Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe

• Decision Date: 26 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 73-1062.,73-1062.
• Citation: 487 F.2d 849
• Parties: IOWA CITIZENS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INC., et al., Appellants, v. John A. VOLPE, as Secretary of Transportation, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

487 F.2d 849 (1973)

IOWA CITIZENS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INC., et al., Appellants, v. John A. VOLPE, as Secretary of Transportation, et al., Appellees.

No. 73-1062.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted September 11, 1973.

Decided November 26, 1973.

Robert B. Scism, Des Moines, for appellants.

Lawrence E. Shearer, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is a timely appeal by plaintiffs, an Iowa environmental organization, and eighteen individuals, from final order of the District Court dismissing their complaint seeking injunctive relief against the construction of a 21.4 mile diagonal segment of Interstate Highway I-35, designated by the Federal Highway Administration as I-35-6.¹

Defendants are the Secretary of Transportation, officials of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and officers of the Iowa State Highway Commission (ISHC). The major part of the cost of I-35-6 is provided by the federal government through FHWA.

This case was tried to Judge Stuart. Many facts were stipulated; evidence was received. Judge Stuart filed a well-reasoned memorandum opinion on November 30, 1972, reported at 3 E.L.R. 20013, which sets out the applicable law and incorporates detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the dismissal of the complaint is based.

It is undisputed that the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., apply to the I-35-6 project here involved. Two basic issues are raised upon this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) filed in connection with the completion of the I-35-6 project complies with NEPA; (2) whether the preparation of the EIS by ISHC at the request of the responsible federal agencies, which the latter reviews, modifies and adopts, complies with the requirements of NEPA.

Substantially the same issues were presented to the trial court and were answered in the affirmative. We agree and affirm.

The standard of review in cases concerning NEPA is succinctly set forth in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972):

Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration and balancing of environmental factors. The court must then determine, according to the standards set forth in §§ 101(b) and 102(1) of the Act, whether "the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values." Calvert Cliffs\' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (1971).

In addition, "the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

Adequacy of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.

Section 102(C) of NEPA requires the responsible federal agency to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official" on the impact of the action on the environment, including alternatives to the proposed action. Section 102(D) requires the agency to "study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives" to the proposed action. Plaintiffs here claim the statement filed for the completion of Interstate 35 fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 102 in that it does not state in sufficient detail any alternatives to the project in question, nor does it show that appropriate alternatives were ever studied, developed, and described. Plaintiffs also assert that the statement does not reflect a goodfaith balancing of environmental factors in that it fails to discuss particular environmental considerations in sufficient detail.

It is well established that NEPA is an "environmental full disclosure law," such that administrative agencies of the federal government must develop and consider all the environmental consequences of their decisions. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 294-295 (8th Cir. 1972). The environmental impact statement required by NEPA is to serve as a basis for consideration of environmental factors by the agency involved and is to provide a basis for critical evaluation by those not associated with the agency. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 350-351 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297-299 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (1971). Thus, all federal agencies are to use the environmental impact statement in conducting a process of good-faith balancing of the important environmental factors which apply to any agency action. In short, the policies of NEPA enunciated in Section 101 must be considered and implemented in the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States "to the fullest extent possible" through the procedural requirements of Section 102(2). Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 296-297 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-1115 (1971).

However, strict though the procedural requirements of Section 102(2) may be, they must be interpreted on a basis of reasonableness. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). "* * * If this requirement is not rubber, neither is it iron. The statute must be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible, given the obvious, that the resources of energy and research—and time—available to meet the Nation's needs are not infinite." Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (1972). See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F.Supp. 916, 933 (N.D.Miss. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F.Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D.Ark.1972).

As Judge Stuart noted, the environmental statement "to some extent must be examined in light of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the project * * * in order to determine its sufficiency. The extent of detail required must necessarily be related to the complexity of the environmental problems created by the project." The discussion of environmental effects need not be "exhaustive" but rather need only provide sufficient information for a "reasoned choice of alternatives." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (1972). See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F.Supp. 440, 444 (W.D. Wis.1972), where the court stated that Section 102(2) does not require that "each problem be documented from every angle to explore its every potential for good or ill."

In the instant case the environmental consequences of the reasonable alternatives would not greatly differ. Judge Stuart succinctly described the factual situation:

At the time the EIS was being prepared for project I-35-6 the northern and southern termini for the project had been fixed by the construction of other segments of I-35. In Iowa only this 27.4 mile segment of I-35 had not been completed. The northern terminus is about 11 miles east of the southern terminus. The area involved in any route between these two points is essentially the same tillable farm-ground. The impact on the natural environment would not differ greatly regardless of which particular route was selected. On the route selected only five families are being displaced. It does not affect any historical, archeological, geological, natural or recreational features or man made structures of any consequence, other than the five homesteads previously mentioned. The greatest environmental impact will be the adverse effect on the farming operations caused by diagonal severance, the straightening of the Iowa River for less than one-half mile and the effect of the construction of a four lane limited access divided highway across tillable farmland.

In such a situation the detail required in an environmental impact statement would not match that which would be required if the various possible alternatives differently affected any historical, geological, or natural features. The placing of a highway across tillable farmland with no particular features of environmental interest or concern does not require the exhaustive analysis which would be required if significant differences in environmental impact among alternatives were present. "Where the environmental aspects of alternatives are readily identifiable by the agency, it is reasonable to state them—for ready reference by those concerned with the consequences of the decision and its alternatives." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S. App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (1972).

In the instant case, the possible alternatives were found to be extremely limited. The project is a matter of closing a gap in a major interstate highway across tillable farmland. As Judge Stuart noted, the alternative of doing nothing need not have been exhaustively detailed in light of the obvious disadvantages of that alternative. The public interest in completing the small gap is clearly established. The other alternatives thus involved particular routings to fill the gap, diagonal or otherwise. The court found that the alternative of building the connecting link in straight lines with two right angle turns would require 7.6 miles more highway over similar land and thus take out of production substantially more land than would the proposed project. The environmental...