Irving v. Agency of Transp., 99-393.
Decision Date | 13 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-393.,99-393. |
Citation | 768 A.2d 1286 |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Parties | Stephen A. IRVING, et al. v. AGENCY OF TRANSPORTATION, Champlain Valley Aviation, Inc., Charles Boyer and Wayne Eels. |
Present AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.
Plaintiff Stephen A. Irving appeals the judgment of the Franklin Superior Court denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial following a jury verdict for defendants. Irving brought suit individually, as the administrator of the estates of Sandra and Andrew Irving and as next friend to Adam Irving against the Vermont Agency of Transportation, Champlain Valley Aviation, Charles Boyer, and Wayne Eels following a mid-air collision in which his wife and son were killed. Irving argues on appeal that liability was proved as a matter of law or, alternatively, the verdict was against the weight of substantial evidence. Furthermore, Irving argues that the trial court erred when it failed to exclude expert testimony from lay witnesses and when it instructed the jury on the standard of care. We affirm.
When reviewing a trial court's refusal to grant a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 169 Vt. 118, 120-21, 730 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1999).
Viewed in this light, the facts are as follows: On June 10, 1995, the Irving family went to the Franklin County Airport to meet Todd Taylor, an individual they knew through their church. Taylor had offered to take the family on a sight-seeing tour in a Cessna 172, a small plane rented by Champlain Valley Aviation, the fixed base operator at the airport. Because of the size of the plane, only two passengers could fly at a time. Sandra and Andrew Irving went first, while Stephen and Adam Irving watched from the ground.
The 172 took off from the runway and, in the course of its climb, collided with a Cessna 150, another small plane, piloted by Charles Boyer. The tail of the 172 was severed from the plane in the collision, causing the aircraft to fall immediately to the ground. All three occupants were killed in the crash. The 150, however, was able to make an emergency landing, and Boyer survived.
Boyer had also rented the 150 from Champlain Valley Aviation. He was a student pilot. The evening before the accident, Boyer had received permission from his instructor, Wayne Eels, to fly solo and had completed his first supervised solo flight. He had returned to the airport by himself the morning of the accident to log more practice hours flying. At the time of the accident, Boyer was attempting to reenter the traffic pattern in order to land. Boyer did not see the 172 until seconds before the planes collided. The 172 was not maneuvering in a way that would indicate that Taylor, the pilot, had seen the 150 either, and the Irvings' expert opined that Taylor never saw the 150 approaching.
On appeal, Irving argues first that the trial court erred when it viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants in its analysis of both the motion for judgment as a matter of law and the motion for a new trial. Relying on federal case law interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), he contends that, when analyzing a motion for a new trial brought under V.R.C.P. 59(a), a trial court should not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, but should instead undertake an independent review.
Although V.R.C.P. 59 is based on Fed. R.Civ.P. 59 in general, Brault v. Flynn, 166 Vt. 585, 586, 690 A.2d 1365, 1366 (1996) (mem.), the text of the two rules differs. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 with V.R.C.P. 59. Furthermore, we have previously addressed the very argument that Irving raises here and have explicitly determined that "[c]ontrary to the federal decisions cited by plaintiff, Vermont law requires a judge, who is asked to grant a new trial, to weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict." Hardy v. Berisha, 144 Vt. 130, 133, 474 A.2d 93, 95 (1984); see also Brueckner, 169 Vt. at 121, 730 A.2d at 1089 ( ). Irving has offered no reason to revisit our decision in Hardy; therefore, we will not do so. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's approach to the evidence.
Turning to the merits of the trial court's decision denying Irving's request for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to V.R.C.P. 50(b) and his request for a new trial pursuant to V.R.C.P. 59(a), we note that although we do not defer to a trial court's decision regarding whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, see Brueckner, 169 Vt. at 122,730 A.2d at 1090; Hardy, 144 Vt. at 133, 474 A.2d at 95, the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, Brueckner, 169 Vt. at 132-33,730 A.2d at 1097. If evidence exists that may fairly and reasonably support the jury's verdict, judgment as a matter of law is improper. Id. at 122, 730 A.2d at 1090. In contrast, while we still view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial, we will reverse that decision only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. at 132-33, 730 A.2d at 1097. We afford the decision of the trial court "`all possible presumptive support, similar to the support the trial court owes to a jury verdict.'" Id. at 133, 730 A.2d at 1097 (quoting Gregory v. Vermont Traveler, Inc., 140 Vt. 119, 121, 435 A.2d 955, 956 (1981)).
We cannot say that the trial court erred by denying Irving's motion for judgment as a matter of law nor, a fortiori, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Irving a new trial. Although the pilots both had a duty to see and avoid one another, Boyer testified that at the time of the...
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