Isajewicz v. Bucks County Dept. of Communications

• Decision Date: 25 February 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-5580.
• Citation: 851 F. Supp. 161
• Parties: Jo Anne ISAJEWICZ, Plaintiff, v. BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

851 F. Supp. 161

Jo Anne ISAJEWICZ, Plaintiff, v. BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 92-5580.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

February 25, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT F. KELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Jo Anne Isajewicz, brought this action against Defendants, the Bucks County Department of Communications and its Director, Martin Ficke ("Bucks County Defendants"); Peter Kostmayer, former member of the United States House of Representatives for the Eighth Congressional District of Pennsylvania¹; and Carmen Raddi, former Township Manager for Bensalem Township. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated or conspired to terminate her employment at the Bucks County Department of Communications in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3) because she is a member of the Republican Party.²

Before the Court are Defendant Kostmayer's Motion for Summary Judgment, Bucks County Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Raddi's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, all motions are granted.

I. FACTS

While working on December 9, 1990, Plaintiff received a call from a Bucks County resident, Scott Porter, who reported that he found a lost dog and requested the police to pick it up from his house. A few moments later, Mr. Porter called back regarding the lost dog. Finding that the dispatcher was unhelpful to Mr. Porter, Mrs. Porter and her six year old daughter sent letters to Congressman Kostmayer, expressing dissatisfaction with the handling of the phone call and stating that the dispatcher who handled the call was "very rude." Letter of Ms. Porter to Kostmayer (emphasis in original).

On December 14, 1990 a letter was sent from Kostmayer's office to Carmen Raddi, who was believed to be the Bensalem Township Manager. Kostmayer enclosed copies of the Porters' letters and asked Raddi to "look into the matter." By letter dated January 11, 1991, Francis Friel, Director of the Bensalem Police Department, informed Kostmayer's office that the dispatcher was under the control of Bucks County and not Bensalem Township. Therefore, Director Friel forwarded the information to the proper Bucks County agency.

Plaintiff claims that shortly thereafter, she was charged with violating a department regulation that requires all calls to be processed in a polite manner. This was Plaintiff's third charge of violating department policy since August, 1990. Because this was Plaintiff's third violation within one year, she was terminated.

Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning her termination pursuant to her union's agreement with Bucks County. Plaintiff's grievance was submitted to binding arbitration and heard on July 23, 1991. By opinion dated July 30, 1991, the decision to dismiss Plaintiff was upheld. Plaintiff then filed the instant suit.

II. STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but rather that party must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Id. If the court, in viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (1986); Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.1987).

III. CONGRESSMAN KOSTMAYER'S MOTION

The basis for Plaintiff's claim against Kostmayer is that, he, "acting as a private citizen but using his Congressional letterhead to add `clout'" wrote a letter to Defendant Raddi asking him to "look into the matter." Complaint at ¶ 20. The Complaint goes on to state:

21. Plaintiff believes, and therefore alleges, that this letter was produced for public consumption and was deliberately left brief and vague to conceal the formation of the illegal conspiracy which followed. Plaintiff believes, and therefore alleges, that Congressman Kostemayer sic, personally or through agency, initiated one or more communications with Carmen Raddi or his agents to select a Republican employee of the county to serve as a `sacrificial lamb' to appease a Democratic constituent and for other political gain. Plaintiff believes, and therefore alleges, that all Democratic employees and patronage appointees were exempted from consideration as the appropriate aforementioned `scapegoat' by virtue of their value to the Democratic party.

22. Plaintiff believes, and therefore alleges, that Carmen Raddi, personally or by agency, acted upon this conspiracy with Congressman Kostemayer sic by joining one or more additional persons into the conspiracy, including Defendant Martin Ficke, whose participation was necessary to select the scapegoat Republican and authorize said person's termination from employment.

Complaint at ¶¶ 21-22.

In order to show a conspiracy, Plaintiff must establish an agreement or meeting of the minds among the conspirators. Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817, 110 S.Ct. 69, 107 L.Ed.2d 36 (1989). Kostmayer contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence of an agreement to terminate Plaintiff.

As to the letter sent to Raddi, Kostmayer contends that it is nothing more than a form letter that was generated by his computer system and not a part of any conspiracy. Kostmayer's district office manager, Judith Braunston, presented an affidavit stating that she works with the constituent case tracking software program, MailAide, which allows Kostmayer's office to easily track, respond and report on constituent casework.³ According to Braunston, she received the letters from the Porters and input all relevant information into the system. The computer program then generated a form letter to the proper agency, which in this instance was Bensalem Township, along with a summary report of the case, which is called a buckslip.

Kostmayer also presented two buckslips pertaining to the Porter's case. The first buckslip shows that the case was opened on December 14, 1990, which is the date of Kostmayer's letter to Raddi. The second buckslip shows that a response was received on January 11, 1990, which is the date that Kostmayer's office received the letter from Friel, and the case was marked as closed. Furthermore, Kostmayer presented a letter dated August 15, 1989 that was sent to another constituent and is identical in its content to the letter that was sent to Raddi.

Moreover, Kostmayer's letter dated December 14, 1990 was not even sent to the appropriate person or agency. The letter was addressed to Carmen Raddi, Bensalem Township Manager. However, Raddi was not even the Bensalem Township Manager at the time the letter was sent. Raddi has presented an affidavit in support of his own motion stating that he had left the position of Bensalem Township Manager in December, 1989, almost one year prior to the events in this case. Furthermore, the letter from Director Friel to Kostmayer's office stated that the Bucks County dispatcher was not even a member of his agency, but rather she worked for the Bucks County Department of Communications.

Kostmayer further contends that there could not be an agreement to terminate Plaintiff because he was completely unaware of this matter until the Complaint was filed in federal court in September, 1992. Braunston stated that routine constituent matters such as this are handled by the staff without Kostmayer's knowledge. She further stated that she did not inform anyone about the Porters' case until September of 1992, when she was served with the Complaint. At that point, Braunston contacted her supervisor, John Seager⁴, in Washington and informed him that a complaint was served concerning a constituent matter. Seager then informed Kostmayer about the complaint. This was the first that Seager or Kostmayer had learned about the Complaint.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of her claims against Kostmayer.⁵ Plaintiff's response is that the Court's previous Order denying Kostmayer's motion to dismiss is res judicata on the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.⁶ Plaintiff is mistaken. The standard that the Court must apply in a motion for summary judgment is different than that which is applied in a motion to dismiss. The motion for summary judgment requires Plaintiff to present evidence that there does exist a genuine issue of material fact, and Plaintiff may not rely solely on the pleadings. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.1987). However, in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not present any evidence, but may rely exclusively on her pleadings.

The only evidence before the Court is that the letter sent to Raddi was a computer generated form letter, Kostmayer knew nothing about the Porters' complaint and that there were no communication between Defendants. Plaintiff's conclusory statements in her Complaint that she was terminated because of her political affiliation are insufficient as a matter of law to support her claim. Liotta v. Springdale, 985 F.2d 119 (3d Cir.1993). She is required to present evidence in support of her claim, and this she has not done. Therefore, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of Kostmayer.

Kostmayer further argues that he is entitled to official immunity....