Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales
| Decision Date | 28 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-18-Civ-4.,74-18-Civ-4. |
| Citation | 438 F. Supp. 1 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Henry H. ISAACSON, Executor of the Estate of Andrea Nickels Neal and James B. Neal, Jr., and Anne P. Wrenn Bryan, Administratrix of the Estate of Kathleen Anne Wrenn, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U. S. A., INC., a corporation, and Toyota Motor Sales Company, Ltd., a corporation, Defendants, Toyota Motor Company, Ltd., a corporation, Additional Defendant. |
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Wendal D. Jackson, of Slaughter, Jackson & Pectol, Bristol, Tenn., Donald G. Sparrow, of Stern, Rendleman, Isaacson & Klepfer, Greensboro, N. C., for plaintiff Henry H. Isaacson.
Emerson T. Sanders, James C. Spencer, Jr., of Sanders, Holt, Spencer & Longest, Burlington, N. C., for plaintiff Anne P. Wrenn Bryan.
Daniel W. Donahue, Joseph E. Elrod, III, of Henson, Donahue & Elrod, Greensboro, N. C., for defendants.
On Saturday, April 1, 1972, at approximately 6:45 P.M., James B. Neal was operating a 1971 Toyota Corolla automobile in a northerly direction on the causeway leading from Atlantic Beach to Morehead City in Carteret County, North Carolina. The other passengers in the automobile were Andrea Nickels Neal, Duncan Stephenson, and Kathleen Anne Wrenn, the owner of the automobile. While the Toyota was stopped for an open drawbridge, it was struck in the rear by a Ford Mustang automobile being operated by Larry Albert Holland and burst into flames. The driver and passengers of the Toyota suffered extreme burns resulting in their deaths.
The plaintiffs, as representatives of three estates, have filed this diversity action seeking to recover for the alleged wrongful death of the decedents.
There are three corporate defendants in this action. Toyota Motor Company, Ltd. manufactures all Toyota automobiles sold in the United States. Toyota Motor Sales Company, Ltd., is the exporter of Toyota automobiles from Japan to the United States. These two defendants are corporations organized and doing business under the laws of a jurisdiction other than the state of North Carolina and their principal place of business in Japan. The third defendant, Toyota Motor Sales, U. S. A., Inc., imports and distributes Toyota automobiles in the United States. It is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of a jurisdiction other than the state of North Carolina having its principal place of business in the state of California.
In the complaint, it is alleged that the Toyota automobile involved in this suit was manufactured, exported to the United States, and distributed by the defendants and was eventually sold to Kathleen Anne Wrenn by a North Carolina dealership; that the defendants negligently breached a duty to design and manufacture a fuel system in that automobile which would not unreasonably enhance the danger to its occupants in the event of a rear-end collision; that the sale of such an automobile was in violation of the defendants warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; and that the defects in the automobile directly and proximately caused the death of Andrea Nickels Neal, James B. Neal, Jr., and Kathleen Anne Wrenn.
Although numerous motions are presently pending before the Court in this action, only one will be considered in this Opinion.
Based upon question of Manufacturer's Duty On September 3, 1974, the defendants, Toyota Motor Sales, Ltd., and Toyota Motor Sales, U. S. A., Inc., moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the motion, the defendants point to the answer to defendants' interrogatory number one in which the plaintiffs admit there was no defect in the Toyota automobile which caused or contributed to the initial collision between the Toyota automobile and the Ford Mustang automobile. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that as a result of the collision, the filler pipe and other appliances attached to gasoline tank became detached and the gasoline tank ruptured with gasoline and gasoline fumes escaping in the passenger area of the automobile. The defendants, therefore, argued that even if the Toyota automobile was defective in the manner alleged, as matter of law, the plaintiffs cannot recover damages against the defendants because under North Carolina law, a manufacturer is liable for defects in its products which cause injuries arising out of the intended use for which the product is manufactured, but it is not liable for injuries arising from defects which do not cause or contribute to the cause of an accident.
The defendants' motion raises an issue which is largely unsettled in many jurisdictions. The question is essentially whether automobile manufacturers can be held liable for defects in design and manufacture which do not cause highway collisions but merely enhance the damages resulting from the collision. Two leading cases from other jurisdictions illustrate the split of authority on the duty of manufacturers to prevent or minimize the so-called "second collision" injuries.
In Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir., 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 L.Ed.2d 70 (1967), the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability. The court found that an intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects despite the fact that such collisions do occur frequently. The manufacturer was held not to be under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof.
In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir., 1968), the court reached a different result. It recognized that there is no duty on the manufacturer to design an accident-proof vehicle, but held that the manufacturer has the duty of designing a vehicle which will reasonably protect its occupants from enhanced injuries in the event of a collision.
Since this is a diversity action, the question must be resolved by reference to the applicable state law. The parties agree that the plaintiffs' claim for relief based upon negligence is governed by the law of North Carolina. It is also conceded that the North Carolina appellate courts have never directly ruled on the question of whether a manufacturer must with reasonable care design a vehicle to minimize crash injuries. This being the situation, the Court is "faced with the extremely difficult problem of forecasting" how the North Carolina Supreme Court would resolve the issue if presented with it. Alexander v. Seaboard Airline R. R., No. 71-1915 (4th Cir., April 25, 1972). It is not the role of this federal district court to fashion the rule which it considers best. McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir., 1973); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir., 1965); Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir., 1963).
The plaintiffs do however contend that certain implied warranties were extended by the defendants and that the interpretation and application of these implied warranties should be under the laws of the state of California. The plaintiffs have noted several North Carolina cases in support of their contention that the North Carolina courts would apply California law to the warranty issues in this case. The first, Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir., 1966), involved the manufacture and sale of a bulldozer. The machine was manufactured in Ohio and delivered in Ohio to the manufacturer's dealer, from whom it was lease-purchased by the plaintiff's employer, a construction concern. The accident occurred in South Carolina and the legal action was brought in the North Carolina courts. In holding that North Carolina would apply Ohio law to the warranty phase of the case, the Fourth Circuit relied upon another case cited by the plaintiffs in the instant action.
In Price v. Goodman, 226 N.C. 223, 37 S.E.2d 592 (1946), the defendant purchased construction forms from the plaintiff, a West Virginia citizen. The defendant dealt directly with the plaintiff and sent his own trucks to West Virginia to receive the forms. In an action to recover the agreed purchase price, the North Carolina Court held that the case, in its substantive features, was controlled by West Virginia law because the sale was consummated in West Virginia and delivery was had there.
These cases appear, however, to be factually distinguishable and are actually authority for applying the law of North Carolina rather than the law of California. The sales in the two cases were consummated in Ohio and West Virginia respectively and delivery to the ultimate consumer was made in those states. In both cases, the courts held that the applicable law was that of the state where the merchandise was sold.
In the present action, the Toyota automobile was manufactured in Japan, shipped to the United States, distributed to an authorized dealer in North Carolina, and then sold to Kathleen Anne Wrenn. The sale of the automobile was completed only when it was delivered to the ultimate consumer in North Carolina by a North Carolina merchant. All warranties extended by the defendants were an integral part of the sales contract which was executed and performed in the state of North Carolina. Accordingly, the interpretation and application of the implied warranties, as well as the plaintiffs' negligence claims, must be under the laws of North Carolina. See also Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir., 1969).
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has never directly addressed the "crashworthiness" issue, two federal courts in the state have considered the issue. In Bulliner v. General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C.1971), the plaintiff sought to...
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