Ipec Planar v. Mach 1 Air Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 99-506-PHX-EHC.,CIV 99-506-PHX-EHC. |
| Citation | 129 F.Supp.2d 1265 |
| Parties | IPEC PLANAR, an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff, v. MACH 1 AIR SERVICES, INC., an Arizona corporation Defendant. Mach 1 Air Services, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Herman C Zickerman, Jr, West Christoffel Konigsberg & Zickerman PC, Tucson, AZ, Todd B Denenberg, Grotefeld & Denenberg LLC, Bingham Farms, MI, for Ipec Planar.
Jeffrey R Simmons, DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Mach 1 Air Services, Inc.
Ryan Emmett Kelly, Baumann Kelly Paytas & Bernstein, Phoenix, AZ, for Landstar Ranger, Inc.
Plaintiff Ipec Planar ("Ipec"), an Arizona corporation, filed this action against Mach 1 Air Service ("Mach I"), an Arizona corporation, in Maricopa County Superior Court. Ipec alleges claims for bailment, negligence, and breach of contract against Mach I in connection with the transportation and delivery of equipment valued at $3.5 million.
Mach I removed to federal court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. Mach I filed a cross-claim against Landstar Ranger, Inc. ("Landstar"), a Delaware corporation, the entity that actually transported the equipment at issue.
Mach I has filed a motion for summary judgment regarding the maximum amount of its liability to Ipec. Landstar has filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Mach I and Ipec regarding the maximum amount of its liability to them. Those motions are discussed below.
Ipec manufactures and distributes planarization machinery used in the production of silicon wafers and semi-conductors for computer chips. Ipec frequently ships its goods using various carriers. (Ex. A to Defendant's Statement of Facts, hereafter "DSOF"). Ipec's shipping department was comprised of a lead shipper and three other employees. (Ex. A to DSOF). The lead shipper at times relevant to this action was Greg Courtright. (Ex. A to DSOF). Courtright and the shipping department were supervised by Paul Tome, Ipec's inventory control manager. (Ex. A to DSOF). Tome established a policy of shipping products at the lowest tariff to substantially reduce shipping costs. (Ex. B to DSOF). Ipec relied on its general insurance policy to cover damage to its shipments during transportation. (Ex. B to DSOF).
In July 1998, Courtright contacted Mach I to arrange shipment of a polisher from Phoenix to a trade show in San Francisco because Mach 1 had submitted the lowest bid to do so. (Ex. A and B to DSOF). Ipec had previously utilized Mach 1 several hundred times during the preceding six years to transport its products and Courtright and Tome were familiar with Mach 1's rates and waybill. In fact, Ipec had preprinted waybills for such shipments and sent approximately fifteen shipments a day via Mach 1. Mach 1 arranged for Landstar, an independent motor carrier, to transport Ipec's polisher to San Francisco. (Ex. C to DSOF).
On July 6, 1998, Ipec delivered to Landstar six crates identified as polisher parts weighing 17,000 and valued at $3.5 million for transport to San Francisco. (Ex. D to DSOF). Ruben Del Rio, an Ipec shipper, met the Landstar truck and loaded the crates on Landstar's trailer. (Ex. D to DSOF). Del Rio signed Mach 1's waybill, # 3066014.1 (Ex. D and E to DSOF).
The waybill provided that:
UNLESS A GREATER VALUE IS DECLARED HEREIN, THE SHIPPER AGREES AND DECLARES THAT THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IS RELEASED TO AN AMOUNT NOT EXCEEDING $50.00 OR 50¢ PER POUND WHICHEVER IS HIGHER.
(Ex. E to DSOF). The back of the waybill set forth Mach I's "Conditions of Contract." Paragraph 2 of the waybill provided that the waybill was subject to Mach 1's applicable tariffs and regulations. (Ex. F to DSOF). Paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Contract provided that:
Charges for Declared Value
higher value is declared for the shipment at time of tender.
(C) Cash on Delivery (C.O.D.) Shipments-Shipper must enter the amount of any shipper's C.O.D. on the carrier's air waybill, which shall be collected subject to the fees and rules of the delivering carrier. If no declared value is listed, then the C.O.D. amount of the shipment shall be deemed the declared value for carriage and the appropriate valuation charge shall be applicable.
(D) SHIPMENTS EXCEEDING $15,000.00 IN DECLARED VALUE MUST RECEIVE PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM MACH 1 AIR SERVICES, INC. CORPORATE MANAGEMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN COVERAGE.
(Ex. F to DSOF). Finally, paragraph 13 provided that:
Debtor does hereby acknowledge and waive its right to raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in any lawsuit commenced by Mach 1 Air Services, Inc. against the debtor. Debtor does hereby consent to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it by the Arizona Superior Court in and for the County of Maricopa and/or the Tempe Precinct of the Maricopa County, Arizona Justice Court in any lawsuit commenced against the debtor by Mach 1 Air Services, Inc. Debtor and Mach 1 Air Services, Inc. do also stipulate that the laws of the State of Arizona shall apply to any lawsuits commenced under this agreement.
(Ex. F to DSOF).
Mach 1's tariff provided that:
[Mach 1's] LIABILITY FOR ALL SHIPMENTS SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE HIGHER OF $50.00 PER SHIPMENT OR $0.50 PER POUND ($1.10 PER KILOGRAM) OF CARGO LOST OR DAMAGED, PLUS THE TRANSPORTATION CHARGES APPLICABLE TO THAT PART OF THE SHIPMENT DAMAGED OR LOST, UNLESS AT THE TIME THE SHIPPER TENDERED THE SHIPMENT, THE SHIPPER MADE A DECLARATION OF VALUE FOR CARRIAGE IN THE SPACE DESIGNED ON THE WAYBILL, AND AN ADDITIONAL VALUATION CHARGE IS PAID. WHEN SUCH A DECLARATION IS MADE, OUR LIABILITY SHALL IN NO EVENT EXCEED THE DECLARED VALUE OF THE SHIPMENT, PLUS APPLICABLE FREIGHT CHARGES OR THE AMOUNT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE SUSTAINED, WHICHEVER IS LOWER.
(Ex. G to DSOF).
Del Rio did not declare a higher value for the shipment on the waybill, consistent with Ipec's policy, described above. (Ex. D to DSOF). Landstar took custody of the shipment. Later that day, Landstar's truck and trailer were involved in an accident near Quartzite, Arizona. Ipec's goods were destroyed.
Ipec filed a claim with Mach 1 which was denied. Ipec thereafter filed this suit alleging claims for bailment, negligence and breach of contract under Arizona law. Mach I and Landstar seek summary judgment as to the extent of their liability for damages.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rules is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Substantive law determines which facts are material. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The dispute must also be genuine. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In a civil case, the question is:
whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
The moving party who has the burden of proof on the issue at trial must establish all of the essential elements of the claim or defense for the court to find that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fontenot v. Upjohn, 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.1986). However, the moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of their case on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. See also, High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.1990).
Mach 1 argues that the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as amended, preempts Ipec's state and common law claims for damage to Ipec's shipment and argues that Ipec's complaint should therefore be dismissed. Ipec argues that the choice of law provision on the back of the waybill reflects the parties opted out of application of the Motor Carrier Act pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14101(b)(1).2
Congress intended the Motor Carrier Act, as amended, to completely govern claims arising out of damage or loss to property transported by interstate carriers. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-506, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913). The Act's broad scope preempts state law claims arising out of the loss or damage to property transported by interstate carriers. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir.1997); Cleveland v....
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