Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Lagle
Decision Date | 19 October 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-194,87-194 |
Citation | 430 N.W.2d 393 |
Parties | IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, Appellant, v. Martha LAGLE d/b/a Lagle Cards & Party, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Julie A. Cohen, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
David P. McManus of Olinger & McManus, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, LAVORATO, and NEUMAN, JJ.
Electric service to Martha Lagle's retail shop was disconnected by Iowa Electric Light & Power Company for nonpayment of her bill. She protested to the Iowa State Commerce Commission (now known as the Iowa Utilities Board), claiming there must have been a company error, because her meter readings had suddenly gone berserk. (It turned out that another tenant in the building who was on the same meter had abandoned the premises, leaving walk-in cooler doors open.)
The Iowa Utilities Board (board) processed her complaint on an informal basis and advised her that any power loss was on her side of the meter, and therefore was her responsibility. The board advised her, also, that if she was dissatisfied with this disposition, she could initiate formal complaint proceedings before the board. She wrote a second letter but did not initiate a formal complaint. Later, when Iowa Electric sued Lagle for her unpaid bill, she counterclaimed for damages resulting from the utility company's alleged negligence.
The district court refused to apply issue preclusion principles to bar Lagle's counterclaim, and Iowa Electric filed this interlocutory appeal. Iowa Electric's appeal was initially heard by the court of appeals, which held that the district court had properly resolved the procedural issues. The court of appeals also held that the informal disposition by the board did not have preclusive effect in the district court case. We granted further review and now affirm the court of appeals and the district court.
In Iowa Electric's suit against Lagle, she answered and raised as an affirmative defense Iowa Electric's negligence in connection with her bill. In May 1986, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed by Iowa Electric on the ground that the board's decision in the informal disposition of Lagle's complaint was res judicata and thus precluded any consideration of Lagle's affirmative defense. Lagle, who was not represented by an attorney at the time, did not file a resistance, and an order was entered granting partial summary judgment to Iowa Electric on issue preclusion grounds.
In November 1986, Lagle retained a lawyer and filed a motion to reconsider the court's earlier summary judgment. She also filed a counterclaim for damages and a demand for a jury trial on all the issues in the case, including those raised by the initial petition and answer.
On Lagle's motion to reconsider, the district court changed its position and entered an order allowing Lagle's counterclaim to stand, concluding it had made a mistake earlier in barring it on res judicata grounds. The court also entered an order granting the demand for a jury trial on all of the issues in the case. Iowa Electric's application for interlocutory appeal followed.
A. The "Motion to Reconsider." Do we still recognize a "motion to reconsider" or has this motion become extinct under present-day procedural rules? Lagle argues that such a motion is still viable. Iowa Electric, on the other hand, argues that all motions predating the rules of civil procedure, including the motion to reconsider, have either been merged into the present procedural rules or abolished. Therefore, because there is no rule expressly providing for a motion to reconsider, Lagle's motion must survive, if at all, as a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) ( ) or rule 252 ( ). Iowa Electric argues that neither of these motions would be appropriate.
The label attached to a motion is not determinative of its legal significance; we will look to its content to determine its real nature. See, e.g., Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984) ( ); Kagin's Numismatic Auctions, Inc. v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) ( ).
Iowa Electric argues that, even if Lagle's motion is considered to be one under rule 179(b), it was error for the court to grant it, because that rule may not be used to challenge a partial summary judgment. See City of Eldridge v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 270 N.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Iowa 1978) See also Kunau v. Miller, 328 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1983) ( ); Budde v. City Dev. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 1979) ( ). Moreover, Iowa Electric claims, Lagle's motion could not be considered as a rule 252 motion, because the partial summary judgment was not a "final judgment or order."
It appears that Iowa Electric is correct in arguing that rules 179(b) and 252 are inapplicable. But, if that is so, and a motion to reconsider has no independent validity, it appears that the only review open to Lagle would have been an application for interlocutory appeal to our court or an appeal from a final judgment at the conclusion of the case.
We do not believe that Lagle's options were so limited. A district court's power to correct its own perceived errors has always been recognized by this court, as long as the court has jurisdiction of the case and the parties involved. A motion to reconsider is found in our cases at least as far back as Townsend v. Wisner, 62 Iowa 672, 18 N.W. 304 (1884). And, while this motion is not expressly found in our rules of civil procedure, it is still recognized by our cases. See, e.g., Hayes v. Kerns, 387 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1986). For instance, in Hayes, we held
that as long as the case is before us we may reexamine our jurisdiction in light of further study and oral submission of the case. This holding is consistent with the rule in the trial court that provides, "[u]ntil ... a final order or a decree [is] rendered, the trial court will have the power to correct any of the rulings, orders, or partial summary judgments it has already entered."
Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Mason City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Van Duzer, 376 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1985) ( ). Consistent with these authorities, we hold that a motion to reconsider may properly be granted prior to final judgment.
Based on these authorities, the district court correctly reconsidered its prior order. Both the case and affected parties remained subject to the court's jurisdiction.
B. The Jury Demand. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 177(b) provides in part:
A party desiring jury trial of an issue must make written demand therefor by filing a separate instrument clearly designating such demand not later than ten days after the last pleading directed to that issue.
Lagle had not demanded a jury trial on the original issues raised in Iowa Electric's petition. Several months later, however, when she filed her counterclaim, she demanded a jury trial on all issues, including those originally raised by the petition. Her right to demand a jury trial on the original issues, of course, had expired because more than ten days had elapsed since the answer. Nevertheless, the court ordered a jury trial on those issues as well as the new ones raised by Lagle's counterclaim. Iowa Electric contends this was error.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 177(d) provides considerable discretion in such a case:
Notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such demand might have been made of right, the court, in its discretion on motion and for good cause shown, but not ex parte, and upon such terms as the court prescribes, may order a trial by jury of any or all issues.
We find no abuse of that discretion. The district court apparently concluded that, if the new issues were to be tried to a jury, they should all be tried that way.
Lagle's two letters to the board protesting Iowa Electric's bill were treated by the board as informal complaints under its administrative rules. The board's responses to Lagle's letters informed her that it could do nothing for her but, if she was not satisfied with this disposition, she could file a formal complaint with the board. Information concerning the procedures for filing a formal complaint was enclosed in the board's correspondence with Lagle.
Lagle did not file a formal proceeding. When Iowa Electric sued her for her bill, however, she filed a counterclaim and reasserted her complaints. Her counterclaim sought damages for emotional distress and loss of profits from her business, as well as "embarrassment and humiliation and other damages."
Iowa Electric argues that, because the board had resolved similar issues against Lagle on her informal complaints, she is barred by principles of issue preclusion from raising similar issues in her counterclaim. Lagle counters that the proceedings before the board were too informal to be preclusive, that the necessary identity of issues was missing, and applying issue preclusion on the basis of the informal disposition by the board would effectively deprive her of any...
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