Ireton v. Chambers, 1038, Sept. Term, 2015.

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Citation: 143 A.3d 215,229 Md.App. 149
• Docket Number: No. 1038, Sept. Term, 2015.,1038, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Parties: James P. IRETON, Jr., v. Lore CHAMBERS.
• Decision Date: 28 July 2016

229 Md.App. 149
143 A.3d 215

James P. IRETON, Jr.
v.
Lore CHAMBERS.

No. 1038, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

July 28, 2016.

143 A.3d 215

Victoria M. Shearer (Kevin Karpinski, Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, PA, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Brian Auchincloss (Neil E. Duke, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: GRAEFF, KEHOE, ARTHUR, JJ.

ARTHUR, J.

One could say that this case is a case about nothing. More precisely, it is a case about whether a court can enter a judgment for nothing in damages against a defendant who has qualified immunity from “civil liability.”

A jury found that the Mayor of Salisbury had committed a civil assault, but had

143 A.3d 216

not acted with the malice that is required to overcome his statutory immunity from “civil liability” for discretionary acts committed within the scope of his employment. The judge entered a judgment against the mayor for zero dollars. After a protracted post-judgment fight, which saw the judge revise and then re-revise the original judgment, the mayor appealed the zero-dollar judgment against him. We hold that because of the mayor's qualified immunity from “civil liability” in the absence of malice, the court should not have entered judgment against him for zero dollars, but instead should have entered judgment in his favor.

Factual and Procedural History

Dr. Lore L. Chambers is the former assistant city administrator of Salisbury, Maryland, a municipal corporation located in Wicomico County. James P. Ireton, Jr., was the mayor of Salisbury at the time.

After an incident, the details of which are not entirely clear,¹ Dr. Chambers was fired. She sued Mayor Ireton for assault. Among other defenses, the mayor claimed that, under Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5–507(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), he was “immune as an official or individual from any civil liability” for his actions because he acted “without malice.”²

At the end of a two-day trial on December 9, 2014, the parties agreed on a verdict sheet. Question 1 of the verdict sheet read, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mayor Ireton assaulted Plaintiff Chambers?” The jury checked, “Yes.” Question 2 read, “If you answered ‘yes' to Question 1, do you find that Mayor Ireton acted with actual malice?” The jury checked, “No.” Question 3 instructed the jury to “go no further” if it answered no to Question 2. The jury complied with the instruction and did not reach the next questions, which concerned damages.

On December 19, 2014, the clerk docketed a judgment in favor of Dr. Chambers, and against Mayor Ireton, for $0.00. On December 29, 2014, Mayor Ireton moved to revise the judgment, arguing that the court should have entered judgment in his favor. In an order filed on January 15, 2015, the judge granted that motion and ordered that the clerk enter judgment in favor of Mayor Ireton. The clerk entered the revised judgment on the docket on January 21, 2015.

On February 20, 2015, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate” the court's previous order (and thus to reinstate the original zero-dollar judgment). The court granted that motion on April 1, 2015, and on the following day the clerk docketed an order reinstating the original judgment.

On April 10, 2015, Mayor Ireton moved to alter or amend that revised order. On July 6, 2015, the court finally ended the back-and-forth motions, denying the mayor's motion and leaving the zero-dollar judgment intact.

Mayor Ireton noted this timely appeal on July 17, 2015.

Question Presented

While the parties dispute both how to reach the question and to frame the standard of review, they both agree that the

143 A.3d 217

essential question is, “Did the Circuit Court for Wicomico County properly enter judgment against Mayor Ireton for zero dollars, when CJP § 5–507(a)(1) immunized him from ‘any civil liability’?” We answer that the court should have entered judgment in the mayor's favor and should not have entered judgment against him in any amount—even the amount of zero dollars.

Discussion

I. Scope and Standard of Review

The parties disagree as to the precise standard of review. Mayor Ireton contends that the case presents a legal question, subject to de novo review, as it involves the interpretation of a statute. Dr. Chambers contends that we are reviewing the circuit court's decision not to revise the judgment and, hence, may consider only whether the court abused its discretion. To determine the standard of review, then, we must determine what exactly we are reviewing.

In this case, the court initially entered its judgment on December 19, 2014. Mayor Ireton filed a timely motion to alter or amend that judgment, which effectively deprived the judgment of finality until the court had decided his motion. See Md. Rule 8–202(c).

After the court granted the mayor's motion to alter or amend, the clerk entered a revised judgment on January 21, 2015. Exactly 30 days thereafter, on February 20, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate,” but which in substance was a motion to revise the revised judgment under Md. Rule 2–535(a). See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 650–51, 574 A.2d 898 (1990).³

When a party files a revisory motion more than 10 days after the judgment, and the court revises its earlier ruling, the revised ruling becomes the final judgment. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. at 651, 574 A.2d 898 (citing Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 240–41, 503 A.2d 239 (1986) ). Therefore, when the court granted Dr. Chambers's revisory motion and re-revised the judgment on April 1, 2015, that ruling, upon its entry on the docket, became the new final judgment.

When Mayor Ireton filed a second, timely motion to alter or amend, that motion effectively deprived the new judgment of finality until the court had decided it. See Md. Rule 8–202(c). The judgment finally became final only when the court denied the second motion to alter or amend on July 6, 2015. Mayor Ireton took a timely appeal from that decision.

When a court enters a judgment against a party, as the circuit court did when it granted Dr. Chambers's revisory motion on April 1, 2015, the party does not forfeit the right to challenge that judgment on appeal merely by filing a timely motion to alter or amend. Hence, when the circuit court denied the mayor's second, timely post-judgment motion, he became entitled to appeal the final judgment itself (Md. Rule 8–202(c) ), as well as any interlocutory orders previously entered in the action. Md. Rule 8–131(d).

For these reasons, the issue before us is not limited to whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mayor Ireton's second motion to alter or amend the re-revised judgment for zero dollars in damages. Instead, we have the power to review the court's decision to

143 A.3d 218

grant Dr. Chambers's revisory motion and to enter a zero-dollar judgment against Mayor Ireton. Because that decision involves “an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [we] must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609 (2002) (citation omitted).⁴

II. Analysis

Both sides agree that, absent malice, Mayor Ireton is “immune as an official or individual from any civil liability” for his tortious conduct (CJP § 5–507(a)(1) ), but they disagree about what this qualified immunity entails. Does it mean that a court cannot enter a judgment against the mayor, even for zero dollars? Or does it mean that a court can enter a judgment against the mayor only if it is for no more than zero dollars?⁵

Mayor Ireton insists that immunity from “civil liability” equals immunity from any civil judgment, even one for zero dollars. Dr. Chambers responds by characterizing...