Iraheta v. Thurman & Phillips, P.C.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | SA-20-CV-00003-XR |
| Parties | JOSE IRAHETA, Plaintiff, v. THURMAN & PHILLIPS, P.C., FOX GROVE, (SAN ANTONIO HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.); MICHAEL B. THURMAN, JENNIFER NUTT, SPECTRUM ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT, L.P., SPECTRUM ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT INC., NATALIE PURCELL, COLBY JACKSON, MARIA ROBINSON, JOHN DOE (1 THRU 40), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this date, the Court considered the status of this case and the pending motions—Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 101) and amended motion (ECF No. 126) for leave to file a second amended complaint; Defendants Spectrum Association Management, L.P. and Spectrum Association Management, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 92) and motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 119); two motions to dismiss by various defendants (ECF Nos. 120, 121); and Defendants' motion for protective order (ECF No. 124). After careful consideration, the Court issues the following order.
BACKGROUND
This case has an impressively long and complicated background for what is, at bottom, a low-dollar dispute between a homeowner and his homeowners' association. Plaintiff Jose Iraheta ("Plaintiff") owns real property in San Antonio, Texas (the "Nugget Peak property"), which he purchased in December 2012. ECF No. 11 ¶ 16. The Nugget Peak property is located in a subdivision governed by Fox Grove. Id. ¶ 17. As such, the property is subject to certain deed restrictions. Fox Grove contracts with a third-party management company, Defendants Spectrum Association Management LP and Spectrum Association Management Inc. (collectively, "Spectrum"), to perform management functions of the subdivision.1 Id. ¶ 19.
Between May 2016 and August 2017, Fox Grove and/or Spectrum sent Plaintiff at least eight written notices of violations of Fox Grove's covenants and restrictions related to weeds in Plaintiff's yard and the location of his garbage containers. Id. ¶ 23. From February 2016 through March 2019, Fox Grove and/or Spectrum sent correspondence to Plaintiff at least fourteen times demanding payments of fees. Id. As of March 2019, the total due was $876.45. Id. After that, it appears Fox Grove and/or Spectrum hired an outside firm2 to attempt to collect from Plaintiff, which sent correspondence to Plaintiff on April 23, 2019 and July 1, 2019. Id. The collections letters demanded payment of past due assessments, late fees, interest, and fines and threatened to "continue with collection remedies . . . including foreclosure of the lien by [Fox Grove]." Id.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this suit on January 3, 2020 against Fox Grove and various of its "agents," including Spectrum Association Management, L.P., Thurman & Phillips, P.C., Michael B. Thurman, Jennifer Nutt,3 and John Doe 1 through 5. ECF No. 1 at 1. In his live pleading, his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), Plaintiff also named Spectrum AssociationManagement, Inc., Natalie Purcell, Colby Jackson, Maria Robinson, and John Doe 1 through 40 as defendants.4
Plaintiff complains that "arbitrary fees" are now charged by Spectrum that weren't charged by Fox Grove's prior management company. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges vast conspiracies between Fox Grove and Spectrum, and schemes between Spectrum and other homeowners' associations, to assess these inflated penalties and fees, which are "excessive, and unconstitutional or unthinkable" and "not part of the operating fund for the benefit of the property owners in the Fox Grove subdivision." Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff also alleges none of the Defendants are authorized to collect debts in the State of Texas. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiff brings claims for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA"), the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and fifteen other causes of action for violations of Florida, Louisiana, and Texas laws, fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, and defamation.
Spectrum has moved for judgment on the pleadings for Plaintiff's RICO claim and for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FDCPA and related Texas law claims. ECF Nos. 92, 119. At a status conference held in this case on April 27, 2020, the Court noted that if Plaintiff's RICO and FDCPA claims were dismissed, the Court would lack jurisdiction over the remaining claims arising under state law. The next day, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint to "cure defects" in his first amended complaint, add claims against several defendants for tortiousinterference with Plaintiff's contract with Caliber Home Loans, and add claims against several defendants for fraudulent and improper lien in violation of Texas law. ECF No. 101. In his proposed second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges for the first time that this Court has diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 101-1. Plaintiff recently filed an amended motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which seeks to add even more state law claims and declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the managing agreement between Fox Grove and Spectrum. ECF No. 126. Various John Doe Defendants who are current or former Fox Grove board members have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against them for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 121. Other unknown John Does, represented by counsel for Spectrum, have similarly moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against them. ECF No. 120.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is only appropriate when "the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2009). "The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(c) is the same as that for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Chauvin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a party fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff'scomplaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the complaint does not need to contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain enough factual allegations to "raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff has an obligation to present more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements to avoid dismissal. Id. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint and take them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the court does not accept conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact as true. Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns. Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co., 465 F.3d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 2006). To establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the movant must either submit evidence that negates the existence of some material element of the non-moving party's claim or defense, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support an essential element of thenon-movant's claim or defense. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1992), on reh'g en banc, 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and designate competent summary judgment evidence "showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Adams, 465 F.3d at 164; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).
The parties may satisfy their respective burdens by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992). Mere conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, unsupported speculation, and hearsay evidence (unless within a recognized exception) are not competent summary judgment evidence. Walker v. SBC Servs., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 524, 535 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994); Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1995)). A court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, and must review all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Reeves v. ...
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