." Interway responded that they were interested in acquiring Alagna's stock and subsequently conducted an extensive analysis of TLC. Thereafter, the Board of Directors of Interway authorized officers of that corporation "to negotiate and consummate the purchase of Alagna's stock." On July 27, 1978, after various negotiations between the parties, a draft of a letter setting forth the terms and conditions of the proposed sale was reviewed at a meeting of Alagna, his attorney Donald Gillis, Interway's vice-president and general counsel, Dennis Kenney and the brokers, Clements, Garvey and Dole. On July 28, 1978, the parties met again and discussed changes in their agreement. A "Letter of Intent" was prepared and was signed by Dennis Kenney as an agent of Interway and accepted by Matthew Alagna, Sr. This letter was set forth as Exhibit A of the Complaint and substantively provides that Interway would transfer $1,618,157.13 worth of Interway stock to Alagna in exchange for Alagna's interest in TLC. The document also contained provisions concerning bonuses, brokerage fees, warranties, insurance, non-competition clauses and discharge of a note. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that Dennis Kenney, Interway's representative in the negotiations, indicated on July 28, 1978 that "it was his understanding and intent that the letter agreement be contractually binding on the parties," and that neither Alagna nor his attorney indicated a contrary intention prior to the execution of the Letter. On oral argument counsel for Alagna stated that he (Alagna) did not indicate an intent to be bound by the document. This is the sole discrepancy enunciated by the parties. However, the Letter specifically states that:

"Our purchase is subject to a definitive Purchase and Sale Contract to be executed by the parties."

On the following business day, July 31, 1978, Alagna informed Interway that he would not proceed with the execution of the formal contract.

Plaintiff, Interway, filed a three-count complaint alleging that defendant had breached the contract for the sale of shares of TLC and requested specific performance, an injunction and alternatively, damages for the breach of the alleged contract. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, sec. 45) asserting that the alleged contract was subject to a condition precedent which had not occurred and therefore the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, and plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to vacate that order, or alternatively, to grant plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. This motion was denied and plaintiff appeals. ¹

We note, at the outset, that the parties do not dispute the general rule that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act admits all facts well pleaded, and that reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom are taken as true for purposes of that motion. (Courtney v. Board of Education of Chicago (1st Dist. 1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25; Harrington v. Timmerman (1st Dist. 1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 404, 8 Ill.Dec. 483, 365 N.E.2d 721.) A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action "attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not the factual sufficiency." (Cain v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago (1st Dist. 1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 574, 586, 325 N.E.2d 799, 808; Hamer v. Village of Deerfield (2nd Dist. 1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 804, 338 N.E.2d 242.) In an appeal from a Section 45 dismissal, a reviewing court should interpret the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. (Farns Associates, Inc. v. Sternback (1st Dist. 1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 249, 32 Ill.Dec. 722, 395 N.E.2d 1103.) Additionally, a complaint should not be dismissed under Section 45 unless the pleadings disclose that no set of facts could be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Patton v. T.O.F.C., Inc. (1st Dist. 1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 94, 34 Ill.Dec. 638, 398 N.E.2d 313.) With this framework in mind, we turn to the dispositive issues on this appeal.

Initially, we must determine whether a document that embodies the essential terms of a contract, yet recites that a more formal agreement will be executed by the parties, is enforceable in Illinois. Commonly referred to as "Letters of Intent," these documents present the issue of whether the provisions agreed upon in the letter are contractually binding or are mere articulations of the parties' present state of negotiation. See, Zehnle, Letters of Intent : The Present State of Illinois Law, 67 Ill.B.J. 286 (1979).

The fact that parties contemplate that a formal agreement will eventually be executed does not necessarily render prior agreements "mere negotiations, where it is clear that the ultimate contract will be substantially" based upon the same terms as the previous document. (Frank Horton Co., Inc. v. Cook Electric Co. (7th Cir. 1966), 356 F.2d 485, 490, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952, 86 S.Ct. 1572, 16 L.Ed.2d 548; Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co. (7th Cir. 1976), 416 F.Supp. 224; 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts at 366; Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co. (1959), 16 Ill.2d 234, 156 N.E.2d 513.) If the parties in the instant case intended that the Letter be contractually binding, that intention would not be defeated by the mere recitation in the writing that a more formal agreement was yet to be drawn. However, parties may specifically provide that negotiations are not binding until a formal agreement is, in fact, executed. (Terracom Dev. Grp. v. Coleman Cable & Wire (1st Dist. 1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 739, 8 Ill.Dec. 642, 365 N.E.2d 1028; Corbin, Contracts § 30 at 78 (1st ed. 1963.) If the parties construe the execution of a formal agreement as a condition precedent, then no contract arises unless and until that formal agreement is executed. (Brunette v. Vulcan Materials Co. (1st Dist. 1970), 119 Ill.App.2d 390, 256 N.E.2d 44; 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 28 at 364 (1963); S. N. Nielsen Co. v. National Heat and Power Co. (1st Dist. 1975), 32 Ill.App.3d 941, 946, 337 N.E.2d 387.) Consequently, it appears that although Letters of Intent may generally be enforceable in Illinois (see Zehnle, Letters of Intent, The Present State of the Law in Illinois, 67 Ill.B.J. 286 (1979)), such letters are not necessarily enforceable unless the parties intend them to be contractually obligatory.

The determination of the intent of the parties to a contract may be a question of law or a question of fact, depending on the documents presented. (Terracom, 50 Ill.App.3d at 743, 8 Ill.Dec. 642, 365 N.E.2d 1028.) Our resolution of this issue in the instant case ultimately depends upon the characterization of the "subject to" language in the Letter of Intent. If thislanguage is ambiguous, then the determination of its meaning is a question of fact (Borg-Warner ; Itek v. Chicago Aerial Industries Inc. (Del.Supr.1968), 248 A.2d 625, applying Illinois law) and not properly resolved by a Section 45 motion to dismiss. (Patton.) However, if the language is unambiguous, then the construction of the alleged contract is a question of law (Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1st Dist. 1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 577, 342 N.E.2d 65) and therefore properly determined by the trial court pursuant to Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act. In Illinois the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is initially a question of law to be determined by the trial court. (Terracom, 50 Ill.App.3d at 744, 8 Ill.Dec. 642, 365 N.E.2d 1028.) If the trial court finds that the agreement is ambiguous, then "parol evidence is admissible to explain and ascertain what the parties intended." (Borg...