Irwin v. Jefferson Cnty. Pers. Bd.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2018
• Docket Number: 1161145
• Citation: 263 So.3d 698
• Parties: Paul A. IRWIN, Jr. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY PERSONNEL BOARD and the City of Trussville
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

263 So.3d 698

Paul A. IRWIN, Jr.

v.JEFFERSON COUNTY PERSONNEL BOARD and the City of Trussville

1161145

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 20, 2018

Scott T. Morro of Morro Law Center, LLC, Gardendale, for appellant.

Laura C. Nettles of Lloyd, Gray, Whitehead & Monroe, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee Jefferson County Personnel Board.

Richard A. Bearden of Massey, Stotser & Nichols, PC, Birmingham, for appellee City of Trussville.

MAIN, Justice.

Paul A. Irwin, Jr., appeals from a final judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his claim for injunctive relief against the Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the Board") and the City of Trussville ("Trussville"), a municipality located in Jefferson County. We dismiss the appeal.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case arises from Trussville's desire to hire a police chief following the retirement of its former police chief. The position of police chief is a classified civil-service position. Under the provisions of § 45–37–121 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County)("the enabling act"), the Board is vested with the authority to regulate the appointment procedure of classified civil-service positions in Jefferson County. In accordance with rules established by the Board, Trussville, on January 3, 2017, submitted a request to the Board to fill the position of "Police Chief II." In response, on January 3, 2017, the Board provided Trussville with a certified list of 10 eligible candidates.

The certified list of candidates—referred to in the rules of the Board as the "Certificate of Eligibles"—provided to Trussville is generated from an eligibility list. That eligibility list for the position of police chief had been created by the Board in 2014 and consisted of qualified applicants ranked based on the results of a competitive assessment examination. Irwin's name appeared on the certified list.

Trussville interviewed Irwin and two other candidates from the certified list. Trussville did not hire Irwin or any other candidate from the certified list supplied by the Board in January 2017. Instead, Trussville returned the list to the Board and requested that the Board administer a new test for the position of Police Chief II. On January 23, 2017, the Board "expired" the eligibility list. On January 27, 2017, the Board also approved Trussville's request to hire a provisional police chief until such time as a new assessment examination could be administered and a new eligibility list generated.

On March 1, 2017, Irwin sued the Board and Trussville, contending that, once the Board issued to Trussville a certified list of eligible candidates for the position of police chief, Trussville was required to hire a candidate from that list and had no discretion to leave the position unfilled. The complaint sought only injunctive relief. Specifically, it requested an order:

"1. Halting the examination for Chief of Police by the [Board].

"2. Restraining any appointments unless it is the name of a candidate that appeared on the [January 2017] list of eligible police chief candidates.

"3. Restraining the [Board and Trussville] from any other actions in this case that are in violation of the Enabling Act.

"4. Directing the City of Trussville to make an appointment pursuant to the Enabling Act."

Irwin's complaint was accompanied by a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). On March 9, 2017, Irwin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 22, 2017, the trial court denied Irwin's motion for a TRO and set the motion for a preliminary injunction for an evidentiary hearing.

Before the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, Irwin accepted the job of police chief with the City of Pell City. Upon notice of Irwin's acceptance of a police-chief position with another municipality, the trial court invited a written response from Irwin as to whether his action against the Board and Trussville had been rendered moot by his accepting a police-chief position with another municipality. Irwin responded that the action had not been rendered moot because, he said, he remained a qualified candidate for the Trussville police-chief job and that, notwithstanding his acceptance of the Pell City police-chief job, he still wanted to be the police chief for Trussville. On April 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order in which it concluded that Irwin's action was not moot but that "the relief he would hereafter pursue would be in the nature of money damages." The trial court denied Irwin's motion for a preliminary injunction and continued the evidentiary hearing.

On April 20, 2017, Irwin moved the trial court to reconsider its order denying the preliminary injunction. In that motion, Irwin explained that his desire to be the Trussville police chief was born of his family's strong ties to the Trussville community and that money damages would not adequately compensate him for the loss of the opportunity to serve as Trussville's police chief. The trial court did not immediately rule on Irwin's motion to reconsider.

