Iowa City v. Muscatine Development Co.

Citation141 N.W.2d 585,258 Iowa 1024
Decision Date05 April 1966
Docket NumberNo. 52049,52049
PartiesIOWA CITY, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. MUSCATINE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Jay H. Honohan, City Atty., Iowa City, for appellant.

Nolan, Lucas & Nolan, Roger H. Ivie, and William J. DeCindio, Iowa City, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

This is a suit in equity by the city of Iowa City to enjoin construction of multiple family dwellings by defendant Muscatine Development Co. in alleged violation of the city's zoning ordinance (Ordinance 2238). Following a hearing on plaintiff's prayer for a temporary injunction when the case was not at issue and trial of the main case had been set for a later date, the trial court dismissed the action at plaintiff's costs. Plaintiff has appealed. Plaintiff is entitled under this record to a reversal of the decree.

I. Defendant owns two adjoining tracts of land in or near the southwest part of Iowa City. Plaintiff contends and defendant denies they have been legally annexed to the city and are subject to its zoning regulations. The north tract is 186 feet east and west by 938 feet north and south, the south tract is 287.7 feet east and west by 1060 feet north and south. The east line of the two tracts is a straight line 1998 feet long. Defendant proposes to erect 18 buildings on its land, each containing four family units (72 in all). Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the construction.

Article IV, Section 3 of Ordinance 2238 provides that all land annexed to Iowa City shall be zoned R1A until the zoning may be changed by the properly constituted authorities of the city. Section 1 prohibits erection of multiple family dwellings in an R1A residence zone.

Plaintiff's petition was filed July 9, 1965. The same day the trial court ordered a hearing for July 12 on plaintiff's prayer for temporary injunction. At this hearing it was stipulated: Ordinance 2238 was legally enacted and received in evidence; it contains the provisions just referred to; on October 28, 1964, defendant petitioned the city for voluntary annexation of its property; on July 6, 1965, plaintiff's city council passed a resolution annexing the property; defendant is now constructing multiple dwellings on the property; a mandamus action brought by this defendant came on for trial on December 17, 1964, in the same court, to compel the Johnson County zoning body to act on a building permit application by this defendant; after a day's trial of that action the county zoning body conceded it should act on the application and on January 26, 1965, it granted the application of defendant (in the present cause) to build multiple dwellings on its land. (Iowa City is situated in Johnson County.)

After the stipulation was made and the few exhibits therein referred to were offered, plaintiff rested. The court then stated, 'As you lawyers know, hearings on temporary injunction are not like trying the permanent, the evidence if brief, but does defendant desire to offer evidence on what has been done?'

Thereupon defendant's president testified to figures prepared by its bookkeeper showing that since it obtained the building permit from the county it had spent about $99,619.16, had accounts payable of $46,189.02 for supplies and subcontractors, had obligated itself on contracts for $1,094,000 besides title insurance and disbursement fees, an extreme amount of grading was done, sewers and two foundations were installed, and the expenditures were made relying on the building permit from the county.

On cross-examination by the city, defendant's president said it told its engineers at the outset the plans and specifications for the project must comply with the city building and fire codes; the plans and specifications were prepared before 'we were annexed to the city'; his opinion is they substantially complied with the city's building code and fire ordinance as of July 6, 1965 (date of the city's resolution to annex the property); and that defendant never received a building permit from the city.

The trial court brought out by questions to the city attorney that the city voted, and filed an action, to annex certain territory which included defendant's land but no court decree of annexation had been entered either in the action commenced for that purpose or on the city's acceptance of defendant's application for voluntary annexation to the city.

Defendant also called the mayor and city manager of Iowa City as witnesses. The mayor testified no council meeting was held before this action was filed; he was informed by the city manager of the action to be taken and the witness told only one other council member, Mr. Hubbard; the witness did not consider the property a nuisance but it does not conform with our concept of good zoning; defendant's property is not now adjacent to a residential area in the city; in defendant's previous annexation proposal it applied for multiple dwelling, R3A, zoning; on this application Planning and Zoning recommended against allowing such zoning.

