Isaiah v. City of Pine Lawn
| Decision Date | 02 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12CV230 HEA,4:12CV230 HEA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | MILTON ISAIAH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PINE LAWN, et al., Defendants |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 64]. Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition to the motion. [Doc. No. 66]. Defendants have filed a Reply. [Doc. No. 67]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Plaintiffs, Milton Isaiah and Joseph Goforth, are former City of Pine Lawn police officers who allege that they were wrongfully discharged for refusing to follow certain orders and directives which were improper, illegal and, in some instances, unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges violations of both their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts I), and their substantive due process rights (Count II).2 Named as Defendants are: the City of Pine Lawn, amunicipal corporation located in St. Louis County, Missouri; Sylvester Caldwell, the Mayor of Pine Lawn; and Ricky Collins, the Chief of Police of Pine Lawn.
On February 14, 2011, the Board of Aldermen of Pine Lawn, in separate votes, terminated Plaintiffs. The votes were taken upon the joint request of Defendants Caldwell and Collins. Plaintiffs assert that they were discharged from their tenured positions, without receiving hearings required under Pine Lawn municipal law. Further, Plaintiffs argue that they were entitled to, but did not receive, procedural due process guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution—namely, notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to respond. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they were terminated to "cover up the illegal or improper actions of the Police Department and City," and contend that their discharge for refusing to violate the constitution was outrageous and shocks the conscience. Plaintiffs request damages and injunctive relief reinstating them in their former positions.
A defendant may file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, a plaintiff must plead facts from which the court can draw a "reasonable inference" of liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" but must contain more than mere "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements" or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. An "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While legal conclusions canprovide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations," id. at 679, which "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court can "choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Turning to any "well-pleaded factual allegations," the court should "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. The court may only consider the initial pleadings. Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 2011).
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs were not entitled to procedural due process before their discharge and cannot state a substantive due process claim because Plaintiffs did not have a protected life, liberty, or property interest in their positions as police officers with the City of Pine Lawn. The Court agrees.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits governments from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "To establish a constitutionally protected deprivation of property, [Plaintiffs] must show they each held a 'property right in continued employment.'" Crews v. Monarch Fire Prot. Dist., 771 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Floyd-Gimon v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 716 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2013)). The Court looks to Missouri state law to determine whether Plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected property interest in their positions as police officers with the City of Pine Lawn. Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs must "show by reference to a specific source, such as a contract or statute, that they had a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment." Armer v. City ofSalem, 861 F.2d 514, 515 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Under section 79.240 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the Mayor of a fourth-class city "may, with the consent of a majority of all the members elected to the board of aldermen, remove from office any appointive officer of the city at will . . . ." R.S.Mo. § 79.240 (emphasis added).3 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the City of Pine Lawn was classified as a fourth-class city in 2011, when Plaintiffs were terminated.4 See Missouri Roster 2011-2012 - A Directory of State, District and County Officials, at 172, available at http://www.sos.mo.gov/MOroster/2011-2012_Missouri_Roster.pdf (last visited January 29, 2015); see also id. at 158 ( ); R.S.Mo. § 72.070. Further, "Missouri courts have consistently treated fourth-class city police officers as 'appointive officers' within the meaning of § 79.240." Armer, 861 F.2d at 515 (citing Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); Pumphrey v. City of Lutesville, 707 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. Ciaramitaro v. City of Charlack, 679 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)).
Accordingly, because Pine Lawn is a fourth-class city and Plaintiffs were appointive officers, Plaintiffs were at-will employees under Missouri law who could be terminated for "no reason or any reason," and thus did not have a property interest in their continued employment implicating procedural due process requirements. See id; State ex rel. Lupo v. City of Wentzville, 886 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ( ) (citing Rapp v. City of Northwoods, 769 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Johnson v. City of Buckner, 610 S.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Cooper v. City of Creve Coeur, 556 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Karzin v. Collett, 562 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).5 The Eighth Circuit, following Missouri case law, has roundly rejected Plaintiffs' argument that, because local Pine Lawn municipal law allegedly made them tenured employees who could not be discharged without a hearing, they were entitled to procedural due process protections:
[A]ppellants argue that their employment status is not governed by the "appointive officer" provision of § 79.240 because they are not appointive officers within the meaning of that statute. They claim that under Salem city ordinances police officers are "permanent employees" removable only for cause after notice and a hearing. Even assuming that Salem ordinances attempt to give police officers a permanent employee status, we reject this argument because § 79.240 controls over any city ordinance to the contrary which purports to change fourth-class city appointive officers' status from that of at-will. Pumphrey, 707 S.W.2d at 477. Salem ordinances cannot override § 79.240 by attempting to classify police officers as something other than "appointive officers" in order to place them beyond the reach of § 79.240, especially where the Missouri courts have established that fourth-class city police officers are governed by the "appointive officer" provision of § 79.240.
Armer, 861 F.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that "the Eighth Circuit's rationale in Armer is inconsistent with the language of the statute," because "R.S.Mo. § 79.240 provides that '[t]he board of aldermen may pass ordinances regulating the manner of impeachment and removals.'" [Doc. No. 66 at 4]. Plaintiffs assert [Id.].
However, as noted, the Eighth Circuit in Armer was following Missouri case law, and the Missouri courts have addressed this issue. In 1976, when the Missouri Court of Appeals decided Russell, § 79.240 contained the same provision upon which Plaintiffs now rely. The plaintiff in Russell argued that a local municipal ordinance prevented his summary removal because it was passed by the Board of Aldermen pursuant to "the power granted to [the Board] by the last sentence of § 79.240[,] [which] allows the Board to pass ordinances to regulate the manner of impeachments and removals." 544 S.W.2d at 52. The Russell court rejected this argument, explaining:
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