Iowa Right To Life Comm. Inc. v. Tooker

Decision Date29 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. 4:10–cv–416 RP–TJS.,4:10–cv–416 RP–TJS.
PartiesIOWA RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., Plaintiff,v.Megan TOOKER,1 in her official capacity as Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board Executive Director; James Albert, John Walsh, Patricia Harper, Gerald Sullivan, Saima Zafar, and Carole Tillotson, in their official capacities as Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board Members, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Bopp, Jr., Richard E. Coleson, Jared Haynie, Joseph E. La Rue, Kaylan L. Phillips, Bopp Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, IN, Adam C. Gregg, Sean P. Moore, Brian P. Rickert, Brown Winick Graves Gross Baskerville & Schoenebaum PLC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.Jeffrey S. Thompson, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Currently before the Court are two motions for summary judgment. The first motion was filed by Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. (IRTL) on January 14, 2011. Clerk's No. 44. The above-captioned government officials (collectively, Defendants) filed a response on February 4, 2011. Clerk's No. 47. IRTL filed a reply on February 11, 2011. Clerk's No. 50. IRTL also filed two “Notices of Additional Authority” in support of its motion on June 9, 2011. Clerk's Nos. 51, 52. The second motion was filed by Defendants on January 14, 2011. Clerk's No. 45. IRTL filed a response on February 4, 2011. Clerk's No. 48. Defendants filed a reply on February 11, 2011. Clerk's No. 49. The matters are fully submitted.2

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. IRTL is an Iowa nonprofit corporation that is exempt from federal income taxes pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter “Pl.'s Facts”) ¶¶ 1, 7 (Clerk's No. 44–2); see also Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter “Defs.' Resp. re Facts”) ¶ 1, 7 (Clerk's No. 47–1). IRTL is affiliated with the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. and is funded solely by donations. See Pl.'s Facts ¶ 6. According to IRTL's mission statement, its “primary purpose is ‘to present factual information upon which individuals may make an informed decision about the various topics of fetal development, abortion, and alternatives to abortion, euthanasia, infanticide and prevention of cruelty to children.’ Id. IRTL asserts that “its major purpose is not and will never be the nomination or election of candidates.” 3Id. ¶ 7 (citing Compl. ¶ 15).

Defendants are the officers and members of the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board (hereinafter the Board). Pl.'s Facts ¶¶ 2–3. Therefore, Defendants “have the power to investigate violations of, and to enforce the provisions of, Iowa Code chapter 68A, chapter 68B, and the rules adopted by the Board.” Id.

In January 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. See ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In April 2010, Iowa revised its election laws and enacted new administrative rules.4

IRTL “wants to make independent expenditures to support candidates who it believes will fight to protect issues that are important to its organization, such as protecting life,” but, according to IRTL, it “is chilled from doing so due to the burdens imposed by the restrictions challenged here—particularly the uncertainty of when PAC status might be imposed—and the potential civil and criminal penalties for violating the challenged provisions.” 5 Pl.'s Facts ¶ 5 (citing Compl. ¶ 13). IRTL also wishes to make campaign contributions to candidates for political office. See id. ¶¶ 11–12 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 19–20).

IRTL filed this case on September 7, 2010. See Compl. ¶ 3(a)-(d). Along with its complaint, IRTL also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Clerk's No. 2. The Court denied that motion on October 20, 2010. Clerk's No. 37 (hereinafter the “PI Order”).6

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The term “summary judgment” is something of a misnomer. See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 Green Bag 2d 273 (Spring 2010). It “suggests a judicial process that is simple, abbreviated, and inexpensive,” while in reality, the process is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. 7 Id. at 273, 281. The complexity of the process, however, reflects the “complexity of law and life.” Id. at 281. “Since the constitutional right to jury trial is at stake,” judges must engage in a “paper-intensive and often tedious” process to “assiduously avoid deciding disputed facts or inferences” in a quest to determine whether a record contains genuine factual disputes that necessitate a trial. Id. at 281–82. Despite the seeming inaptness of the name, and the desire for some in the plaintiffs' bar to be rid of it, the summary judgment process is well-accepted and appears “here to stay.” 8Id. at 281. Indeed, “judges are duty-bound to resolve legal disputes, no matter how close the call.” Id. at 287.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that [a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” However, “summary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances.” Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of summary judgment is not “to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.” Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)). Rather, it is designed to avoid “useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried.” Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1975)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment upon motion after there has been adequate time for discovery. Summary judgment can be entered against a party if that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The Court does not weigh the evidence, nor does it make credibility determinations. The Court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir.1987) (“Summary judgment is not designed to weed out dubious claims, but to eliminate those claims with no basis in material fact.”) (citing Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1047, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.1975)).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Specifically,

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond its original pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that needs to be resolved by a trial. See id.; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

Courts do not treat summary judgment as if it were a paper trial. Therefore, a district court's role in deciding the motion is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). In a motion for summary judgment, the Court...

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  • Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • June 21, 2012
    ...it either has made or hopes to publish. See Pls.' Summ. J. Br. 13 & n. 11, ECF No. 166–1; Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 795 F.Supp.2d 852, 863 n. 16 (S.D.Iowa 2011). By largely proceeding as if vagueness is a question of law shorn of context, VRLC seems to argue the provisions h......
  • Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 4:10–cv–416
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • September 28, 2015
    ...disposed of all four counts on summary judgment, and IRTL appealed to the Eighth Circuit. SeeIowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 795 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Iowa 2011) (hereinafter "IRTL I" ). The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded two issues that are now befor......
  • Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell
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    • June 21, 2012
    ...it either has made or hopes to publish. See Pls.' Summ. J. Br. 13 & n.11, ECF No. 166-1; Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 863 n.16 (S.D. Iowa 2011). By largely proceeding as if vagueness is a question of law shorn ofcontext, VRLC seems to argue the provisions h......
  • Iowa Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 30, 2011
    ...On June 29, 2011, the district court granted summary judgment for the Board on all counts except Count I. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 795 F.Supp.2d 852, 873 (S.D.Iowa 2011). The district court reserved ruling on Count I because it had doubts about the proper interpretation of ......
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