Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Davis

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DEEMER, J.
• Citation: Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Davis, 102 Iowa 128, 71 N.W. 229 (Iowa 1897)
• Decision Date: 13 May 1897
• Parties: THE IOWA RAILROAD LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. SAMUEL T. DAVIS

71 N.W. 229

102 Iowa 128

THE IOWA RAILROAD LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. SAMUEL T. DAVIS

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 13, 1897

Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--HON. GEORGE W. WAKEFIELD Judge.

SUIT in equity to recover for taxes paid by plaintiff and its assignors upon certain lands in Woodbury county, the title to which at the time the taxes were paid being in dispute, and finally found by this court to be in defendant's grantors (see 72 Iowa 508, 34 N.W. 304), this decree being affirmed by the supreme court of the United States (143 U.S. 38, 12 S.Ct 362). The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Chas A. Clark for appellant.

C. C. Cole, O. C. Treadway, and S. T. Davis (pro se) for appellee.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

From the petition we gather the following facts, which are regarded as controlling. On the nineteenth day of July, 1856, Thomas L. Griffey, defendant's grantor, filed a pre-emption claim to certain lands in Woodbury county, in the United States land office, and some time prior to July 7, 1857, made final proofs. On this last-named date the commissioners of the general land office canceled the pre-emption entry and location, but Griffey refused to receive back the payment made by him for the land, and insisted upon the validity of his claim. Afterwards, and on the thirtieth day of June, 1882, the letter of cancellation was withdrawn and set aside, and a patent was issued to Griffey covering the land originally located by him. The plaintiff claimed title to the lands under grant of May 15, 1856, and certified as land in place, April 7, 1863. After the completion of the railway, and on July 5, 1871, the land was patented by the state to the railway company. It appears that the railway was surveyed past the land in question July 5, 1856, but the plat of this survey was not filed with the state department until October 2, 1856, nor was it filed in the United States land office until October 13, 1856. In the case of Land Co. v. Griffey, 72 Iowa 505 (34 N.W. 304), being a controversy between plaintiff's assignor and the defendant's grantor,--we held that the railroad company acquired no interest in the land until a plat of the survey was filed in the general land office at Washington; following a line of decisions commencing with Railroad Co. v. Grinnell, decided June 14, 1879, and reported in 51 Iowa 476 (1 N.W. 712). We further held that until the plat was so filed the land was open to pre-emption, and that since, before such plat was so filed, defendant had obtained a valid pre-emption right, upon which he afterwards procured a patent, his was the better title. This case was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States, the opinion being found in the case referred to in the statement preceding this opinion. 143 U.S. 32, (12 S.Ct. 362). The land was taxed for the year 1871, and for each and every subsequent year down to and including the year 1890, and the taxes so assessed were paid by the plaintiff and its assignors. These taxes were, as a rule, paid before the first day of March of the year succeeding the levy, and all except two small items were paid prior to the first day of April. The petition alleges that plaintiff and its assignors supposed and believed, until the adverse decision against it in the supreme court of the United States, that it was entitled to the land under the act of congress approved May 15, 1856, and that the taxes were paid in good faith; each and all believing that it was the lawful owner of the land, and held the same by good and indefeasible title. Davis acquired title to the lands by virtue of certain mesne conveyances from Griffey, and with full notice and knowledge that plaintiff and its assignors had paid the taxes thereon. This suit is for an accounting as to the taxes paid, for judgment for the amount thereof, and to establish a lien to the amount of the judgment against the land. The demurrer is the general equitable one, and further says that all claims for taxes paid prior to the year 1887 are barred by the statute of limitations. Another ground of the demurrer is that the lands were not taxable prior to the year 1883, and plaintiff is not entitled to any relief for taxes paid prior to that date. The trial court found that plaintiff's title was and is absolutely null and void, and that it and its grantors paid the taxes under a mistake of law, and are not entitled to recover. It also found that the lands were not subject to taxation prior to the year 1882, and that in no event would defendant be liable for taxes paid by plaintiff or its assignors during the years 1871 to 1882, inclusive.

