Ireland v. AMR Corp.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: ROSS, District Judge
• Citation: Ireland v. AMR Corp., 20 F.Supp.3d 341 (E.D. N.Y. 2014)
• Decision Date: 15 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–CV–6315 ARRRLM.,12–CV–6315 ARRRLM.
• Parties: George IRELAND, Plaintiff, v. AMR CORPORATION and American Airlines, Inc., Defendants.

20 F.Supp.3d 341

George IRELAND, Plaintiff

v.AMR CORPORATION and American Airlines, Inc., Defendants.

No. 12–CV–6315 ARRRLM.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed May 15, 2014.

Vivia L. Joseph, Cambria Heights, NY, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Crowley, Michael Bojbasa, Connell Foley LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

ROSS, District Judge:

In this action, George Ireland (“plaintiff” or “Ireland”) seeks damages for injuries he suffered while aboard a flight operated by American Airlines, Inc. (“American”) between Miami, Florida, and Kingston, Jamaica. American and its parent company, AMR Corporation (jointly, “defendants”), have moved to dismiss Ireland's complaint on the grounds that he did not commence suit within two years of the date of the flight's arrival in Jamaica as required by the Montreal Convention, which the parties agree governs this action. Plaintiff argues that his time for commencing suit was extended by the defendants' filing for bankruptcy, which resulted in an automatic stay on litigation against defendants. The question that must now be addressed is whether the automatic bankruptcy stay extended plaintiff's two-year period for filing his claim under the Montreal Convention. For the reasons stated below, the court agrees with defendants that the bankruptcy stay did not extend plaintiff's filing period, and their motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2009, Ireland was a passenger on American Flight 331 between Miami, Florida, and Kingston, Jamaica.¹ Compl., DE # 1, ¶¶ 11–13, 16–17. Flight 331 was operated by defendants, and the members of the flight crew were American employees. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. While landing on Runway 12 at Norman International Airport in Kingston, Jamaica, at approximately 10:22 p.m., Flight 331 ran off the end of the runway.² Id. ¶ 18. The aircraft veered off the runway, went through a perimeter fence, crossed a road, and came to rest on a rocky beach approximately 175 feet beyond the end of Runway 12 and approximately 40 feet from the water line. Id. ¶ 22. As a result of its departure from the runway, the aircraft fuselage was broken into three pieces. Id. ¶ 23.

On December 21, 2012, plaintiff filed suit in this action. In his complaint, he alleges that the negligence of defendants and their employees caused the landing accident and that, as a result, he suffered “severe mental anguish, fear of impending death, and ... severe physical injuries.” Id. ¶¶ 24–25. He seeks at least $1,000,000 in damages. Id. ¶ 26.

On November 29, 2011, prior to plaintiff's commencing this suit, defendants filed voluntary petitions seeking bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. ) (the “Bankruptcy Code”). DE # 4. As a result, pursuant to the automatic stay provision in section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the proceedings in this action were stayed upon the action's commencement. In the interim, while the stay remained in effect, plaintiff did not seek relief from the automatic stay. On January 2, 2014, counsel for defendants in this action filed notice that the automatic stay had been lifted effective December 9, 2013. DE # 13. Following termination of the stay, the parties were directed to continue with proceedings in this action, and defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir.2004). The complaint's allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Only a “plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir.2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief,” including on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ; see also Claude v. Peikes, 534 F.3d 801 (2d Cir.2008) (affirming dismissal of time-barred claims under Rule 12(b)(6) ); Harris v. City of N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that, to survive a motion to dismiss as time-barred, all that is required of a complaint are “allegations consistent with a claim that would not be time-barred”).

II. Application of Two–Year Limitation Period to Plaintiff's Claim

The parties agree that the Montreal Convention³ governs plaintiff's negligence claim. Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim must be dismissed because it was not filed within two years of the date of the landing accident as required by Article 35 of the Montreal Convention. Article 35 contains a “limitation of actions” provision that provides:

1. The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period of two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived....

2. The method of calculating that period shall be determined by the law of the court seized of the case.

Ireland did not file suit until December 21, 2012, which was just shy of three years from the date of the accident upon arrival in Jamaica. Accordingly, defendants argue, his suit must be dismissed.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the running of the two-year limitations period under Article 35 was suspended by the automatic stay that went into effect under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code upon defendants' filing for bankruptcy on November 29, 2011. Plaintiff relies predominantly on section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states in relevant part:

[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor ... and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—

(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or

(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362... with respect to such claim.

11 U.S.C. § 108(c). Plaintiff argues that, because the two-year period under Article 35 of the Montreal Convention had not yet expired when defendants filed for bankruptcy on November 29, 2011, section 108(c) operated to suspend the running of the two-year period. He submits that, under section 108(c)(2), he had until 30 days after he received notice of the expiration of the automatic stay to file his claim. Notice of the termination of the stay was not given until January 2, 2014—well after plaintiff filed his suit in December 2012. He thus argues that his time to file suit within the Article 35 limitation—what he refers to as a “statute of limitations”—did not run out prior to his bringing this action.

In arguing for dismissal, defendants cite to a line of cases regarding the characterization of the two-year limitation. Although there is a scarcity of precedent discussing Article 35 of the Montreal Convention, which entered into force in 2003, cases considering the effect of Article 35 look to prior case law interpreting an identical provision in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention, which was the predecessor to the Montreal Convention.⁴ See Mateo v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 847 F.Supp.2d 383, 388 (E.D.N.Y.2012) ; Duay v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., Civ. Action No. H–10–CV–1454, 2010 WL 5342824, at *4 & n. 4 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 21, 2010) ; see also George N. Tompkins, Jr., Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as Developed by the Courts in the United States 267 (2010). The most cited of these precedents is Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.1998), in which the Second Circuit deemed the two-year limitation in Article 29 a “condition precedent to suit” and affirmed the lower court's conclusion that it was not subject to a state-law provision allowing tolling for a plaintiff's infancy. Id. at 143–45. In Fishman, the Second Circuit looked to the treaty's legislative history, which revealed that “the drafters of the Convention specifically considered and rejected a proposed provision that would have allowed the limitations period to be tolled according to the law of the forum court.” Id. at 144. In holding that tolling was unavailable under Article 29, the Second Circuit emphasized that “the main concern of the drafters in rejecting the tolling proposal was ‘to remove those actions governed by the Convention from the uncertainty which would attach were they to be subjected to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the member states.’ ” Id. (quoting Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 696, 443 N.Y.S.2d 79, 87 (1981) ). A number of other courts have followed the reasoning in Fishman to find tolling unavailable under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Redl v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 22 Fed.Appx. 652, 654 (8th Cir.2001) (holding Art. 29 not subject to equitable tolling); Sanchez Morrabal v. Omni Air Servs., Co., 497 F.Supp.2d 280, 285 & n. 10 (D.P.R.2007) ( “[Art. 29] has been consistently interpreted by federal courts as a condition precedent to suit and thus not subject to tolling.”); McCaskey v. Cont'l Airlines,...