Irizarry v. U.S.

• Citation: 508 F.2d 960
• Decision Date: 23 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 282,D,282
• Parties: Bolivar IRIZARRY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. ocket 74-1866.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 960

508 F.2d 960

Bolivar IRIZARRY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 282, Docket 74-1866.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Nov. 18, 1974.

Decided Dec. 19, 1974, As Amended Jan. 23, 1975.

Stephen Gillers, New York City (Metrick & Ostrow, Seymour Ostrow, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Lee A. Adlerstein, Asst. U.S. Atty. (David G. Trager, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Raymond J. Dearie and Thomas R. Pattison, Asst. U.S. Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

Before SMITH, HAYS and MANSFIELD, Circuit Judges.

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Bolivar Irizarry appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Mark A. Costantino, Judge, denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate a judgment of conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, entered upon that court's acceptance of Irizarry's plea of guilty. Irizarry attacks that judgment on the ground that the district court accepted his guilty plea in violation of Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., in that it failed to establish on the record at the time of the plea that the plea was entered with an understanding of the nature of the charge and that there was a factual basis for the plea. The district court rejected these contentions. We hold that at the time of the plea there was a failure sufficiently to comply with the requirement of Rule 11 that the court, by 'addressing the defendant personally,' determine 'that the plea is made . . . with an understanding of the nature of the charge . . ..' We therefore reverse and remand to enable Irizarry to plead anew.

I. THE FACTS

This is not the first time that the conspiracy alleged in this case has been before this court; in United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1973), we reversed the conviction of one of Irizarry's co-defendants. There is no need to repeat the detailed description of the events leading up to the arrests of the alleged co-conspirators set forth in Gonzalez; the following skeletal outline will suffice.

On October 7, 1972, one Jose Valenzuela-Correa was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport by Customs officials who discovered approximately four pounds of cocaine strapped to his body. Correa, apparently recognizing the difficulty of concocting a plausible explanation in such circumstances, agreed to cooperate with the authorities, and a controlled delivery of the cocaine was arranged. Correa went to a preliminary meeting with Gonzalez, the purchaser of the drugs, to set up the details. Gonzalez recruited Irizarry to make the actual pickup at Correa's motel room. Irizarry went to the motel and established his identity to Correa's satisfaction. As he inspected the cocaine, he was arrested.

Ten days later, on October 19, 1972, Irizarry, Correa, Gonzalez and 'John Doe, also known as Mario 'Co" (a Chilean acquaintance of Correa's, named by him as the seller of the cocaine) were indicted. The seven-count indictment charged conspiracies to import, possess and distribute the cocaine, and the corresponding substantive counts. Irizarry himself was named only in counts three (conspiracy to possess and distribute), six (possession with intent to distribute) and seven (distribution). On January 15, 1973, Correa entered a guilty plea to count three, conspiracy to possess and distribute. Two weeks later, on January 29, Irizarry entered a plea to the same count. Whether the colloquy that took place at that time satisfied Rule 11 is the issue on this appeal; the relevant portion of the transcript is set forth in the margin. ¹ On April 9, 1973, Irizarry was sentenced to eight years imprisonment and a special parole term of five years, and the charges against him under counts six and seven were dismissed.

On March 13, 1974, Irizarry moved the district court (a) to reduce the special parole term to three years, since at the time the plea was entered the court had stated that three years was the maximum special parole term he could have received; (b) to correct a clerical error in the judgment, which stated erroneously that Irizarry had been found guilty of conspiracy to import, rather than conspiracy to possess and distribute; and (c) to vacate the judgment entirely, on the ground that there had not been compliance with Rule 11. The court granted the motion as to (a) and (b), but denied it as to (c). It is that denial which Irizarry challenges on this appeal.

II. IRIZARRY'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE

Rule 11 provides:

A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Irizarry claims that the district court did not make a sufficient determination of whether he understood the nature of the charge, because its questioning was directed not at the charge of conspiracy to possess and distribute, but rather at the charge of conspiracy to import. In support of this argument, he points to the erroneous judgment of conviction and the fact that, in its opinion denying his present motion, the district court referred to statements made by Correa when he entered his guilty plea. We think this claim to be farfetched. There was no indication that the district court had smuggling in mind during the questioning of Irizarry; the inquiry was focused rather on Irizarry's role in going to Correa's motel room to pick up the cocaine for Gonzalez. In addition, the erroneous judgment was merely a clerical error, which there is no reason to impute to the court. Finally, the charge to which Correa pled guilty was not, as Irizarry claims, conspiracy to import, but rather conspiracy to possess and distribute-- the same charge to which Irizarry entered his guilty plea. Thus, to the extent the district court's reference to Correa, in an opinion dated fifteen months after Irizarry's plea, can have any bearing whatever on the court's thinking at the time it accepted that plea, it supports the proposition that the court's questions were directed at the correct charge.

That Irizarry's principal argument carries no weight does not dispose of the appeal, however, for the very fact that such an argument could be made at all raises questions regarding compliance with Rule 11. If, at the time of the plea, the trial court addresses the defendant personally to determine his understanding of the nature of the charge, it would seem that the identity of the charge would, virtually as a matter of definition, be spelled out with sufficient precision to preclude the subsequent claim that the court had the wrong charge in mind. In fact, such a claim is not precluded in this case because the full charge-- conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine-- was never even identified. The closest that the court came was to identify the charge as 'conspiracy'; conspiracy to do what was never mentioned. In addition, the court's discussion of the nature of a conspiracy charge was limited to statements that 'you can't conspire with yourself' and 'you have to have somebody else to conspire with'-- hardly an adequate probing of the nature of conspiracy. Finally, at no time was Irizarry asked whether he understood the nature of the offense with which he was charged, nor did he volunteer that information, nor did he say anything from which such an understanding might be inferred. Rule 11 forbids the acceptance of a guilty plea in such circumstances.

The standards for compliance with Rule 11 were set forth in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). That decision stressed that the defendant's understanding of the charge must be established through personal questioning by the trial judge; to the extent that he 'resorts to 'assumptions' not based upon recorded responses to his inquiries,' id. at 467, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, he fails to comply with the Rule:

There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him.

Id. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173. ² It follows as a matter of course from McCarthy that there can be no compliance with Rule 11 where the charge is never even fully identified.

Moreover, even if the charge had been identified, the court's discussion of conspiracy did not pass muster under Rule 11. Just how much explanation is necessary in each particular instance will vary from case to case. McCarthy, supra, 394 U.S. at 467 n. 20, 89 S.Ct. at 1171 n. 20. The determination will depend, inter alia, upon the complexity of the crime charged. Eagle Thunder v. United States, 477 F.2d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873, 94 S.Ct. 142, 38 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973). ³ That was a case of assault with a dangerous weapon-- a relatively simple crime. It was held that Rule 11 was complied with where the court asked the defendant if he 'did wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully assault Moses Anderson McBride with a dangerous weapon,' and the defendant answered affirmatively. Id. On the other hand, where the charge is more complicated, more explanation is necessary. In Majko v. United States, 457 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1972), the defendant was charged with a crime in violation of state law on a federal enclave, under 18 U.S.C. 7, 13; the court held: 'Reading the indictment and asking whether a defendant has discussed the charge with his attorney does not satisfy McCarthy.' Id. at 791...