Irvin v. Winn

• Decision Date: 02 December 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-13783
• Parties: ROYALE LAMPTON IRVIN, Petitioner, v. THOMAS WINN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ROYALE LAMPTON IRVIN, Petitioner, v. THOMAS WINN, Respondent.

Case No. 14-13783

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

December 2, 2016

Honorable Linda V. Parker

OPINION & ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, & DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. Introduction

This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Royale Lampton Irvin ("Petitioner") is challenging his convictions of second-degree murder in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws Section 750.317 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense, in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws Section 750.227b, following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of 35 to 70 years imprisonment and five years imprisonment for those convictions in 2011. In his petition, he raises claims concerning the admission of text messages at trial, an upward sentencing departure, and the late appointment of counsel at his preliminary examination. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also is denying a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting death of Derry/Derek Kirkland¹ at his home in Detroit, Michigan, during the early morning hours on January 29, 2011. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the relevant facts as follows:

The evidence at trial showed that defendant went to the home of Karen Thomas ("Tee Tee") at 3:00 a.m. and knocked on the door. When Derek Kirkland, her boyfriend, answered the door, defendant asked whether Tee Tee was home and then shot Kirkland five times through the door. Several witnesses testified that, after the shooting, defendant claimed that he did not "do drivebys," he did "knock knocks." Two other individuals were charged. One of them drove with defendant to Thomas' home and the other obtained the address of the home and information that Thomas, the intended victim, was home at that time. Both of these individuals were allowed to plead to lesser charges in exchange for their testimony. Defendant testified that he went to the home to confront "Tee Tee," who he believed had participated in a rape of his sister two years earlier. Defendantclaimed that he acted in self-defense and that, when he knocked on the door, Kirkland opened the door with a gun in his hands.

People v. Irvin, No. 306188, 2013 WL 6124275, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2013) (unpublished). These factswhich are presumed correct on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009).

Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court erred in admitting text messages sent by Karen Thomas, that the trial court erred in departing above the state sentencing guidelines in imposing his sentence, that he was denied due process because counsel was appointed moments before the start of his preliminary examination, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct and for failing to properly represent him at sentencing. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on those claims and affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. Id. at *1-3. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the text message, upward sentencing departure, and preliminary examination appointment of counsel claims. The court denied leave to appeal in a standard order. People v. Irvin, 846 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 2014).

Petitioner dated his initial federal habeas petition on September 25, 2014. In that petition, he raised claims concerning the admission of text messages at trial, an upward sentencing departure, the late appointment of counsel at his preliminary examination, and the constructive denial/ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court dismissed that petition without prejudice to allow Petitioner to return to the state courts and exhaust his constructive denial/ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.

Petitioner subsequently moved to reopen this case to proceed on an amended petition containing only his three properly-exhausted claims. The Court granted Petitioner's motion and reopened the case on December 2, 2014. Respondent has since filed an answer to the petition, as amended, contending that it should be denied because all three claims lack merit and the final claim is also procedurally defaulted. Petitioner filed a reply to the answer.

III. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") sets forth the standard of review federal courts must use when considering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. AEDPA provides in relevant part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.' " Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

"[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [the] petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.' " Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.' " Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). A habeas court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of a claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.; see also White v. Woodall, -- U.S. --, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Federal judges "are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Woods v. Donald, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not 'an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them."...