On May 22, 2017, Trussville filed a motion to dismiss Irwin's action or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. On May 31, 2017, the Board also filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment.

On June 2, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on Irwin's motion to reconsider the denial of his preliminary-injunction motion and the motions to dismiss filed by the Board and Trussville.

On July 10, 2017, Irwin filed a notice in the trial court indicating that the Board had administered a new police-chief examination; that he had taken the new examination; and that he had achieved the highest possible score. The Board responded by stating that "[t]he appearance of [Irwin]'s name on any Certified List requested by the City of Trussville once the Eligibility List is completed does not create an obligation on the part of the City of Trussville to hire [Irwin]."

On August 9, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the Board's and Trussville's motions to dismiss. The order explained:

"Pending are motions to dismiss filed by defendants, the [Board] and [Trussville]. [Irwin] opposes these motions. Because the court regards the pending motions as motions to dismiss, the allegations raised in [Irwin's] filings are viewed as establishing the material facts at issue. The question is whether, based on the allegations made by [Irwin], the [Board and Trussville] are entitled to the dismissal of this action as a matter of law.

"In his complaint and motion for temporary restraining order, [Irwin] alleges that the [Board] provided to [Trussville] a certified list of eligible police chief candidates on January 3, 2017, but [Trussville] elected not to make an appointment from that list, causing the list to expire by the end of January. In his motion for preliminary injunction, [Irwin] further alleges that he was included on that list and was interviewed for the Trussville vacancy. The gravamen of [Irwin's] action is that by failing to make an appointment from the January eligibles list, the City of Trussville has violated his legal rights.

"Rule 11.2(b) of The Rules and Regulations of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, provides an appointing authority ‘may make an appointment from the Certificate of Eligibles...’ (Emphasis added). Under Rule 11.2(c), once a Certificate of Eligibles is issued, an Appointing Authority has ten business days to either make an appointment or give written notification that the request has been withdrawn. Rule 11.2(c) goes on to provide, however, that ‘[i]f no appointment is made within thirty (30) days of the date of the Certificate of Eligibles, then the Certificate of Eligibles shall expire unless extended upon written request of the Appointing Authority, approved by the Director.’ [The Board and Trussville] argue that this is what happened here. [Irwin] does not dispute that the events of January were in keeping with the [Board]'s Rules and Regulations.

"[Irwin] instead argues that Rule 11.2 violates the Enabling Act of the [Board]. Section 18 of the Enabling Act provides among other things the following:

" ‘Whenever a vacancy in an existing position is to be filled by appointment, the appointing authority shall submit to the director a statement of the title of the position, and if requested by the director to do so, the duties of the position, and desired qualifications of the person to be appointed and a request that the Director certify the Appointing Authority the names of persons eligible for appointment to the position. The Director shall thereupon certify to the Appointing Authority the ranking eligibles, correlating to the 10 highest test scores from the appropriate register .... Within 10 days after the names are certified the Appointing Authority shall appoint one of those whose names are certified to each vacancy which he or she is to fill.’

"[§ 45–37–121.15, Ala. Code 1975 ] (Emphasis added.) Under Rule 11.2, an Appointing Authority ‘may’ make an appointment from the list of eligibles provided to it, while under the Enabling Act, an appointing authority ‘shall’—and [Irwin] argues, must—make such a selection.

"However, other language in Section 18 suggests that an appointing authority does not bear such an unconditional obligation. Specifically, the section provides the consequences if an appointing authority fails to make a selection:

" ‘In the event an Appointing Authority fails or refuses to fill a vacancy in an existing position from a certified list of eligibles the Director may refuse to certify the payroll, voucher or account of any ineligible person found to be performing the duties of the position.’

"If an appointing authority is unconditionally obligated to select from a certified list, there is no reason to have such language.

"The court finally notes the following language of Section 18, which expressly provides to the Personnel Board the authority to proscribe rules governing this process:

" ‘The Personnel

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