Iowa Voter Alliance v. Black Hawk Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. C20-2078-LTS,C20-2078-LTS
• Citation: 515 F.Supp.3d 980
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
• Parties: IOWA VOTER ALLIANCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLACK HAWK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

515 F.Supp.3d 980

IOWA VOTER ALLIANCE, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.BLACK HAWK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. C20-2078-LTS

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

Signed January 27, 2021

Erick G. Kaardal, Pro Hac Vice, Vincent J. Fahnlander, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.

Katie Lynn Graham, Randall D. Armentrout, Nyemaster Goode West Hansell & O'Brien, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant Black Hawk County.

Robert Lee Cusack, Scott County Attorney's Office, Davenport, IA, for Defendant Scott County.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on a motion (Doc. 31) to dismiss filed by defendant Black Hawk County, Iowa, and joined (Doc. 32) by defendant Scott County, Iowa (the counties). Plaintiffs Iowa Voter Alliance, Todd Obadal, Michael Angelos and Diane Holst have filed a resistance (Doc. 34) and the counties have filed a reply (Doc. 35). Oral argument is not necessary. See N.D. Iowa L.R. 7(c).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on October 1, 2020.¹ Doc. 1. They alleged that the counties’ acceptance of private grants from the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL) to help fund operations for the November 3, 2020, federal election violated federal and state law and harmed their right to vote. Id. They sought (1) a declaratory judgment stating that receiving and using the funds was illegal and (2) an injunction to prevent the counties from using the CTCL grants to help fund the upcoming election. Id.

The CTCL is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization that offered "COVID-19 Response Grants" to local election jurisdictions that lacked sufficient funding to cover the extra, unforeseen costs of conducting an election safely during a pandemic. Doc. 1-2. Because the counties had not factored such costs into their budgets for the November 2020 election, they applied for, and received, grants from the CTCL. Docs. 16-4, 26-1. Black Hawk County received $267,500 while Scott County received $286,870. Id. Both counties signed the CTCL's "Grant Agreement," which required, among other things, that the counties (1) use the funds "exclusively for the public purpose of planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration" and (2) "produce a brief report explaining and documenting how grant funds have been expended" in accordance with the counties’ submitted plans for carrying out a safe and secure election during the COVID-19 pandemic. Docs. 16-3, 35.

Because the November 2020 election was rapidly approaching, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on October 6, 2020. Doc. 6. I held a hearing on the TRO request on October 20, 2020, and entered an order denying the request the same day. Docs. 21, 23.

On October 28, 2020, the counties moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Docs. 26, 27. Plaintiffs responded on November 11, 2020, by filing an amended complaint and a motion to stay ruling on the counties’ motion to dismiss. Docs. 28, 29. The counties then renewed their joint motion to dismiss, rendering moot their original motion to dismiss and plaintiffs’ motion to stay. Docs. 31, 32, 33.

The amended complaint raises largely the same claims raised in the original complaint. Doc. 28. However, because the election is over, plaintiffs now seek (1) a declaratory judgment that the counties’ use of the CTCL grants to help fund the 2020 election violated federal and state law and (2) an injunction preventing them from using CTCL grants, or any other private election grants, in the future. Id. The counties again contend that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Doc. 31.

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) – Lack of Standing

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that "have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Marine Equip. Management Co. v. United States , 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1993). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a motion to dismiss a complaint due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. V S Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Housing and Urban Development , 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. , 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1989) ). Moreover, a federal court has a special obligation to consider sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction in every case. Hart v. United States , 630 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2011). If a plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a claim, then the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minnesota , 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2002). "Therefore, a standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1)." Id. When determining standing, the emphasis is on whether the plaintiff "possesses a legally cognizable interest, or ‘personal stake,’ in the outcome of the action." Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 71, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (quoting Camreta v. Greene , 563 U.S. 692, 701, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) ). Generally, a plaintiff must assert his or her own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of third parties. Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

Where a party limits its subject matter jurisdiction attack to the face of the complaint, the attack is a "facial challenge." Jones v. United States , 727 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp. , 285 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2002) ). When presented with a facial challenge, " ‘the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings, and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).’ " Id. (quoting Osborn v. United States , 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) ). Those protections include treating the complainant's factual allegations as true and dismissing the action only if it appears beyond a doubt that the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Osborn , 918 F.2d at 729 & n.6.

By contrast, when a party makes a factual challenge to the district court's jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), " ‘no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the [complainant's] allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude [the court] from evaluating ... the merits of the jurisdictional claims.’ " Iowa League of Cities v. EPA , 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Osborn , 918 F.2d at 729–30 & n. 6 ). Where the challenge is factual, "the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns v. United States , 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). "[T]he court may look beyond the pleadings and ‘the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists. ’ " Khoury v. Meserve , 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment."

Velasco v. Gov't of Indon. , 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004).

Here, the attack is facial, not factual, as the counties argue that plaintiffs’ allegations do not meet the legal requirements to establish standing. Therefore, I will consider only the parties’ pleadings.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a pre-answer motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has provided the following guidance in considering whether a pleading properly states a claim:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Court held in [ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ], the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. , at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. , at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. , at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. , at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ " Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Courts assess "plausibility" by " ‘draw[ing] on [their own] judicial experience and common...