Investigation of January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury, In re

• Decision Date: 16 October 1974
• Citation: 458 Pa. 586,328 A.2d 485
• Parties: In re INVESTIGATION OF the JANUARY 1974 PHILADELPHIA COUNTY GRAND JURY. Petition of CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al. *
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 485

328 A.2d 485

458 Pa. 586

In re INVESTIGATION OF the JANUARY 1974 PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

GRAND JURY.

Petition of CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

PROPERTY, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al. ^*

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 16, 1974.

Martin Weinberg, City Sol. Sheldon L. Albert, Chief Deputy City Sol., Stephen Arinson, Asst. City Sol., Philadelphia, for Custodian of Records et al.

W. M. Phillips, Philadelphia, for Harry A. Takiff et al.

John R. Radova, Solo, Bergman & Padova, Philadelphia, for other petitioners.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Chief Justice.

In June of 1972 Judge Harry A. Takiff convened and charged a grand jury, upon the petition of the District Attorney, to investigate various aspects of official corruption in the City of Philadelphia. The convening of that grand jury was upheld by this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Camelot Detectiv Agency, Inc. v. Specter, 451 Pa. 370, 303 A.2d 203 (1973). During the term of that grand jury twenty-one presentments were made identifying pervasive and systematic corruption and other criminal acts among public officials and employees, and numerous indictments were recommended. In addition, the June 1972 grand jury issued a final report in January of 1974 wherein it recommended that a new investigating grand jury be convened 'very promptly' to inquire further into the distribution of narcotics and related payoffs to policeman, and kickbacks required of architects, engineers, milk company executives and other businessmen in exchange for procuring public contracts.

Judge Takiff was also assigned to supervise the January 1974 grand jury. Although the new District Attorney who took office in the beginning of January 1974 had taken no action in response to the recommendations of the June 1972 grand jury, two citizens' groups had petitioned Judge Takiff requesting such an investigation. These petitions which were filed by the Committee of Seventy and Americans for Democratic Action was rendered moot on January 31, 1974, however, when Judge Takiff charged the grand jury on his own motion to conduct an investigation into nine specified areas. ¹ In order to effectuate this charge, the term of the grand jury was extended indefinitely and the grand jury was directed to reconvene, following completion of business, on February 11, 1974. Additionally, Judge Takiff requested the District Attorney to assign members of his staff to handle the investigation being conducted by the grand jury. The District Attorney, however, declined to comply with Judge Takiff's request and subsequent order to assign members of his staff to conduct these investigations.

Following the District Attorney's refusal to comply with Judge Takiff's order, President Judge Jamieson advised the Attorney General of the Commonwealth by letter that in his judgment the matter was appropriate for intervention by the Commonwealth and requested him, pursuant to the Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, art. IX, § 907, 71 P.S. § 297, to assign a special attorney or attorneys to represent the Commonwealth, attend the January 1974 grand jury and perform all the duties and responsibilities in connection therewith. The Attornye in connection therewith. The Attorney Judge Jamieson's request with the suggestion that there first be a request for a determination by this Court to resolve the question of the validity of the grand jury. Subsequently, the Attorney General filed a petition for declaratory judgment to determine the validity or invalidity of the grand jury and a second petition requesting that this Court assume original jurisdiction of the petition seeking declaratory relief. The merits of these petitions were the subject of oral argument before this Court on April 29, 1974. On July 1, 1974, this Court entered an opinion and order denying declaratory relief because the petitions were an effort to obtain an advisory opinion which is not contemplated under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, and because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not authorize the entry of judgments in criminal matters. Packel v. Takiff, Pa., 321 A.2d 649 (1974).

