Ireland v. Edwards
Decision Date | 10 July 1998 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 194726 |
Citation | 230 Mich.App. 607,584 N.W.2d 632 |
Parties | Jennifer IRELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sharon-Lee EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Neal Bush, Detroit, and Karen Russell, Mt. Clemons, for plaintiff.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (By Christine D. Oldani and Patrick M. Barrett), Detroit, for defendant.
Before SAWYER, P.J., and BANDSTRA and J.B. SULLIVAN *, JJ.
Plaintiff Jennifer Ireland appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting defendant Sharon-Lee Edwards' motion for summary disposition of plaintiff's defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
This case represents, we hope, the dying embers of a highly publicized battle between plaintiff and Steven Smith for the custody of their daughter, Maranda. The custody matter was apparently resolved through a settlement, but not before almost four years of acrimonious litigation, including a six-day custody trial, an appeal to this Court, 1 an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, 2 and an additional four-month trial. Because this case arises from the underlying custody matter, we will briefly address the facts involved there. 3
Defendant is the attorney who represented Smith in the custody dispute. After the first custody trial, Macomb Circuit Judge Raymond Cashen awarded physical custody of Maranda to Smith. Judge Cashen found that plaintiff and Smith were equal with regard to all factors considered under the Michigan Child Custody Act, M.C.L. § 722.23; M.S.A. § 25.312(3), with the exception of factor e. Judge Cashen found that factor e, regarding the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial homes, favored Smith. Judge Cashen's conclusion regarding factor e was premised on his finding that plaintiff planned to enroll Maranda in a day-care center while she attended classes at the University of Michigan, while Smith planned to care for Maranda in his parents' home, with their help. After the release of Judge Cashen's decision, the custody battle became the subject of much media attention, and both parties' attorneys made statements to the press.
While the custody matter was winding its way through the appellate system, plaintiff filed the current suit alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on twenty statements defendant made to the media. Defendant made the alleged statements on several different occasions; some were made at a press conference called by defendant, some were made during the taping of various television programs, and one was apparently made to a newspaper reporter. Four of the statements concerned plaintiff's fitness as a mother: "The fact is, this evidence overwhelmingly showed that Ireland was not a fit mother"; "[t]his case is about a woman who is not fit to raise her child and never spent any time with her child"; "[t]his woman has never been a mother"; and "Ireland is an unfit mother." Eight of the alleged statements involved the amount of time plaintiff spent with Maranda: "Ireland never spent a moment with the child"; "Ireland was never home with the child"; "[t]he trial evidence all showed that Ireland was never with Maranda"; "Ireland abdicated all responsibility for the care and raising of this child to everybody"; "[i]f the child were with her mother, as she has been in the past, that means the child would never be with her mother"; "[t]hat mother was never with her child"; ; and "Ireland was never with Maranda for the first three years of Maranda's life." Five of the alleged statements indicated that plaintiff was violent and abused Maranda: "Ireland abused her child"; "Ireland was violent and assaultive"; "Ireland has a history of violence and child abuse"; "Maranda suffered a fractured arm because of Ireland's neglect"; and "Ireland hit Maranda hard enough to leave bruises on Maranda's thigh, hip and other parts of Maranda's body." The remaining alleged statements were: "Ireland did not want to take Maranda to the University of Michigan with her"; "Ireland was a pathological liar"; and "Ireland is limiting her interviews because she is holding out for the tabloids to offer her big bucks for her tale."
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of her defamation claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree. An order granting summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dowell, 204 Mich.App. 81, 86, 514 N.W.2d 185 (1994). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Michigan Mut, at 85, 514 N.W.2d 185. The motion may be granted when, except with regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence presented. Id. Giving the benefit of the doubt to the nonmoving party, the court must determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue on which reasonable minds might differ. Id. When First Amendment freedoms are involved, this Court's role takes on added importance:
When addressing defamation claims implicating First Amendment freedoms, appellate courts must make an independent examination of the record to ensure against forbidden intrusions into the field of free expression and to examine the statements and circumstances under which they were made to determine whether the statements are subject to First Amendment protection. [Northland Wheels Roller Skating Center, Inc. v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 213 Mich.App. 317, 322, 539 N.W.2d 774 (1995).]
Thus, we recognize that we must consider society's interest in free expression, in addition to the interests of the individual parties. We also recognize that summary disposition is an essential tool in the protection of First Amendment rights. 4 We begin our review of the relevant law with these principles in mind.
A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower an individual's reputation in the community or deters third persons from associating or dealing with that individual. New Franklin Enterprises v. Sabo, 192 Mich.App. 219, 221, 480 N.W.2d 326 (1991). However, not all defamatory statements are actionable. If a statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff, it is protected by the First Amendment. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Garvelink v. Detroit News, 206 Mich.App. 604, 608-609, 522 N.W.2d 883 (1994). Thus, at least some expressions of opinion are protected. Milkovich, at 18-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695.
Where a defendant's statements are not protected by the First Amendment, a plaintiff can establish a defamation claim by showing: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod). New Franklin Enterprises, supra at 221, 480 N.W.2d 326. Furthermore, because the parties here agree that plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure, 5 she must establish that defendant made the statements with actual malice. Id. at 222, 480 N.W.2d 326. Actual malice exists where the publication was made with knowledge of the falsity of the statements or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Id. at 221, 480 N.W.2d 326. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Milkovich, supra at 15, 110 S.Ct. 2695; Garvelink, supra at 608, 522 N.W.2d 883.
Before addressing the alleged defamatory statements, we note that both parties make it a point to accuse the other of starting and encouraging the media frenzy in this case. Indeed, defendant asserted this as a defense below, arguing that she was entitled to respond after plaintiff's attorney made disparaging remarks about her client. While we understand that an attorney may feel compelled to respond to media attacks on her client, an attorney is never justified in knowingly making false statements about an opposing party. In short, "he started it" is not a valid defense to a defamation claim where a plaintiff can show actual malice. 6
In granting summary disposition for defendant, the trial court concluded that plaintiff would be unable to establish that defendant made any of the alleged defamatory statements with actual malice. The trial court apparently reasoned that, because defendant's statements found support in the custody trial record, plaintiff would be unable to show that defendant made the statements knowing they were false or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. We agree with this reasoning with regard to some of the alleged statements. However, we conclude that the statements cannot all be grouped together and that plaintiffs claims regarding different statements fail for different reasons.
Which Statements are actionable?
One of the difficulties in addressing defamation issues lies in determining whether specific statements are actionable. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the idea that all statements of "opinion" are protected. Instead, the Court has directed that a statement must be "provable as false" to be actionable. Milkovich, supra...
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