Appellant's counsel in argument first attacks this last conclusion of the court, and, following the order adopted by him, we turn our attention to this proposition. The conflicting claims of the par with reference to this point may be stated as follows: Appellant contends that, when one acquires a vested right to a patent for lands, it is the equivalent of a patent actually issued, and, when the patent does issue, it relates back to the inception of the right of the patentee, and he takes the legal title, by relation, from the date of his original right thereto, and that under the facts of this case the legal title to the land was in defendant and his grantors from the year 1856, and was taxable from and after that year. It also contends that, if it be held that the lands claimed under the land grant were not taxable until the patent issued, as the state patented the land to plaintiff's assignors in the year 1872, it was taxable for that and subsequent years. While, on the other hand, appellee's counsel contend that the lands were not taxable until the patent issued to Griffey, for the reason that prior thereto, and during the controversy between the parties as to the title to the land, the United States held the title in trust for the party entitled thereto, and that while so held the land was not subject to taxation. Neither party disputes the proposition of law made by the other, and the case turns upon this one proposition, did the United States hold the title in trust prior to the time it issued the patent to Griffey? Answer to this question depends upon the solution of the question as to whether the government held the legal title to the land after it certified the same to the railway company. The petition recites that the secretary of the interior certified the land to the state of Iowa April 7, 1863, and that the state patented the same to plaintiff's assignors July 5, 1871. Now, it has frequently been held that such certification and patent operate to transfer the legal title, subject to be decreed to another who subsequently shows himself entitled thereto. The legal title passed to the plaintiff's assignors, and the lands were clearly taxable from that time on. Chicago, R. & M. R. Co. v. Carroll County, 41 Iowa 153; Land Co. v. Antoine, 52 Iowa 429 (3 N.W. 468); American Emigrant Co. v. Iowa R. L. Co., 52 Iowa 323 (3 N.W. 88); Mower v. Fletcher, 116 U.S. 380 (6 S.Ct. 409, 29 L.Ed. 593); Williams v. U.S., 138 U.S. 514 (11 S.Ct. 457, 34 L.Ed. 1026); Buena Vista County v. Iowa Falls & S. C. R. Co., 112 U.S. 165 (5 S.Ct. 84, 28 L.Ed. 680). The cases of Land Co. v. Fitchpatrick, 52 Iowa 244 (3 N.W. 40); Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 221; Dickerson v. Yetzer, 53 Iowa 681 (6 N.W. 41); Doe v. Land Co., 54 Iowa 657 (7 N.W. 118); and Grant v. Land Co:, 54 Iowa 673 (7 N.W. 113),--are not in point, for the reason that in none of them was the land certified by the general government, and patented by the state. On the contrary, in each case the title was withheld by the general government pending a controversy between conflicting claimants, and it was thought improper to hold that the land was subject to taxation and to tax sales while the United States had a duty to perform in regard to it. It is clear that the land was taxable after its certification by the general government. Whether it was taxable from the time Griffey was entitled to receive his patent we need not determine, for no taxes were levied until after the United States had certified the lands, and transferred the legal title to the railroad company. The case of Wood v. Curran, 76 Iowa 560 (41 N.W. 214), is not in conflict with the views herein expressed.

Appellant's next point is that it paid the taxes in good faith, and that under the doctrine announced in Goodnow v. Moulton 51 Iowa 555 (2 N.W. 395), and other like cases, it is entitled to recover the amount thereof, with interest, and to establish the amount of such payments as a lien upon the land. To this appellee responds by saying that the taxes were paid under a mistake of law; were paid voluntarily with full knowledge of all the facts, and without the request or consent of the owner of the land, in violation of a right given by statute to the owner, not in good faith, but with knowledge that their title was void, and that claims for all taxes paid prior to the year 1887 are barred by the statute of limitations. Appellee confidently relies upon the cases of Garrigan v. Knight, 47 Iowa 525; Montgomery County v. Severson, 68 Iowa 451 (27 N.W. 377); Read v. Howe, 49 Iowa 65; Barr v. Patrick, 59 Iowa 134 (12 N.W. 805); Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Iowa 16. In the case of Garrigan v. Knight, supra, we held, following, as we now believe, the general current of authority, that "when the title to real estate is in controversy, and one of the parties pays the taxes, and is afterwards unsuccessful in his claim of ownership, he cannot recover the taxes thus paid." It was also said in that opinion that "the mere fact that plaintiff knew the defendant was paying the...