Following oral argument on the petition for declaratory judgment and pending this Court's decision in that matter, the Attorney General informed President Judge Jamieson that he was complying with his request and directing a special prosecutor and his staff to man the January 1974 grand jury and to proceed without delay. In the course of the grand jury investigation, subpoenas duces tecum dated June 10, 1974, were issued and served upon the Custodian of Records of the Philadelphia Department of Public Property, the Custodian of Records of the Philadelphia Department of Recreation, the Custodian of Records of the Philadelphia Managing Director's Office, the Custodian of Records of the Philadelphia Mayor's Office, the Custodian of Records of Frank Rizzo, Candidate, the Custodian of Records of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission and Thomas J. Mangan. On June 17, 1974, a petition for writ of prohibition was filed on behalf of the Custodians of Records of the various departments of Philadelphia named above. On June 19, 1974, a petition for supersedeas was filed and following a conference with the parties in the chambers of Mr. Justice Nix and upon consideration of the petitions, the matters were directed to be argued before the full Court on June 26, 1974, and proceedings with regard to petitioners were stayed pending the decision of this Court. On June 25, 1974, petitions for writ of prohibition and supersedeas were filed on behalf of Thomas J. Mangan and an order similar to that entered in the Custodian of Records case, directing argument before the full Court on June 26, 1974, and staying the proceedings, was entered by Mr. Justice Nix.

Subsequent to oral argument in the Custodian of Records and Mangan cases, a petition for writ of prohibition in the nature of a taxpayer's action was filed by Joseph I. Fineman on July 10, 1974. A petition to assume plenary jurisdiction was also filed by Fineman on July 10. On July 11, 1974, petitions for a writ of prohibition and supersedeas were filed on behalf of Otto Winter and Nora Slavin as taxpayers and recipients of subpoenas ad testificandum. An order was entered upon these petitions directing that briefs be filed by July 18, 1974, ² and that the subpoenas not be enforced pending this Court's final decision on the merits of the petition for writ of prohibition. On July 25, 1974, petitions for writs of prohibition were filed on behalf of Martin Weinberg and Meridian Engineering, Inc. On July 26, petitions for writs of prohibition were filed on behlaf of Charles Frank and Augustine Salviti and on behalf of Gary Friedman. Orders on all four of these petitions were entered on July 26, 1974, directing that the subpoenas not be enforced pending this Court's determination on the merits of the petitions. The final petition for writ of prohibition relevant to this opinion was filed on behalf of Louis Cissoni on July 30, 1974. On that same date, because of the public importance of a prompt disposition, the above-described petitions were denied by per curiam orders (Mr. Justice Eagen, Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino dissenting) with the indication that an opinion was to follow. This is that opinion.

Because the relief sought in all nine of the petitions is the same, I.e., the termination of the January 1974 grand jury investigation, we have elected to address dollectively the issues raised by the various petitioners. ³ Petitioners' arguments in support of a writ of prohibition are essentially tenfold: (1) Judge Takiff was without authority to charge the January 1974 grand jury on his own motion to conduct an investigation; (2) the January 1974 grand jury was a nullity because of the order of this Court dated December 17, 1973; (3) the term of the January 1974 grand jury was unlawfully extended; (4) the grand jury investigation is approaching impermissible permanency; (5) the legal prerequisites for maintaining a grand jury investigation have not been met; (6) there is no authority for the Attorney General to appoint a continuing, permanent prosecutor to supersede the District Attorney on a large and indefinite body of cases; (7) the Attorney General abused his discretion and exceeded his authority in superseding the District Attorney in this case; (8) the use of federal funds to aid in the enforcement of state criminal law violates the doctrine of federalism under Articles I and II of the United States Constitution; (9) the use of federal funds to finance the office of the special prosecutor is not an authorized expenditure under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of June 19, 1968, P.L. 90--351, Title I, § 100, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3701; and (10) that the subpoenas were void for lack of specificity and failure to show on their face that the requested documents are germane to the scope of the grand jury inquiry.

Initially, we can dismiss petitioners' arguments numbered (6) through (9) as not being cognizable by this Court in a petition for writ of prohibition. The writ of prohibition is to be used with great caution and forebearance and as an extraordinary remedy in cases of extreme necessity to secure order and regularity in Judicial proceedings if none of the ordinary remedies provided by law are applicable or adequate to afford relief. Carpentertown Coke & Coal Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948). The office of the writ is to prevent an unlawful assumption jurisdiction by an inferior Court, not to correct mere errors and irregularities in matters over which the court has cognizance. Commonwealth v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 61 A.2d 430 (1948). Questions relating to the Attorney General's supercession, the appointment of a special prosecutor, and the funding of the special prosecutor's office...