Iroegbulem v. United States
| Decision Date | 24 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 CV 8422,18 CV 8422 |
| Parties | ALLEN C. IROEGBULEM, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Allen C. Iroegbulem, who plead guilty to sex trafficking of a minor in violation of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("Sex Trafficking Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release, filed a pro se petition for relief under 28 U.S.C § 2255, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his allegedly erroneous criminal history calculation and failing to argue against the application of a United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines") sentencing enhancement. R. 3. With the Court's permission, Mr. Iroegbulem later filed a supplement to his petition arguing that counsel was also ineffective for failing to challenge 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) as unconstitutionally vague and his indictment as duplicitous. R. 11. For the following reasons, the Court denies both the original and supplemental petitions.
Facts and Charges. In March 2015, Mr. Iroegbulem was charged in a three-count indictment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1) and (b)(2) in connection with sex trafficking three girls he knew were underage—Minors A, B, and C—to adult men in exchange for money he retained for himself. The Government contends that he gave his minor victims a steady supply of drugs and alcohol, and that the girls were raped and injured, frequently while unconscious. Eleven days before trial, Mr. Iroegbulem plead guilty to Count Two in exchange for the Government moving to dismiss the other two counts. 15 CR 52-1, R. 68. Count Two charges as follows:
Beginning in or about December 2013, and continuing until in or about February 2014, . . . [Mr. Iroegbulem], in and affecting interstate commerce, knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained by any means . . . Minor B, and benefitted financially and by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which has engaged in recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, and maintaining by any means Minor B, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that Minor B had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act; In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591(a) and (b)(2).
Id., R. 24 at 2 (emphasis added).
Sentencing. The plea agreement and presentence investigation report calculated Mr. Iroegbulem's guideline range at 360 months to life imprisonment. 15 CR 52-1, R. 72 at 34. The Government recommended a 360-month sentence, Id., R. 113 at 50, while Mr. Iroegbulem's counsel argued that 120 months was reasonable.Id., R. 94. Ultimately this Court sentenced Mr. Iroegbulem to 240 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release. Id., R. 113 at 152.
Appeal. Mr. Iroegbulem filed a timely notice of appeal challenging his sentence and contending that the Sex Trafficking Act was unconstitutional because it was enacted without a quorum of Congress. His trial counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the ground that Mr. Iroegbulem's appeal was frivolous. See 15 CR 52-1, R. 115. On March 23, 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted counsel's motion and dismissed the appeal because Mr. Iroegbulem's plea agreement included a broad appeal waiver and Mr. Iroegbulem did not seek to have his guilty plea set aside. United States v. Iroegbulem, 716 Fed. App'x 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court also noted that the Sex Trafficking Act was properly enacted and binding. Mr. Iroegbulem did not file a petition for writ of certiorari.
Section 2255 Petition. Thereafter in December 2018, Mr. Iroegbulem filed a timely Section 2255 petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to object to his allegedly erroneous criminal history score; and (2) failing to argue against the simultaneous application of Sentencing Guidelines enhancements Section 4B1.5(b)(1) and Section 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). R. 3. Mr. Iroegbulem filed a supplement to his Section 2255 petition with the Court's permission on August 30, 2019, arguing that counsel also was ineffective for failing to challenge 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) as unconstitutionally vague and his indictment as duplicitous. R. 11. The Government argues that the Court should deny Mr. Iroegbulem's petitions because:1) he waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence; 2) his supplemental petition is time-barred; and 3) his claims fail on the merits in any case. R. 6; R. 15.
Section 2255 allows "a prisoner under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . [to] move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A criminal defendant is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence if "the court finds . . . that there has been a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." Id. § 2255(b). Section 2255 relief is reserved for "extraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Court first addresses the Government's waiver argument, before turning to the claims raised in each of Mr. Iroegbulem's petitions, and ultimately examining whether an evidentiary hearing or certificate of appealability is warranted.
The Government contends that Mr. Iroegbulem waived the claims in his original and supplemental petitions via his plea agreement. A defendant may validlywaive both his right to a direct appeal and his right to collateral review under Section 2255 as a part of his plea agreement. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1999). These waivers are generally upheld in accordance with their terms, with limited exceptions for cases in which the plea agreement was involuntary, the district court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race), the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or the defendant claims "ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of [the plea] agreement.'" Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Iroegbulem's plea agreement states in relevant part that:
[Mr. Iroegbulem] . . . waives the right to challenge his conviction and sentence, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, and (in any case in which the term of imprisonment and fine are within the maximums provided by statute) his attorney's alleged failure or refusal to file a notice of appeal, in any collateral attack or future challenge, including but not limited to a motion brought under . . . Section 2255. This waiver does not apply to a claim of . . . ineffective assistance of counsel, which relates directly to this [plea] agreement or to its negotiation.
15 CR 52-1, R. 68 at 14. Mr. Iroegbulem's ineffective assistance claims are thus foreclosed by this waiver and Seventh Circuit precedent unless they "relate directly to" his plea agreement or "its negotiation." Id.; Rickett v. United States, 2011 WL 760004, *1, 3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2011) (). The Government does not meaningfully address how Mr. Iroegbulem's waiver applies to his various claims, which as discussed concernwhether his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain sentencing calculations (each of which was set forth in his plea agreement), or to the Sex Trafficking Act or indictment as unconstitutionally vague and/or duplicitous. And Mr. Iroegbulem does not address the waiver argument at all. But as explained infra, Mr. Iroegbulem's claims fail even if each could properly be characterized as a challenge to the negotiation of his plea agreement, and thus side-step the waiver.
As stated, Mr. Iroegbulem's original Section 2255 petition contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the allegedly erroneous calculation of his criminal history points, and the simultaneous application of two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements. Section 2255 relief is generally not available for sentencing errors, especially when such errors could have been raised on direct appeal. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2011). But sentencing errors couched in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable to the extent they satisfy the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994). Those standards are exacting. To succeed on such a claim, the petitioner must show that: (1) counsel provided representation that "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" (performance prong); and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" (prejudice prong). 466 U.S. at 688, 694. The performance prong is "'highly deferential' to counsel, presuming reasonable judgment and declining to second guess strategic choices." United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7thCir. 1997). And if a petitioner cannot establish one of the Strickland prongs, the Court need not consider the other. Groves v. United States, 755 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court...
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