Irving v. Dormire

• Decision Date: 07 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-1591.,07-1591.
• Citation: 519 F.3d 441
• Parties: William, IRVING, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Dave DORMIRE; Campbell, previously named as Cambell, Captain-JCCC; Daniel Kempker, Functional Unit Manager-JCCC; Ed Rupple, Caseworker-JCCC; Nina Branson; Raina Martin, previously named as Baina Morgan, Caseworker-JCCC, Defendants, Warren Cressey, previously named as Crissey, CO1-JCCC; Thomas Brigance, previously named as Birdgance, CO1-JCCC, Defendants/Appellants, Sgt. Blount, JCCC; Lt. King, JCCC, Defendants, Ronetta Hyer, Correctional Officer-JCCC; Leonard Neff, previously named as Neef, Correctional Officer-JCCC; Hudson, Correctional Officer-JCCC, Defendant/s Appellants, Martin; Gregory Patrick; Ms. Ortbal;— Petis; Dittman; Jay Cassady; Gene James; Webster;—Murphy; R. Corser;—Thomas, Defendants, Debra Reed, Defendant/Appellant, Gregory Patrick, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

519 F.3d 441

William, IRVING, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Dave DORMIRE; Campbell, previously named as Cambell, Captain-JCCC; Daniel Kempker, Functional Unit Manager-JCCC; Ed Rupple, Caseworker-JCCC; Nina Branson; Raina Martin, previously named as Baina Morgan, Caseworker-JCCC, Defendants, Warren Cressey, previously named as Crissey, CO1-JCCC; Thomas Brigance, previously named as Birdgance, CO1-JCCC, Defendants/Appellants, Sgt. Blount, JCCC; Lt. King, JCCC, Defendants, Ronetta Hyer, Correctional Officer-JCCC; Leonard Neff, previously named as Neef, Correctional Officer-JCCC; Hudson, Correctional Officer-JCCC, Defendant/s Appellants,

Martin; Gregory Patrick; Ms. Ortbal;— Petis; Dittman; Jay Cassady; Gene James; Webster;—Murphy; R. Corser;—Thomas, Defendants,

Debra Reed, Defendant/Appellant,

Gregory Patrick, Defendant.

No. 07-1591.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 15, 2007.

Filed: March 7, 2008.

Kathleen Robertson, argued, Bart A. Matanic and Emily P. Kalmer, on the brief, Jefferson City, Mo, for appellant.

James W. Erwin, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges, and DOTY,¹ District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

William Irving, an inmate in the Missouri penal system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the Jefferson City Correctional Center, alleging multiple violations of his constitutional rights of due process, access to the courts, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the due process and access to courts claims, but denied the defendants' request for qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim. Correctional officers Thomas Brigance, Warren Cressey Ronetta Hyer, and Leonard Neff remain as defendants, and they appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity on that claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Irving alleges that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of the defendants over several months in 2004-2005. He alleges that these incidents were in retaliation for his bringing an earlier version of this lawsuit and constituted an effort to intimidate him from proceeding further with it. Specifically, Irving alleges that on November 4, 2004, inmate Ephriam Prewitt requested that Hyer and Neff "pop" open the cell doors so that he could assault Irving. In response to that request, Hyer and Neff opened the doors, whereupon Prewitt rushed out of his cell and into Irving's, where he struck Irving in the face, injuring his jaw and nose. Although Irving received medical treatment only once for the injury, he alleges that he was unable to breathe properly for two months. On December 1, Brigance gave inmate Eric Hessler a razor so that Hessler could use it to make a weapon with which to assault (in Hessler's words) "the nigger next door." Irving overheard this exchange and was able to bring it to the attention of Brigance's supervisor, which caused Brigance to retrieve the razor before Hessler could convert it to a weapon for use against Irving. On March 3, 2005, Brigance offered inmate James Spann fifty dollars and cigarettes if Spann would assault Irving, an offer that Spann did not accept. On April 6, Cressey said that he would have Irving killed if Irving did not drop the lawsuit against him. On April 11 and April 17, Brigance threatened to kill Irving or to have him killed. On April 25, Brigance offered to give inmate Brian Vehlewald cash and cigarettes to attack Irving, an offer that Vehlewald did not accept. A month later, Brigance said that he would find someone to "beat [Irving's] ass." In mid-August, Brigance, Cressey, and Hyer promised Irving that they would get a chance to "off" him soon. On August 23, Brigance, Cressey, and Neff told Irving, "sooner or later we will get you," and waved a can of mace threateningly at him either at that time or shortly thereafter. On August 30, Brigance offered to pay inmate Jerome Powell to assault Irvin. Instead, Powell warned Irving of Brigance's offer. In September, Hyer told Irving that she wanted him dead, and Brigance told him that he would get what was coming to him. During the time period encompassing these events, Brigance repeatedly told other inmates that Irving was a snitch in an effort to incite them to assault Irving. In October, the district court entered a preliminary injunction moving Irving out of Housing Unit No. 7 of the Jefferson City Correctional Center.

