Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. United States
Decision Date | 16 June 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 76-91-2. |
Citation | 414 F. Supp. 1393 |
Parties | IOWA-DES MOINES NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Tobin B. Swanson, Watson & Swanson, P. C., Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiff.
Allen L. Donielson, U. S. Atty., William D. Scherle, George H. Perry, Asst. U. S. Attys., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendant.
This case involves the issue of whether the United States Postal Service is immune from properly instituted state law garnishment proceedings. On February 9, 1976, plaintiff Iowa-Des Moines National Bank caused a notice of garnishment to be served upon the Des Moines office of the Postal Service. The garnishment proceedings were based upon a judgment in the amount of $1,029.03 obtained by the bank against Ronald and Vickie Strange. Because Vickie Strange is an employee of the Postal Service, the matter was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1442. See Drs. Macht, Podore & Associates, Inc. v. Girton, 392 F.Supp. 66, 67-68 (S.D.Ohio 1975); Allen v. Allen, 291 F.Supp. 312, 313 (S.D.Iowa 1968); see also 42 U.S. C.A. § 409(a) (1976 supp.). The matter currently before the Court is defendant's motion to quash notice of garnishment. The essence of defendant's motion is the claim that the Postal Service (the garnishee) is immune from such proceedings absent explicit congressional consent authorizing garnishments.
The United States Postal Service was established by Congress in Public Law 91-375, 84 Stat. 720, effective July 1, 1971. See 39 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (1976 supp.). First among the enumerated powers of the Postal Service is the power "to sue and be sued in its official name." 39 U.S.C.A. § 401(1). Notwithstanding this expansive consent to suit, the Government maintains that garnishment proceedings are excluded from the meaning of Section 401(1). While at least six different United States District Courts have accepted the Government's view of Section 401(1) in the context of a garnishment proceedings, one United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have held to the contrary. Compare Drs. Macht, Podore & Associates, Inc. v. Girton, supra; Nolan v. Woodruff, 68 F.R.D. 660 (D.D.C. 1975); Lawhorn v. Lawhorn, 351 F.Supp. 1399 (S.D.W.Va.1972); Detroit Window Cleaners Local 139 Ins. Fund v. Griffin, 345 F.Supp. 1343 (E.D.Mich.1972); Commerce Bank of Kansas City v. Fugate, No. 20470-2 (W.D.Mo.1973); and Bean, Phillips & Bean v. Moore, No. 6305 (E.D.Tenn.1972) with Standard Oil Division, American Oil Company v. Starks, 528 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975), and Colonial Bank v. Broussard, 403 F.Supp. 686 (E.D.La.1975). It is the Court's conclusion that the views expressed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana correctly state the current status of the Postal Service on the question of congressional consent to garnishment proceedings against the Service. Accordingly, defendant's motion to quash must be overruled.
In F.H.A. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 60 S.Ct. 488, 84 L.Ed. 724 (1940) the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether congressional consent that the F.H.A. could "sue and be sued" encompassed garnishment proceedings. In holding that the F.H.A. is subject to garnishment for sums due to an employee, Justice Douglas made the following comments, which are fully applicable to the instant case:
For the defendant to escape the clear implications of Burr, it must be shown either (1) that the Postal Service has not been "launched . . . into the commercial world" in the same manner the F.H.A. was; (2) that garnishment is inconsistent with the statutory scheme setting up the Postal Service; or (3) that "grave interference" with Postal Service operations would occur should garnishments be allowed. Further, defendant asserts that garnishments for commercial debts are expressly precluded by the recently-enacted 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (1976 supp.), which provides as follows:
In Standard Oil v. Starks, supra, the Seventh Circuit discussed whether any of the three "implied exceptions" to consent of F.H.A. v. Burr applied to garnishments of the Postal Service. This Court is in full agreement with the conclusion in Standard Oil that none of the implied exceptions of Burr remove garnishment proceedings from the Postal Service's consent "to sue and be sued." Congress established the Service to be an independent agency, and to engage in numerous endeavors, both "governmental" and "commercial," in an autonomous manner. 528 F.2d 201-04. The only statutory exceptions to the Service's consent to be sued appear to involve matters within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act and in regard to procedural rules applicable to suits against the United States. 39 U.S. C.A. § 409; See Standard Oil, supra, at 203; White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1386 (4th Cir. 1974). In light of these express limitations to the blanket consent of § 401(1), if Congress had intended garnishment proceedings to be similarly excluded it would have said so.1 Cf. F.H.A. v. Burr, supra, at 247 n. 10. The statutory scheme setting up the Postal Service simply does not justify engrafting the "implied exceptions" of Burr upon the Service's general consent to suit. Standard Oil, supra; Colonial Bank v. Broussard, supra; see also White v. Bloomberg, supra, at 1385-86.
Remaining to be considered is the question of whether 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (1976 supp.) bars the instant garnishment. The Government asserts that § 659 is fully applicable to the Postal Service, and that it allows garnishment for only two purposes: child support and alimony payments. Since this case involves a garnishment to collect upon a court judgment stemming from a commercial obligation, the Government asserts that § 659 bars the proceeding. The Court agrees with the...
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