Iowa Pork Producers Ass'n v. Bonta

• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-01663-NE-EPG
• Decision Date: 27 December 2021
• Parties: IOWA PORK PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. ROB BONTA, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

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IOWA PORK PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. ROB BONTA, et al. Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-01663-NE-EPG

United States District Court, C.D. California

December 27, 2021

ORDER DECLINING TO RECONSIDER EXPEDITING PENDING MOTION

ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTE TO CLERK OF COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA: THIS CASE IS RECOMMENDED FOR DIRECT TRANSFER TO DISTRICT JUDGE CHRISTINA A. SNYDER IN LIGHT OF RELATED CASE NO. 2:19-cv-08569-CAS-FFM

Plaintiff in this case challenges the constitutionality and seeks to prevent the enforcement of California Health & Safety Code § 25990, et seq., which California voters most recently amended through passage of Proposition 12 on November 16, 2018 (“Proposition 12”). Among other things, Proposition 12 prohibits the sale of “whole pork meat” from a “covered animal” that was confined in a “cruel manner” or is the immediate offspring of a covered animal that was confined in a cruel manner. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25900. The statute defines “confined in a cruel manner” to include confining any animal in a manner that “prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending the animal's limbs, or turning around freely.” Id. at § 25901. In a provision that explicitly does not take effect until after December 31, 2021, the law also includes “confining a breeding pig with less than 24 square feet of usable floorspace per pig” within the definition of “confined in a cruel manner.” Id. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief based on its assertion that Proposition 12, including its enforcement provisions, violates the Due Process Clause the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause, and is preempted by Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 193 et seq. (Doc. No. 23 (first amended complaint (“FAC”)).)

As mentioned below, commerce clause challenges to Proposition 12 previously have been presented to other courts where related injunctive relief motions have been resolved and rejected. The present lawsuit advances similar commerce clause arguments once again and adds several new claims. Among other things, plaintiff now alleges that certain aspects of Proposition 12 are unconstitutionally vague, particularly given that implementing regulations related to the law- which Proposition 12 directed relevant state agencies to promulgate by September 1, 2019-have yet to be finalized. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25993(a). For example plaintiff alleges that “it remains vague [ ] to whether a single violation is based on each sale, each pound or piece of meat, or each breeding pig.” (FAC ¶ 49.) Plaintiff elsewhere argues that while Proposition 12 prohibits the sale of non-compliant whole pork meat by anyone “engaged in” the sale of meat within California California Health & Safety Code §§ 25990(b)(2), 25991, the term “engaged in” is not defined and therefore “requires the entire pork supply chain to speculate as to its meaning while concurrently risking criminal prosecution.” (Doc. No. 24-1 at 18.) Finally plaintiffs assert that the “turn around” requirements and “square footage” requirements “are only mentioned in one phrasing in the statute providing no further definition of what these terms even mean, ” which plaintiff asserts is problematic because “[t]he practical implication of how to implement these two sets of requirements is complex.” (Id.)

The complaint in this action was originally filed in Fresno County Superior Court on November 9, 2021; defendants removed the matter to this federal court on November 16, 2021. (Doc. No. 1.) On November 22, 2021, plaintiff filed an overlength motion for preliminary injunction. (See Doc. Nos. 15-15-6.) Plaintiff urged the court to accept the overlength brief (see Doc. No. 14); to set a hearing on the matter for December 17, 2021; and to rule on their motion for preliminary injunction before January 1, 2022, the effective date of some of Proposition 12's provisions.^[1] (See Doc. No. 15.) In an order issued November 24, 2021, the undersigned struck the overlength brief, granted a more modest page expansion, required the re-filing of the motion, and declined to expedite the matter in the manner requested by plaintiff. (Doc. No. 21.) The court noted that “[considering the ongoing and well-documented judicial resource emergency in this court . . . plaintiff's request would be nearly impossible to accommodate.” (Id. at 2.) The thrust of the court's ruling was premised upon plaintiff's failure to bring the matter before this court with the urgency required to merit expedited treatment under the circumstances:

