Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli

Decision Date30 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. 58829,58829
PartiesIOWA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al., Petitioners, v. Hon. Anthony M. CRITELLI, et al., Respondents.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Gordon E. Allen, Leslie Babich and Joseph L. Marks, Des Moines, for petitioners.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and C. Joseph Coleman, Jr., and William G. Enke, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

En banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

This is an original action which petitioners ask this court to enter a supervisory order nullifying a local rule of the Fifth Judicial District. We deny the petition.

The questions presented are (1) whether this court should accept jurisdiction of the action under its supervisory power, (2) whether petitioners have standing to bring the action, (3) whether the case is moot, (4) whether respondent judges had authority to adopt the rule, (5) whether petitioners have shown the rule denies them due process and equal protection, and (6) whether petitioners have shown the rule denies them pretrial rights assured by various statutes.

In 1973 the judges of the Fifth Judicial District adopted 31 rules of practice. Eighteen of them were made applicable throughout the district, and the remainder were made applicable in Polk County only. Rule 26 prescribed procedures to be utilized in processing pretrial motions in civil and criminal cases. For purposes of the rule, motions were defined in division (A) as including 'all motions, special appearances, applications, objections, resistances or other preliminary matters, however denominated, and whether applicable to pleadings or discovery matters or applicable to other legal matters in a case, civil or criminal'.

Subsequently the district judges adopted an amendment to rule 26 adding division (F), setting various time limits for pretrial procedures in Polk County criminal cases. Rule 26(F) is challenged in this action. It provides:

In addition, the following schedule and time limits shall apply in criminal cases due to the time requirements of Chapter 795, The Code.

1. Pre-trial motions as defined in (A) above include Motions for a Bill of Particulars, Motions to Suppress, Motion for Trial under Chapter 783, the Code, and all discovery requests directed to the Court or a party, except discovery depositions.

2. Except where otherwise ordered by the Court, all pre-trial motions, as defined in the Rule, shall be filed within 17 days after arraignment and responded to within 7 days thereafter. This time limit shall not apply to alter the time limit set out in the 1975 Code of Iowa, Section 749A.2, 769.18, 776.1, 777.18, and 780.10.

3. All discovery depositions permitted by law shall be completed within 25 days after arraignment.

4. A Motion in Limine shall not include requests to suppress evidence obtained by search and seizure or evidence in the nature of admissions or confessions of a defendant. A Motion in Limine shall be filed no later than 10 days before trial date.

5. Motions to Dismiss based on Chapter 795, the Code, or on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, shall be filed when the grounds therefor arise.

6. The County Attorney shall, within 17 days of arraignment, file any request, with reasons, to try a Defendant jointly with another Defendant, or try a Defendant jointly on more than 1 charge, or try a Defendant on less than all counts charged, or, in the alternative, and with reasons, his requested priority of Trials of Multiple charges against 1 Defendant or single charges against Multiple Defendants. The Defendant shall file any objections thereto within 7 days thereafter, and the Court shall rule as in the case of other Pre-trial Motions.

The amendment was applicable to all criminal cases docketed on and after November 1, 1975. The second sentence of subparagraph (F)(2) was added in May 1976.

I. Jurisdiction. This court is charged with constitutional power and responsibility to 'exercise a supervisory and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout the State.' Article V, § 4, Constitution of Iowa. We have authority but not necessarily the duty to entertain original actions seeking to invoke the exercise of this power. Warren County v. Judges of Fifth Jud. Dist. of Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa, filed June 30, 1976). When a remedy is available in district court, we are not inclined to entertain an original action. Relief in this court should ordinarily await the normal course of appellate review.

In the present case, petitioners might well have pursued a remedy in district court, either through an action for declaratory judgment or by appropriate challenges to rule 26(F) in the criminal cases in which certain of them have been involved. Although we would not ordinarily accept jurisdiction under our supervisory power in these circumstances, we have decided to do so here because the action includes a challenge to the authority of district judges to adopt rules of court like rule 26(F), an issue of considerable public importance which has been squarely presented for our decision in this case.

