Irving v. John
| Decision Date | 09 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-1002-MMH-MCR |
| Parties | HATTIE IRVING, Plaintiff, v. SAM ST. JOHN, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Suwannee County, et al., Defendants. v. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Count IV by Defendant Sam St. John, in his official capacity (Doc. 15; Motion), filed November 3, 2021. In the Motion, St John requests that the Court dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff Hattie Irving's Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 12; Complaint). Irving timely filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See Plaintiffs Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Sam St John's Motion to Dismiss Count IV (Doc. 24; Response) filed November 24, 2021. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A “plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 () (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]'” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
This case arises from a criminal investigation that occurred in 2018 in Suwannee County, Florida. On March 24, 2018, a store clerk at a Family Dollar Store called 911 and reported an alleged theft to Public Safety Communications Officer R. Black, an employee of Suwannee County. Complaint ¶ 10. According to Irving, the store clerk told Officer Black that the suspect's license plate number was “IAEZ28” and confirmed that the fourth letter was “Z as in Zebra” and “Z as in Zulu.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. However, when Officer Black searched for the tag number IAEZ28, the corresponding vehicle did not match the store clerk's description of the suspect's vehicle. Id. ¶ 12. Irving alleges that, despite knowing that the store clerk reported “IAEZ28,” Officer Black then changed the Z to a C and chose to search for the tag number “IAEC28.” Id. ¶¶ 13-14. The vehicle with the tag number IAEC28 was similar to the vehicle described by the store clerk. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Irving owned the vehicle with the tag number IAEC28. Id. ¶ 22. Irving asserts that Officer Black relayed IAEC28 as the suspect's tag number to the investigating officer, Michael Landis (who is also a defendant in this action). Id. ¶¶ 14, 19. Irving maintains that the store clerk never told Officer Landis that the tag number was IAEC28. Id. ¶ 28. Irving also alleges that Officer Landis never viewed the store's surveillance video of the alleged crime and that the store clerk “did not, in fact, positively identify Plaintiff Irving.” Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. According to Irving, Officer Landis recorded the incorrect tag number on his police report and used the tag number as a basis for probable cause to obtain a warrant for Irving's arrest. Id. ¶ 15. Irving was arrested on the warrant on June 16, 2018, and spent approximately one week in jail. Id. ¶ 33. After a period of discovery in the ensuing criminal case, on January 16, 2019, the State Attorney's Office dropped all of the charges against Irving. Id. ¶ 37.
Based on these and other allegations, Irving initiated this action on August 27, 2021, by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, in and for Suwannee County, Florida. See State Court Docket (Doc. 12), filed October 6, 2021. St. John and Officer Landis removed the case to this Court on October 6, 2021. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). With leave of the Court, Irving filed the currently operative Complaint on October 28, 2021. See generally Complaint. As relevant here, in Count IV of the Complaint, Irving asserts a negligence claim against St. John in his official capacity as Sheriff of Suwannee County[2] for his employees' alleged negligent acts that led to Irving's arrest. See id. ¶¶ 62-73.
In the Motion, St. John argues that Count IV should be dismissed because Irving has not established “the existence of any legal duty owed to” Irving “that was breached by” St. John. Motion at 4. St. John asserts that Irving's claim is barred by the “black letter law holding that there is no duty owed to the public” at large “for enforcement of the laws.” Id. at 6. According to St. John, Irving has not shown that he owed her any special duty. See id. at 6-7. In addition, St. John argues that, even if he did owe a special duty to Irving, he is immune from suit for the discretionary decision to make an arrest. See id. at 7-8. St. John maintains that a false arrest claim is the proper vehicle for addressing Irving's allegations, not a negligence claim. See id. at 8.
In her Response, Irving contends that the errors of St. John's employees in recording the incorrect license plate number and failing to view the store's surveillance video placed Irving into a foreseeable zone of risk. See Response at 9-10. Irving argues that she alleged that Officer Black gave the incorrect tag number to Officer Landis, despite knowing that the store clerk reported the tag number as IAEZ28, not IAEC28. See id. at 10-11. Irving then asserts that, because Officer Black knew of the error, he had a duty to take action to correct his mistake or to otherwise lessen the risk that Irving would be arrested. See id. at 11. According to Irving, even if the officers did not actually know that they were making an error in the license plate number, they still had a duty to exercise reasonable care in recording information and investigating the case because it was foreseeable that someone could be wrongly accused. See id. at 10. Finally, Irving argues that Officer Landis placed her into a foreseeable zone of risk by failing to review “readily available video evidence to determine whether a crime actually occurred.” Id. at 11-12.
Having reviewed the filings and applicable law, the Court finds that Irving has failed to state a negligence claim under Florida law. Although the State of Florida and its subsidiaries such as municipalities are generally immune from tort liability, Florida has waived its immunity “under circumstances in which the state agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1)). Thus, when presented with a negligence suit against a state or its subsidiary, the Court “should first determine whether the circumstances alleged would subject a private person to liability under Florida law.” Id. (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989)). To state a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages.[3] Id. (citing Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)); see also Wynn v. City of Lakeland, 727 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2010).[4] If the plaintiff can meet this burden, then the Court must decide “whether the challenged actions are nonetheless acts which required the exercise of basic governmental discretion, as opposed to implementation of an already established policy.” Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1262. A “governmental agency is immune from tort liability based upon actions that involve its ‘discretionary' functions.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1117 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1266); see also Gelbard v. City of Miami, 845 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1264).
Here Irving has failed to state a negligence claim because she has not satisfied her initial burden to plausibly allege that Officer Black and Officer Landis owed her, specifically, a duty of care. Whether a duty of care exists is a “minimal...
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