Isaac v. Hill

• Decision Date: 02 December 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 13-cv-03007-JD
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: MICHAEL ISAAC, Petitioner, v. RICK HILL, et al., Respondent.

MICHAEL ISAAC, Petitioner, v. RICK HILL, et al., Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-03007-JD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 2, 2014

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND RECLASSIYING CASE

Re: Dkt. No. 20

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits with the Court. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2011, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, petitioner entered a no contest plea in two Sonoma County cases. People v. Isaac, No. A132378, 2012 WL 3055420, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 27, 2012). Petitioner was sentenced to ten years and eight months in state prison. Id. at 2. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. Id. at 4. Petitions to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court were denied. Resp. Exs. 5-9.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonableapplication of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner's claims, the Court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard of reviewunder AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court should conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) counsel was ineffective for refusing to file a motion to withdraw the plea and for failing to obtain a certificate of probable cause; and (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to substitute counsel at a Marsden hearing.²

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "Areasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. at 686.

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal set forth the general background regarding the plea:

After the case had been set for trial many times, on March 17, 2011, in a negotiated plea agreement defendant entered no contest pleas in both cases: in case number SCR-552115, to burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and a firearm use enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.5), with a sentencing range of a minimum of five to a maximum exposure of 16 years in state prison; in case number SCR-552981, to resisting an executive officer by threat, force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69), with a specified consecutive term of eight months. FN2 The pleas specified that probation "will be denied."

FN2. Additional charges in case number SCR-552115 were dismissed.

On May 4, 2011, defendant moved pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), to relieve his appointed counsel and pursue withdrawal of his no contest plea. At a closed hearing defendant asserted that counsel refused to confer with him, failed to disclose evidence to him, and "misled" him as to his potential state prison term and the immigration consequences of the plea. When questioned, counsel recounted for the trial court his preparation for trial, his many conferences with defendant, the evidence he presented to defendant, his discussions of the plea offer and sentencing range, specifically his admonishment to defendant that "probation was going to be precluded" by the plea, and his explanation to defendant "that he would, in fact be deported" if he was sentenced to state prison. Counsel also stated that he was "ready, willing and able to go to trial" in the case, and had not encouraged defendant to accept the plea offer, but felt the offer was in defendant's best interests.

At a continued Marsden hearing two days later, defendant indicated that he was seeking to retain private counsel, so the hearing was further continued. By May 16, 2011, defendant advised the court that he did not hire private counsel, and wanted to proceed with the Marsden motion to appoint substitute counsel. Defendant reiterated his complaints with his appointed attorney, particularly the failure of counsel to assist with withdrawal of his plea. He also indicated that if counsel refused to move to withdraw his plea, he wanted to "go ahead and file the motion" himself. The court advised defendant that if his Marsden motion was denied, he could seek to represent himself. Counsel responded that he advised defendant "there was no legal basis to withdraw the plea," and "it wouldn't be in his best interest" to do so. At the conclusion of the hearing the court denied the Marsden motion.

Defendant did not thereafter bring a motion to represent himself or a motion to vacate the plea. The sentencing hearing was conducted on May 26, 2011. The trial court denied probation and imposed anaggregate state prison term on defendant of 10 years and 8 months, computed as follows: the aggravated term for burglary of six years; a consecutive middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement; and, a consecutive middle term of eight months for the offense of resisting an executive officer by threat, force or violence.

Isaac, 2012 WL 3055420, at *1-2.

This claim was denied without a reasoned opinion by the state courts, therefore this Court has conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. Petitioner argues...