Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Lagle

• Citation: 430 N.W.2d 393
• Decision Date: 19 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-194,87-194
• Parties: IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, Appellant, v. Martha LAGLE d/b/a Lagle Cards & Party, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 393

430 N.W.2d 393 IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
Martha LAGLE d/b/a Lagle Cards & Party, Appellee. No. 87-194. Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 19, 1988.

Page 394

Julie A. Cohen, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

David P. McManus of Olinger & McManus, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, LAVORATO, and NEUMAN, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

Electric service to Martha Lagle's retail shop was disconnected by Iowa Electric Light & Power Company for nonpayment of her bill. She protested to the Iowa State Commerce Commission (now known as the Iowa Utilities Board), claiming there must have been a company error, because her meter readings had suddenly gone berserk. (It turned out that another tenant in the building who was on the same meter had abandoned the premises, leaving walk-in cooler doors open.)

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The Iowa Utilities Board (board) processed her complaint on an informal basis and advised her that any power loss was on her side of the meter, and therefore was her responsibility. The board advised her, also, that if she was dissatisfied with this disposition, she could initiate formal complaint proceedings before the board. She wrote a second letter but did not initiate a formal complaint. Later, when Iowa Electric sued Lagle for her unpaid bill, she counterclaimed for damages resulting from the utility company's alleged negligence.

The district court refused to apply issue preclusion principles to bar Lagle's counterclaim, and Iowa Electric filed this interlocutory appeal. Iowa Electric's appeal was initially heard by the court of appeals, which held that the district court had properly resolved the procedural issues. The court of appeals also held that the informal disposition by the board did not have preclusive effect in the district court case. We granted further review and now affirm the court of appeals and the district court.

I. The Procedural Issues.

In Iowa Electric's suit against Lagle, she answered and raised as an affirmative defense Iowa Electric's negligence in connection with her bill. In May 1986, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed by Iowa Electric on the ground that the board's decision in the informal disposition of Lagle's complaint was res judicata and thus precluded any consideration of Lagle's affirmative defense. Lagle, who was not represented by an attorney at the time, did not file a resistance, and an order was entered granting partial summary judgment to Iowa Electric on issue preclusion grounds.

In November 1986, Lagle retained a lawyer and filed a motion to reconsider the court's earlier summary judgment. She also filed a counterclaim for damages and a demand for a jury trial on all the issues in the case, including those raised by the initial petition and answer.

On Lagle's motion to reconsider, the district court changed its position and entered an order allowing Lagle's counterclaim to stand, concluding it had made a mistake earlier in barring it on res judicata grounds. The court also entered an order granting the demand for a jury trial on all of the issues in the case. Iowa Electric's application for interlocutory appeal followed.

A. The "Motion to Reconsider." Do we still recognize a "motion to reconsider" or has this motion become extinct under present-day procedural rules? Lagle argues that such a motion is still viable. Iowa Electric, on the other hand, argues that all motions predating the rules of civil procedure, including the motion to reconsider, have either been merged into the present procedural rules or abolished. Therefore, because there is no rule expressly providing for a motion to reconsider, Lagle's motion must survive, if at all, as a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) (enlargement or amendment of judgment or decree) or rule 252 (vacation or modification of final judgment or order). Iowa Electric argues that neither of these motions would be appropriate.

The label attached to a motion is not determinative of its legal significance; we will look to its content to determine its real nature. See, e.g., Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984) ("motion for rehearing," while not expressly recognized by our rules, will be considered as a rule 179(b) motion); Kagin's Numismatic Auctions, Inc. v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) ("motion to reconsider" considered as rule 179(b) motion).

Iowa Electric argues that, even if Lagle's motion is considered to be one under rule 179(b), it was error for the court to grant it, because that rule may not be used to challenge a partial summary judgment. See City of Eldridge v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 270 N.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Iowa 1978) (Rule 179(b) motions are available only for expansion or amendment of judgment when the court is "trying an issue of fact without a jury." In summary judgment cases, the court only determines

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whether issues of material fact exist.) See also Kunau v. Miller, 328 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1983) (rule 179(b) motion unavailable to challenge ruling on motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, because no issue of fact is raised in such motion); Budde v. City Dev. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 1979) (rule 179(b) motion inappropriate to challenge ruling based solely on questions of law). Moreover, Iowa Electric claims, Lagle's motion could not be considered as a rule 252 motion, because the partial summary judgment was not a "final judgment or order."

It appears that Iowa Electric is correct in arguing that rules 179(b) and 252 are inapplicable. But, if that is so, and a motion to reconsider has no independent validity, it appears that the only review open to Lagle would have been an application for interlocutory appeal to our court or an appeal from a final judgment at the conclusion of the case.

We do not believe that Lagle's options were so limited. A district court's power to correct its own perceived errors has always been recognized by this court, as long as the court has jurisdiction of the case and the parties involved. A motion to reconsider is found in our cases at least as far back as Townsend v. Wisner, 62 Iowa 672, 18 N.W. 304 (1884). And, while this motion is not expressly found in our rules of civil procedure, it is still recognized by our cases. See, e.g., Hayes v. Kerns, 387 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1986). For instance, in Hayes, we held

that as long as the case is before us we may reexamine our jurisdiction in light of further study and oral submission of the case. This holding is consistent with the rule in the trial court that provides, "[u]ntil ... a final...