Irving seeks nominal and punitive damages from Brigance, Cressey, and Hyer for their threats and conduct. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Hyer and Neff for physical and emotional injuries stemming from the Prewitt incident. Irving also seeks an injunction transferring him to a correctional institution at which none of the defendants are employed.

II.

A denial of a state official's assertion of qualified immunity is immediately appealable. Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.2007). We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. We are not concerned with whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, but rather with the legal question whether any clearly established right was violated under the facts alleged by the nonmoving party. Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.2005).

A state official is protected from suit by qualified immunity so long as the official's "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)) (internal quotation omitted). In analyzing whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we ask first whether the alleged facts, when considered in the light most favorable to the injured party, demonstrate that the defendant violated the injured party's rights. Bearden, 475 F.3d at 929 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). If a violation occurred, we then ask whether the constitutional right was clearly established from the perspective of a reasonable official in the defendant's position at the time of the defendant's conduct. Id.

To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements, one objective and one subjective. The first requirement tests whether, viewed objectively, the deprivation of rights was sufficiently serious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The second requirement is subjective and requires that the inmate prove that the prison officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id. Eighth Amendment cases are analyzed in light of the specific claim raised. In excessive force claims, the subjective inquiry is whether the force was used "`in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'" Arnold v. Groose, 109 F.3d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). In prison conditions claims, which include threats to an inmate's health and safety, the subjective inquiry is whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1298.

Irving's allegations satisfy the second, subjective requirement. Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Irving, no legitimate penological purpose could have been served by defendants' conduct, and their actions toward Irving demonstrated a state of mind that was not merely deliberately indifferent, but also sadistic and malicious. Thus, the defendants' subjective intent is sufficiently culpable regardless of what type of Eighth Amendment claim is raised.

Determining what satisfies the sufficiently serious injury requirement is also claim-dependent. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Excessive force claims involve the direct infliction of harm upon inmates. Because the use of force is sometimes required in prison settings, guards are liable only if they are completely unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it maliciously and sadistically. Id. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995. Even with such motivation, not every push or shove violates the Constitution, but any use of force greater than de minimis, or any use of force that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," does. See id. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (internal quotation omitted). Routine discomfort is a part of the penalty that criminal offenders must pay, so only extreme conditions that deprive inmates of a "civilized measure of life's necessities" violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 995. In cases involving a failure to protect an inmate, there must be a "substantial risk of serious harm" to the inmate. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Prison officials are bound by the Eighth Amendment to take "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Id. at 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation omitted).

The allegations in this case do not fit neatly into either category because the defendants' malicious and sadistic schemes to use other prisoners to harm Irving resulted in little physical harm to him. See Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1298. In Arnold, we treated a conspiracy between guards and prisoners to murder a prisoner as a prison conditions case and not an excessive force case because it did not arise from a disciplinary situation, and thus the prison officials were not entitled to the protection afforded by the higher subjective intent requirement. Id. Accordingly, we likewise treat this case as a...