Iowa Supreme Court Com'n v. Sturgeon
Citation | 635 N.W.2d 679 |
Decision Date | 10 October 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-0417.,99-0417. |
Parties | IOWA SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, Appellee, v. LeRoy James STURGEON, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
LeRoy J. Sturgeon, Sioux City, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
LeRoy Sturgeon has appealed from a district court order enjoining him from the unauthorized practice of law arising out of his bankruptcy business. We modify and affirm.
On April 13, 1998, our Commission on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (commission) sought an injunction against Sturgeon, claiming his bankruptcy business violated our unauthorized practice rules. The district court granted the injunction, and Sturgeon appealed.
Sturgeon's appeal raises six issues, which we consolidate into four: (1) the court's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 110, concerning the scope of work permitted to be performed by a nonattorney; (2) the adequacy of the factual record to support the charge; (3) the constitutionality of our unauthorized practice rules; and (4) the scope of the court's injunction.
However, the statute provides that states may do exactly that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit activities that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and laws that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law.
11 U.S.C. § 110(k) (1994). "As a result of this provision, a document preparer may not use § 110 as a `safe harbor' if a rule or certain rules prohibit the unauthorized practice of law or the document preparer's activities are otherwise prohibited by law." In re Gabrielson, 217 B.R. 819, 826 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1998); see also In re Farness, 244 B.R. 464, 470 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2000)
( ); Florida Bar v. Catarcio, 709 So.2d 96, 99 n. 1 (Fla.1998) ().
We hold these unauthorized practice proceedings are not proscribed by 11 U.S.C. § 110 and therefore proceed to a determination of the merits of the charge.
This is an equity proceeding, so our review is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 4. Sturgeon asserts the commission must prove the allegations of their complaint by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, citing Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Iowa 1992). Baker, however, was not an unauthorized practice case, so its standard of proof is not necessarily binding here. The commission, however, does not argue for a different standard of review, so for purposes of this appeal, we will assume the standard is a convincing preponderance of the evidence.
Iowa Court Rule 118A.1 authorizes injunctions against the unauthorized practice of law. The commission notes that this court has the inherent authority to define and regulate the practice of law, citing Baker. In Baker we approved the nonexclusive definition of the practice of law found in Ethical Consideration 3-5:
It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law. However, the practice of law includes, but is not limited to, representing another before the courts; giving of legal advice and counsel to others relating to their rights and obligations under the law; and preparation or approval of the use of legal instruments by which legal rights of others are either obtained, secured or transferred even if such matters never become the subject of a court proceeding. Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of professional judgment of the lawyer is the educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in matters involving professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is not involved, nonlawyers, such as court clerks, police officers, abstracters, and many governmental employees, may engage in occupations that require a special knowledge of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential in the public interest whenever the exercise of professional judgment is required.
Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 3-5; see also Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 701
(. )
Sturgeon claims that he merely typed information, furnished by his clients, into preprinted forms. The commission, however, has a different view: Sturgeon solicited information to complete the forms, chose the forms to be used, rendered advice to his clients as to the information that would be required, and inserted the information obtained into appropriate blanks in the forms. In at least one case, Sturgeon actually drafted a pleading to be filed in the bankruptcy case.
Cases have drawn the unauthorized practice line at the point at which data entry (either by typewriter or computer) crosses the line between copying written information provided by the client and oral solicitation of the information necessary to fill out documents selected by the preparer. See, e.g., Hastings v. United States Trustee (In re Agyekum), 225 B.R. 695, 702 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1998) (); Farness, 244 B.R. at 472 ( ); In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr.S.D.Calif.1998) (); In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769, 774 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990) (); Catarcio, 709 So.2d at 98, 100 ( ); see also Gabrielson, 217 B.R. at 827
().
Sturgeon conducted an initial interview to solicit information, which he then typed into the computer. He also advised clients to bring certain information with them to the interview. He stated, "I believe at least I can provide a service to minimize the occasion of pro se debtors in bankruptcy who fill [documents] out incorrectly or who perhaps don't know that they also have to file a statement of financial affairs or will only file this set of documents and not that one." Clearly, Sturgeon counseled clients on which documents they needed to file, and this has been held to be the practice of law. See Bachmann, 113 B.R. at 773
.
Sturgeon's own testimony established that he did more than merely fill in blanks in computer-generated forms. It is clear he drew on his knowledge and experience in bankruptcy matters. He testified:
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