Even if the court could muster the resources to address the pending motion on the expedited timeline suggested by plaintiff, the undersigned declines to urgently prioritize this matter vis-a-vis the numerous other civil litigants who have been waiting many months (if not years) for rulings on important matters. It is undisputed that Proposition 12 passed in November 2018. (See Doc. No. 15-1 at 12.) Some of the provisions challenged here went into effect later that year. (Id.) Certain other aspects of Proposition 12 are set to go into effect on January 1, 2022. (Id.) Since Proposition 12's passage, starting in 2019, at least two other groups of similarly-situated plaintiffs have tried unsuccessfully to block the same aspects of Proposition 12 challenged by plaintiff here from going into effect. See N. Am. Meat Institute v. Becerra, 420 F.Supp.3d 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff'd, 825 Fed.Appx. 518 (9th Cir. 2020); Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 456 F.Supp.3d 1201, 1206 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff'd, 6 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2021).

Moreover, it has come to the court's attention that plaintiff initially filed a largely identical suit to this one in state court in Iowa in May 2021. See Iowa Pork Producers Ass'n et al. v. Bonta, No. 3:21 -cv-3018 (N.D. Iowa), ECF No. 1-4 (Complaint). That case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa and subsequently dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction in late August 2021. Id. at ECF No. 67. Then, seemingly inexplicably, plaintiff waited approximately ten weeks to file the instant complaint in Fresno County Superior Court on November 9, 2021. The Fresno County complaint was subsequently (and unsurprisingly) removed to this federal court seven days later, a mere six weeks before the square footage requirements of Proposition 12 are set to take effect. Were this motion to proceed according to the December 17, 2021 hearing date proposed by plaintiff, this highly complex matter would become ripe a mere 21 days before December 31, 2021, a period that encompasses several holiday-related court closures. This timing renders the pending motion effectively one for a temporary restraining order insofar as it demands highly expedited treatment. The undersigned therefore looks to this court's local rule regarding temporary restraining orders, which provides:

Timing of Motion. In considering a motion for a temporary restraining order, the Court will consider whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary restraining order. Should the Court find that the applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive relief, the Court may conclude that the delay constitutes laches or contradicts the applicant's allegations of irreparable injury and may deny the motion solely on either ground.

Local Rule 231(b).

The court finds that the present record fails to explain why this case could not have been presented to the court in a far timelier manner. The “urgency” presented here is largely of plaintiff's own making. Therefore, the court will not expedite consideration of the pending motion in the manner suggested by plaintiff. The court recognizes that-at least according to plaintiff-the financial implications of Proposition 12 going into effect may be enormous, but that does not change the procedural history of this case.

(Id. at 2-4 (footnotes omitted).) In short, the undersigned refused to effectively treat plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as one for temporary injunctive relief. In the same order, the undersigned also indicated that it was “considering the issuance of an order to show cause why this case should not be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, where the substantially related North American Meat Institute v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-08569- CAS (FFMx) case remains open, ” but did not indicate an intended timeframe for its consideration of that issue. (Id. at 5.)

More than three weeks later, on December 16, 2021, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint along with a revised motion for preliminary injunction, setting that motion for hearing before this court on January 27, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 23, 24.) Simultaneously, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for an order transferring venue to the Central District of California, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiff indicated therein that defendants were taking no position on the question of transfer. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also appears not to have fully internalized the undersigned's ruling that expedited treatment of this matter was not warranted given the substantially self-inflicted delay in bringing this action before a federal court in California. For example, plaintiff suggests that a delayed ruling on their motion to transfer will “invite more unnecessary briefing and undue delay that will certainly surpass the January 1, 2022 deadline.” (Doc. No. 27 at 2.) To the extent that this language could be construed as a request for reconsideration of this court's prior...