Irons v. Neske
| Decision Date | 15 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:21 CV 293 RWS |
| Parties | JONATHAN IRONS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN NESKE, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before me on Defendant Richard Morrell's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. [37]. Plaintiff Jonathan Irons brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as supplemental state law claims against officers of the O'Fallon Police Department and St. Charles County Sheriff's Department, the City of O'Fallon, and St. Charles County for their actions during the investigation and prosecution of Irons for the shooting of Stanley Stotler. For the reasons set forth below Morrell's motion to dismiss will be granted as to Counts III and VII, and denied as to Counts I, II, IV, VI, and VIII.
On January 14, 1997, Stanley Stotler returned home from work and heard someone in his bedroom closet. He retrieved a gun he kept under his mattress, pointed it toward the closet, and ordered the intruder to come out. When the closet door opened, the intruder fired a shot, hitting Stotler in the arm. The assailant shot Stotler again in the temple and fled.
The O'Fallon Police Department and St. Charles County Sheriff's Department investigated Stotler's assault. Although investigators collected evidence from the scene none of it pointed directly to a suspect, so they canvassed the neighborhood. It was during this process that they determined that Irons had been in the neighborhood on the night of Stotler's assault. Irons was later arrested and prosecuted. Irons maintained his innocence throughout his prosecution, but he was convicted of the assault on October 20, 1998, and sentenced to fifty years in prison.
More than twenty years later, compelling evidence was discovered casting doubt on Irons' conviction. Three new pieces of evidence were used to overturn his conviction: (1) a previously undisclosed exculpatory fingerprint report, (2) an expert report revealing the use of a suggestive photo array, and (3) the existence of previously suppressed evidence of police misconduct by one of the investigators. Based on this evidence, on March 9, 2020, a Missouri court granted Irons' petition for a writ of habeas corpus and vacated his conviction.
Irons now brings claims against the City of O'Fallon, St. Charles County, and several officers who participated in his investigation and prosecution, including Morrell. Irons alleges that Defendants falsified evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, and conspired against him with the intent of prosecuting and convicting him for Stotler's assault. Irons' complaint includes several claims under § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights as well as state law claims under Missouri law. Morrell has moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and to strike Irons' request for attorneys' fees regarding his state law claims.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), I must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them most favorably to the plaintiff. Hager v. Arkansas Dept. of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations” but must provide “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to allow me to draw “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability and suit under § 1983 unless their conduct violated “a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 2014). An official seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on an assertion qualified immunity must show he is entitled to qualified immunity “on the face of the complaint.” Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, I must consider: (1) “‘whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right;'” and (2) “‘whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.'” Id. (quoting Hager, 735 F.3d at 1013). An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless both prongs are met. Id.
Morrell argues that Irons' claims against him should be dismissed. His arguments fall into three main categories: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) qualified immunity; and (3) statute of limitations. I will discuss each of these arguments as they apply to Irons' claims against Morrell. But, as an initial matter, I will address Morrell's argument that Irons' group pleading is insufficient under Rule 8(a).
In his memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, Morrell focuses on the allegations in Irons' complaint that reference him by name while largely discounting allegations against all Defendants. Then, in his reply brief, Morrell argues that such group pleading violates Rule 8(a) and fails to put him on notice of the claims against him. Although Morrell is correct that group pleading is not favored Irons' complaint does not violate the group pleading standard.
A plaintiff may refer to defendants collectively in a complaint if the complaint provides the defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them. See Anderson v. Waddle, 474 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1120 (E.D. Mo. 2007); Wilson v. Jones, No. 2:15CV45 CDP, 2016 WL 1624015, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2016). When, as in this case, a complaint contains specific allegations of misconduct by the named defendants, differentiating between a defendant, group of defendants, and all defendants satisfies Rule 8(a). See McPherson v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 494 F.Supp.3d 269, 279-81 (D. Md. 2020); Downing v. Goldman Phipps PLLC, No. 4:13CV206 CDP, 2015 WL 4078198, at *6-7 (E.D. Mo. July 6, 2015).
Irons' complaint provides Morrell with adequate notice of the claims against him. Many of Irons' allegations identify a specific Defendant or group of Defendants that performed the alleged act. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 43, 55, 56, 68. Other allegations state that “Defendants” performed a specific act. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 81-83. It is clear from Irons' complaint that, when he alleges “Defendants” performed an act, he means to implicate all Defendants. Moreover, Irons alleges Morrell participated in the investigation of Stotler's assault, and Irons' complaint contains specific allegations of misconduct by Morrell. See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20, 68, 72, 73.
Reading Irons' complaint as a whole, I find that he alleges sufficient details to provide Morrell with adequate notice of the claims against him. Therefore, Irons' complaint satisfies Rule 8(a), and I must consider all of Irons' allegations in analyzing Morrell's motion to dismiss.
In Count I, Irons brings a due process claim against Defendants under § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. Morrell argues this claim should be dismissed as against him based on failure to state a claim and qualified immunity.
Irons alleges that Defendants, including Morrell, violated his right to a fair trial by: (1) fabricating evidence and failing to correct fabricated evidence known to be false; (2) using unduly suggestive identification procedures to obtain false and unreliable identifications; and (3) deliberately withholding and suppressing exculpatory evidence. Compl. ¶¶ 104-108. Referencing Morrell specifically, Irons alleges he fabricated a police report that falsely claimed that Irons confessed to Stotler's assault and removed a recording of an interrogation in which Irons repeatedly denied any involvement in the crime. Compl. ¶¶ 68 72, 73. Irons also alleges that the recording was never disclosed, and that Morrell concealed the fact that Irons repeatedly denied any involvement. Compl. ¶¶ 72-73. Morrell argues Irons has failed to state a claim because Irons does not specifically allege that the fabricated confession was used to secure his conviction or that the removed recording would have resulted in his exoneration. I disagree.
Irons has stated a plausible due process claim against Morrell based on fabrication of evidence. Law enforcement officers violate a defendant's right to due process when they use false evidence to secure the defendant's conviction. White v. Smith, 696 F.3d 740, 754 (8th Cir. 2012); see also id. () (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Irons alleges that Morrell fabricated a confession; that Defendants, including Morrell, provided false police reports to prosecutors, which became the basis for charging and prosecuting Irons; and that he was convicted based solely on Defendants' fabricated evidence. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 73, 78, 82. While discovery may reveal that Morrell's report had no effect on Irons' prosecution or conviction, or that Morrell played no role in the fabrication of other evidence, Irons has alleged sufficient facts to raise a reasonable inference that Morrell fabricated evidence to secure Irons' conviction.
Irons has also...
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