We therefore accept jurisdiction.

II. Petitioners' standing. Respondents filed a pre-submission motion to dismiss this action on the ground petitioners lack standing to maintain it. After hearing, we ordered the motion submitted with the merits of the action.

Since petitioners' challenge to the rule is based in part on claimed infringement of federal constitutional rights, we apply federal principles to determine whether they have standing. Gradischnig v. Polk County, 164 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1969). We must decide whether petitioners have alleged a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to insure the dispute is presented in a concrete adversary context. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678 (1962). Whether they have the required personal stake in the outcome does not depend on the merits of their claim. It depends on whether, if the wrong alleged does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained it. Id., 369 U.S. at 208, 82 S.Ct. at 705, 7 L.Ed.2d at 680.

Petitioner Iowa Civil Liberties Union alleges it is an organization incorporated under the laws of Iowa, whose members are residents, taxpayers and citizens of Iowa, and whose purpose is the 'defense, preservation, and protection of the civil liberties' of Iowans assured under the state and federal constitutions. Petitioners Gordon E. Allen and Judd Golden allege they are Iowa lawyers who represent defendants in criminal cases in Polk County. The remaining petitioners are persons who allege they are defendants in Polk County criminal cases subject to rule 26(F).

We find the Iowa Civil Liberties Union and lawyer-petitioners lack standing to maintain this action. The principle of Jus tertii applies to them. They seek to raise the rights of third persons. Ordinarily, a party lacks standing to raise the rights of others. Although the principle is subject to exceptions, the exceptions do not apply here. Iowa Movers & Warehousemen's Ass'n v. Briggs, 237 N.W.2d 759, 772--773 (Iowa 1976).

The situation is different as to petitioners O'Brien, Ewing, Anderson, Anita Marie Allen, and Bradshaw, who allege they are defendants in Polk County criminal cases subject to rule 26(F). They contend rule 26(F) invades specific constitutional and statutory rights of theirs. They assert the rule threatens them with direct injury, and they challenge the authority of respondents to adopt the rule. We think these claims show a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to recognize the standing of these petitioners. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499--500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205--2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 355--356 (1975); Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695, 700--703 (D.C.Cir.1975); United States v. Kahane, 396 F.Supp. 687, 696 (E.D.N.Y.1975).

We find the petitioners who allege they are defendants in Polk County criminal cases subject to rule 26(F) have standing to maintain this action. Subsequent use of the term 'petitioners' in this opinion shall refer to them alone. Respondents' motion to dismiss the action is sustained as to the other petitioners.

III. Mootness. Standing may, of course, be lost if the claim on which it is based becomes moot. The stipulated record shows that as of the time of submission of this action, only petitioner Bradshaw was still subject to rule 26(F). All other prosecutions had either terminated or proceeded beyond the pretrial stage. The record also shows that none of the petitioners, including Bradshaw, had in fact suffered a sanction under the rule.

The claims of all petitioners except Bradshaw are moot. Since Bradshaw's claim is not moot and because, in any event, the case presents a matter of public importance and a problem which will likely recur, we will not dismiss petitioners' claims on the ground of mootness. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 (1973); Catholic Char. of Arch. of Dubuque v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 542--543 (Iowa 1975).

IV. Respondents' authority. Petitioners contend respondent judges did not have authority to adopt rule 26(F). They allege the rule is therefore void.

Respondents named in this action include only the district judges who reside in Polk County. The record shows rule 26(F) was adopted by majority vote of all district judges of the Fifth District; the other judicial officers named as respondents did not participate in adoption of the rule. Our use of the word 'respondents' will refer to those respondents who actually participated in adoption of the rule.

Petitioners' argument is premised on two provisions of the Constitution of Iowa. One is Article V, § 14, which charges the legislature with the duty to provide for the carrying into effect of the judicial article 'and to provide for a general system of practice in all the Courts of this State.' The other is Article III, § 1, the separation of...

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