Ir re Maclub of America, Inc.

Citation3 N.E.2d 272,295 Mass. 45
PartiesIr re MACLUB OF AMERICA, Inc.
Decision Date01 July 1936
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Proceeding in the matter of Maclub of America, Incorporated, on a petition brought by the Attorney General alleging that respondent was engaged illegally in the practice of law. The case was heard by a single justice, who reported it for determination by the full court.

Decree in accordance with opinion.P. A. Dever, Atty. Gen., and J. J. Ronan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Attorney General.

H. W. Hardy, of Boston, for respondent.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This is a petition brought by the Attorney General alleging that the respondent is engaged illegally in the practice of law. The case was heard by a single justice, who found the material facts in substance to be these: The respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of this Commonwealth with a capital of $25,000. It sells ‘membership,’ in reality contracts, for a consideration of $12 for the first year and $10 for each year renewed thereafter, to persons belonging to the Masonic fraternity. These contracts give to the members various benefits connected with the operation of automobiles in this and other States. Each member receives a ‘first aid kit’ for use by a person injured by accident, an automobile map, and a folder giving information helpful in travelling. Each member also receives, nine times a year, a magazine entitled ‘Maclub Friends Along The Road Magazine,’ containing lists of approved hotels and restaurants and of ‘official service stations and dealers' with a star opposite the names of those service stations which may be called upon to render roadside service in case an automobile is disable. To a limited extent the respondent assumes the service charges.

One benefit to members, described by the respondent in its printed matter as ‘one vitally important phase of Maclub service,’ is the ‘Maclub legal defense.’ The respondent agrees to furnish at its expense ‘consultations and advice in any case pertaining to the use of the automobile, legal defense of members in any civil suit arising from the use of a member's automobile that may involve property damage, legal defense of claims for personal injuries where members are not insured,’ and ‘legal defense in the courts of members charged with violating any automobile law, any city ordinance or any police, regulation, including alleged manslaughter.’ A list of recommended attorneys (who pay nothing for the listing) is published in the magazine at intervals. This list of names of recommended attorneys was secured by the legal department of the respondent corporation. Some at least of the recommended attorneys consented to being on the list. The list contains the names of attorneys in almost every important city and town in the New England States. Members are at liberty to employ other attorneys, but are urged to employ those on the list. The respondent has lived up to its contracts with respect to ‘Maclub legal defense.’

The amount paid for services of attorneys was about $500 in 1933 and less than $40 in each of the two following years. There are about nine hundred members of the respondent of whom about four hundred live in this Commonwealth. When an attorney is retained by a member, the respondent knows nothing of it until the bill for services is presented. It takes no part in the management of the case and it has no salaried attorney. The final statement of the single justice is that, unless these facts ‘require the conclusion as matter of law that the method of doing business adopted by the respondent amounts to the illegal practice of law, I do not draw from them such conclusion as matter of fact. I report the case for the determination by the full court, without further decision.’

The respondent does not contend that it can legally practice law. In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) 194 N.E. 313. It does not challenge the jurisdiction of the court. It was enacted by St.1935, c. 346, § 1, amending G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 221, § 46, that ‘No corporation * * * shall practice or appear as an attorney for any person other than itself in any court in the commonwealth or before any judicial body or hold itself out to the public or advertise as being entitled to practice law * * * or give legal advice in matters not relating to its lawful business, or practice law, or hold itself out in any manner as being entitled to do any of the foregoing acts, by or through any person orally or by advertisement, letter or circular.’ Penalties are established for violation of this section. By section 2 of said chapter 346 there were added to said chapter 221, section 46A and section 46B. It was provided by said section 46A (with exceptions not here material that no individual other than a member of the bar ‘shall practice law, or, by word, sign, letter, advertisement or otherwise, hold himself out as authorized, entitled, competent, qualified or able to practice law.’ By said section 46B jurisdiction was conferred in equity upon petition of the Attorney General among others to restrain violations of said sections 46 and 46A.

The present proceeding was instituted subsequently to the operative date of said chapter 346. The provisions of its first section, so far as concerns the facts shown on this record, do not enlarge the provisions of the common law touching the practice of law. Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725, 81 A.L.R. 1059;In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495, 55 A.L.R. 1309;In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) 194 N.E. 313. In view of said chapter 346, § 2, it is not necessary to determine what remedies might be open to the petitioner apart from this statute.

The terms of the contract between the respondent and its members bound the respondent in plain terms, for the consideration paid it, to furnish them services which can be rendered by members of the bar alone and which require the practice of law. Comprised within the sweep of its obligations touching liabilities arising from the use of an automobile were consultations and advice, legal defense of members in actions involving property damage, legal defense of claims for personal injuries against which members were not insured and legal defense in the courts of members charged with violation of any automobile law including manslaughter. This contractual obligation embraced every variety of litigation, whether civil or...

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2 cases
  • Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1943
    ... ... Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Association, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 372, 3 N.E.2d 746. See, also, McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 366, 10 N.E.2d ... Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495, 55 A.L.R. 1309;Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 48, 3 N.E.2d 272, 105 A.L.R. 1360;Matter of Thibodeau, 295 Mass ... ...
  • United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • December 5, 1967
    ... ... See, e.g., In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272, 105 A.L.R. 1360, and cases therein cited. See generally Drinker, Legal Ethics 26—30, 35—48 ... ...

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