Irwin v. Justice of Mun. Court of Brighton Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1937
• Citation: 298 Mass. 158,10 N.E.2d 92
• Parties: IRWIN v. JUSTICE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF BRIGHTON DIST.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

298 Mass. 158

10 N.E.2d 92

IRWIN

v.JUSTICE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF BRIGHTON DIST.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 17, 1937.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Certiorari proceeding by James J. Irwin against the Justice of the Municipal Court of the Brighton District, in the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk. Order by Pierce, J., sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the petition, and petitioner brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

James J. Irwin, of Everett, for petitioner.

J. J. Ronan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

QUA, Justice.

This petition for a writ of certiorari sets forth a copy of a complaint subscribed and sworn to by the petitioner before the respondent, under G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 55, § 39, alleging that many corrupt practices were committed in violation of law in connection with a special primary held on February 25, 1936, and a special election held on March 10, 1936, to fill a vacancy in the office of representative to the General Court, and praying that the court hold an inquest in accordance with the statute. The petition further avers that the respondentdenied the prayer of the complaint upon certain erroneous rulings of law. A single justice of this court has sustained the respondent's demurrer to the petition and dismissed the petition.

The demurrer was a proper pleading. Webster v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (Mass.) 4 N.E.(2d) 302.

For the purposes of this decision it is unnecessary to recite in further detail the charges of the original complaint or the allegations of the petition for certiorari specifying the rulings of law which are claimed to have been erroneous. We think it fairly appears from the petition itself that the alleged errors are all based upon statements contained in a letter sent to the petitioner under date of May 12, 1936, by the clerk of the court of which the respondent is judge. A copy of this letter is annexed to the petition. In it the clerk states that he is ‘directed by the Court to say that the complaint for the most part has to do with the expenditures of money made by the Campaign Committee and that inasmuch as the law places no limitation upon the amount of money to be expended by the said Committee that portion of your complaint appears to be without foundation.’ The letter goes on to say that ‘The allegation set forth in the remainder of the complaint is so general and vague and unsupported by statements of any witnesses whatsoever that it would appear to be the Court's duty to decide not to hold an inquest in the matter.’ It is further stated that if certain violations of law have occurred, the remedy is by criminal complaint.

G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 55, § 39, under which the original complaint was filed, permits ‘any person’ to institute before a district court a complaint alleging reasonable ground to believe that the election laws have been violated and provides that ‘such court or justice may at once hold an inquest to inquire into such alleged violation of law.’ It seems plain that this statute was intended to give to the judges of the district courts power to hold election inquests when the public interests...