The city manager testified he felt defendant renewed its petition for annexation in order to get sewer; he didn't consider the property a nuisance; he and the city attorney decided to start this action without previously consulting members of the council; the mayor and councilman Hubbard were both informed the action was to be filed before it was done.

At the conclusion of the testimony of defendant's three witnesses 'plaintiff asked to put a witness on the stand, to which the court requested plaintiff to hurry because they were taking too long for a temporary injunction.' This notwithstanding the only time plaintiff had taken was to join with defendant's attorneys in the brief stipulation above summarized, to answer questions the court put to the city attorney and to cross-examine two of defendant's three witnesses for a total of 45 lines in the printed record.

Plaintiff thereupon called the city planning inspector who testified he examined defendant's plans and specifications on July 8 and they did not comply with the fire protection required by the city; a representative of defendant's engineer later showed the witness where some of the problems had been taken care of, said they would make the other necessary corrections and were proceeding to do so at the time of the hearing.

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court gave counsel ten days to try to 'dig up' the law and seven days to defendant 'to file a pleading.' He also stated that until there was a court decree the annexation of defendant's property was not final; defendant could proceed at once to erect the two buildings for which basements were built but he did not know whether he would restrain the building of the others. The court then announced, 'I am saying to counsel, regardless of what I do on the temporary, the hearing on the permanent injunction is set for 9:30, September 21,' and finally, 'These ordinances are made for the benefit of everybody and they should and will be respected.'

Seven days later defendant filed its motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition, as to both the temporary and permanent injunction, on the grounds: 1) By annexing the property plaintiff waived and is estopped to assert any right to equitable relief; 2) The action was not instituted by the city council as required by Code section 414.20; 3) Plaintiff is trying to entrap defendant and seeks equity with unclean hands; 4) Article IV, Section 3 of Ordinance 2238 is arbitrary, capricious and unlawful as applied to defendant's real estate 5) By the expenditures defendant testified to it acquired a vested right to complete construction; and 6) There is no balance of equities to preserve by injunction since the mayor and city manager both testified the multiple dwellings would not be a nuisance.

Four days later plaintiff filed resistance to the above motion denying the allegations thereof, denying the facts testified to by defendant's president and the legal conclusion stated in ground 5 of its motion, alleging the zoning ordinance authorized the proper city authorities to institute injunction actions and the city attorney, manager and mayor are proper authorities; and that ground 3 of the motion to dismiss is based on facts not in the record.

Three days still later the trial court filed Findings, Orders and Decree stating at the outset that the action seeks a temporary injunction against the erection of multiple dwellings and other general equitable relief, and with no specific prayer for permanent injunction, evidence was heard July 12, 'the case was submitted and is determined as follows.'

The court then proceeded to hold defendant's property was not officially annexed to the city; defendant proceeded in good faith to erect and contract for the erection of its buildings at costs testified to by its president in reliance on the county building permit and thus acquired a vested right which should not be ignored; the matters now decided are adequate for determination of the cause; 'Code section 414.20 has clear, unmistakable and mandatory language that only the city council may legally authorize the bringing of such an action and this one must fail for noncompliance with the statute'; the evidence clearly shows no nuisance is involved; by passing the resolution of July 6 accepting defendant's property as part of the city it accepted it subject to the zoning right from the county and is estopped and has waived it right to object to the taking of defendant's property; the equities of the case are with defendant; 'for the reasons above indicated plaintiff's petition is dismissed. There being no specific prayer for permanent injunction, the court holds no permanent injunction is involved and any assignment for September 21 is herewith set aside.' Costs were taxes to plaintiff.

Plaintiff promptly filed motion for new trial asserting error in each of the trial court's findings, orders and...

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