Irvan v. Cooper, 16 C 4881
| Decision Date | 02 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16 C 4881,16 C 4881 |
| Parties | GWENDOLYN P. IRVAN, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN COOPER, KEVIN BUSCH, TAIT LUNDGREN, STACEY WHITTMAN, SCOTT MILLER, MARIOS KARARRAYINNIS, THE FOSTER & BUICK LAW GROUP, LLC, and WEED CUTTING, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Irvan filed a pro se complaint against defendants based on the handling of her state-court divorce case and the disposition of certain property. Defendants Steven Cooper, Kevin Busch, Tait Lundgren, Marios Karayannis, and the Foster and Buick Law Group, LLC have filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, these motions are granted. This case is dismissed in its entirety against all Defendants.
The following facts are drawn from Irvan's complaint as well as several state-court orders. Courts can take judicial notice of documents that are contained in the public record. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998).
On November 1, 1992, Irvan and defendant Scott Miller were married. On November 22, 2013, a judgment was entered in Illinois state court dissolving that marriage. As part of that order, the court ordered the sale of the marital residence and a farm located in Waterman, Illinois. The proceeds of this sale were to be added to the marital estate.
On January 20, 2016, the state-court judge appointed defendant Tait Lundgren as Receiver to sell these properties, and Lundgren received permission to retain defendant Foster & Buick Law Group, LLC as counsel in his role as Receiver. The judge granted Lundgren broad discretion in his role, saying that Lundgren was permitted "to utilize whatever means he feels appropriate to effectuate the sale."
Irvan submitted a motion in state court to purchase the Waterman farm. On March 29, 2016, the court denied Irvan's motion and ordered that the property be sold to a third party, who made a $340,000 cash offer. Irvan moved to reconsider that order. The court denied the motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2016, and also denied Irvan's motion to stay the sale.
That same day, Irvan filed a pro se complaint with this court, naming seven parties as defendants, all of whom had some involvement in her divorce case. She has sued her ex-husband, the state-court judge who presided over the case, the court-appointed receiver and his law firm, and her own attorneys. She alleges that she was deprived of the opportunity to purchase the Waterman property because of her sex, marital status, and disability status. Among the many allegations in her complaint, she claims that the state-court judge harassed her, the court-appointedreceiver defrauded her, and various defendants violated state and federal housing statutes that prohibit discrimination.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges jurisdiction in federal court, and the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the elements necessary for jurisdiction. Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2012). A court may look outside of the complaint's allegations and consider whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue of jurisdiction. Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). For purposes of a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scanlan, 669 F.3d at 841.
The "first thing a federal judge should do when a complaint is filed is check to see that federal jurisdiction is properly alleged." Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district courts from "exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016). No matter how erroneous or unconstitutional a state-court judgment may be, the only federal court with jurisdiction to review such a judgment is the Supreme Court of the United States. Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442(7th Cir. 2012). While the courts of appeals disagree about whether the doctrine is limited to final state-court decisions or whether interlocutory decisions are also precluded from review, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that the federal district courts lack jurisdiction over any state-court judgment. See Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014) ( ).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in two instances. First, it applies when a plaintiff asks a federal district court to overturn an adverse state judgment. Brown, 668 F.3d at 442. Second, the doctrine applies when a plaintiff's claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state-court judgment. Id. A claim meets this standard when the supposed injury was caused by the state-court judgment. Id.
A finding that a federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state order does not end the inquiry. The court must also determine whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state-court proceedings. Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff had such an opportunity, then the claim is barred under Rooker-Feldman.
Irvan alleges that the judge in the state-court proceedings, defendant Kevin Busch, failed to protect her rights as a disabled person when he denied her motion to purchase the Waterman property, permitted her former husband to modify theestate properties such that she could not access them, and allowed her former husband to make threats. These claims all flow directly from Busch's orders directing how the estate properties were to be sold. As state-court judgments, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal suit alleging injuries that were caused by these judgments. Denying jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman does not deny Irvan the opportunity make arguments about the constitutionality of such judgments. She had the opportunity to raise these arguments in her motion to reconsider the state-court order, and she could raise these issues again in a state-court appeal. This court is barred, however, from considering the merits of Irvan's arguments.
Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to Irvan's claims against Busch, these claims would be barred by absolute judicial immunity. The common law doctrine of absolute judicial immunity "shields judges from civil liability for their judicial actions." Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000). Busch's decisions about how to address the sale of the properties at issue were made in the course of his judicial capacity. All claims against Defendant Busch are therefore dismissed.
Irvan alleges that the court-appointed receiver, defendant Tait Lundgren, and the law firm he retained to assist in that role, defendant Foster & Buick Law Group, are liable for legal malpractice and violations the "Fair Housing Act (HUD) and Illinois Fair Housing laws." She also says that these defendants violated the United States Constitution by participating in the sale of the Waterman property.These allegations stem from Irvan's disability and the protections granted to the disabled by the Constitution and state and federal housing statutes.
Irvan's constitutional claims against Lundgren and his law firm and the claims rooted in federal and state housing law are barred by Rooker-Feldman. These defendants were only ever involved in the divorce case because the state-court judge ordered Lundgren to act as receiver and granted Lundgren discretion in that role. Those state-court orders caused the alleged injuries that Irvan describes in her complaint. Even though these were not final orders, there is no basis upon which a federal district court can sit as an appellate court to review the proceedings of a state court. See Harold, 773 F.3d at 886.
Irvan alleges that her attorneys, defendants Steven Cooper and Marios Karayannis, failed to protect her from discrimination when the state court entered an order denying her request to purchase the Waterman farm.
The allegations that these attorneys violated the United States Constitution and various housing statutes, like Irvan's other claims of discrimination, are inextricably intertwined with the state-court order denying Irvan's request to purchase the property. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal review of a state-court judgment, and Irvan had the opportunity to challenge these judgments in state court.
Irvan's claims of legal malpractice are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as those claims are separate from the substance of the state-court proceeding. Riddle v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 599 Fed. Appx. 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (). Irvan has alleged that her own attorneys failed to protect her interests. She also alleged that Lundgren failed to act in her interest as receiver. While Irvan did not clearly plead a separate count of legal malpractice in her complaint, the court should interpret her unrefined pleadings...
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