Irvin v. Dowd

• Decision Date: 05 June 1961
• Docket Number: No. 41,41
• Citation: 6 L.Ed.2d 751,366 U.S. 717,81 S.Ct. 1639
• Parties: Leslie IRVIN, Petitioner, v. A. F. DOWD, Warden
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

366 U.S. 717

81 S.Ct. 1639

6 L.Ed.2d 751

Leslie IRVIN, Petitioner,

v A. F. DOWD, Warden.

No. 41.

Argued Nov. 9, 1960.

Decided June 5, 1961.

Messrs. Theodore Lockyear, Jr., and James D. Lopp, Evansville, Ind., Messrs. Hahn, Zimmerman, Nafe & Fisher by Mr. James D. Nafe, South Bend, Ind., on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Richard M. Givan, Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding, brought to test the validity of petitioner's conviction of murder and sentence of death in the Circuit Court of Gibson County, Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898, and we denied direct review by certiorari 'without prejudice to filing for federal habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.' 353 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 827, 1 L.Ed.2d 857. Petitioner immediately sought a writ of heabea corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241,¹ in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, claiming that his conviction had been obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that he did not receive a fair trial. That court dismissed the proceeding on the ground that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies. 153 F.Supp. 531. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 251 F.2d 548. We granted certiorari, 356 U.S. 948, 78 S.Ct. 921, 2 L.Ed.2d 842, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits or remand to the District Court for reconsideration. 359 U.S. 394, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900. The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction and decided the claim adversely to petitioner. 271 F.2d 552. We granted certiorari, 361 U.S. 959, 80 S.Ct. 607, 4 L.Ed.2d 542.

As stated in the former opinion, 359 U.S. at pages 396—397, 79 S.Ct. at page 827:

'The constitutional claim arises in this way. Six murders were committed in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana, two in December 1954, and four in March 1955. The crimes, extensively covered by news media in the locality, aroused great excitement ad indignation throughout Vanderburgh County, where Evansville is located, and adjoining Gibson County, a rural county of approximately 30,000 inhabitants. The petitioner was arrested on April 8, 1955. Shortly thereafter, the Prosecutor of Vanderburgh County and Evansville police officials issued press releases which were intensively publicized, stating that the petitioner had confessed to the six murders. The Vanderburgh County Grand Jury soon indicted the petitioner for the murder which resulted in his conviction. This was the murder of Whitney Wesley Kerr allegedly committed in Vanderburgh County on December 23, 1954. Counsel appointed to defend petitioner immediately sought a change of venue from Vanderburgh County, which was granted, but to adjoining Gibson County. Alleging that the widespread and inflammatory publicity had also highly prejudiced the inhabitants of Gibson County against the petitioner, counsel, on October 29, 1955, sought another change of venue, from Gibson County to a county sufficiently removed from the Evansville locality that a fair trial would not be prejudiced. The motion was denied, apparently because the pertinent Indiana statute allows only a single change of venue.'

During the course of the voir dire examination, which lasted some four weeks, petitioner filed two more motions for a change of venue and eight motions for continuances. All were denied.

At the outset we are met with the Indiana statute providing that only one change of venue shall be granted 'from the county' wherein the offense was committed.² Since petitioner had already been afforded one change of venue, and had been denied further changes solely on the basis of the statute, he attacked its constitutionality. The Court of Appeals upheld its validity. However, in the light of State ex rel. Gannon v. Porter Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 637, 159 N.E.2d 713, we do not believe that argument poses a serious problem. There the Indiana Supreme Court held that if it was 'made to appear after attempt has actually been made to secure an impartial jury that such jury could not be obtained in the county of present venue * * * it becomes the duty of the judiciary to provide to every accused a public trial by an impartial jury, even though to do so the court must grant a second change of venue and thus contravenue (the statute) * * *.' 239 Ind at page 642, 159 N.E.2d at page 715. The prosecution attempts to distinguish that case on the ground that the District Attorney there conceded that a fair trial could not be had in La Porte County and that the court, therefore, properly ordered a second change of venue despite the language of the statute. Inasmuch as the statute says nothing of concessions, we do not believe that the Indiana Supreme Court conditions the duty of the judiciary to transfer a case to another county solely upon the representation by the prosecutor regardless of the trial court's own estimate of local conditions that an impartial jury may not be impaneled. As we read Gannon, it stands for the proposition that the necessity for transfer will depend upon the totality of the surrounding facts. Under this construction the statute is not, on its face, subject to attack on due process grounds.

England, from whom the Western World has largely taken its concepts of individual liberty and of the dignity and worth of every man, has bequeathed to us safeguards for their preservation, the most priceless of which is that of trial by jury. This right a § become as much American as it was once the most English. Although this Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand the use of jury trials in a State's criminal procedure, Fay v. People of State of New York, 332 U.S. 261, 67 S.Ct. 1613, 91 L.Ed. 2043; Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288, every State has constitutionally provided trial by jury. See Columbia University Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Index Digest of State Constitutions, 578—579 (1959). In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682; Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942. In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his life. In the language of Lord Coke, a juror must be as 'indifferent as he stands unsworne.' Co.Litt. 155b. His verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial. Cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654. This is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies. It was so written into our law as early as 1807 by Chief Justice Marshall in 1 Burr's Trial 416(1807). ³ 'The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155, 25 L.Ed. 244.

It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Spies v. People of State of Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 8 S.Ct. 22, 31 L.Ed. 80; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021; Reynolds v. United States, supra.

The adoption of such a rule, however, 'cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case, the application of that rule works a deprivation of the prisoner's life or liberty without due process of law.' Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166. As stated in Reynolds, the test is 'whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily * * * raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact * * *.' At page 156 of 98 U.S. 'The affirmative of the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside * * *. If a positive and decided opinion had e en formed, he would have been incompetent even though it had not been expressed.' At page 157 of 98 U.S. As was stated in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507, 73 S.Ct. 397, 446, 97 L.Ed. 469, the 'so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.' It was, therefore, the duty of the Court of Appeals to independently evaluate the voir dire testimony of the impaneled jurors.

The rule was established in Reynolds that '(t)he finding of the trial court upon that issue (the force of a prospective juror's opinion) ought not be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.' 98 U.S. at page 156. In later cases this Court revisited Reynolds, citing it in each instance for the proposition that findings of...